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Margaret Gilbert

University of California, Irvine
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    97
    • Most Recent
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  •  Events
    5
  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • University of California, Irvine
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1978
Irvine, California, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action
Meta-Ethics
Philosophy of Law
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Social Science
  • All publications (97)
  •  71
    On Anthropological Knowledge (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3): 146-147. 1990.
  •  112
    Me, you, and us: Distinguishing “egoism,” “altruism,” and “groupism”
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4): 621-622. 1994.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  450
    Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?
    Journal of Philosophy 90 (12): 627-649. 1993.
    This paper challenges the common assumption that an agreement is an exchange of promises. Proposing that the performance obligations of some typical agreements are simultaneous, interdependent, and unconditional, it argues that no promise-exchange has this structure of obligations. In addition to offering general considerations in support of this claim, it examines various types of promise-exchange, showing that none satisfy the criteria noted. Two forms of conditional promise are distinguished …Read more
    This paper challenges the common assumption that an agreement is an exchange of promises. Proposing that the performance obligations of some typical agreements are simultaneous, interdependent, and unconditional, it argues that no promise-exchange has this structure of obligations. In addition to offering general considerations in support of this claim, it examines various types of promise-exchange, showing that none satisfy the criteria noted. Two forms of conditional promise are distinguished and both forms are discussed. A positive account of agreements as joint decisions founded in a joint commitment is sketched. It is argued that the example agreements represent especially clearly the normative structure of social union.
    Promises
  •  101
    Further Reflections on the Social World
    ProtoSociology 35 257-284. 2018.
    This discussion responds to a collection of papers that relate in one way or another to the author’s work in the philosophy of social phenomena. It focuses on those passages that deal most directly with that work. After making some general points that respond to remarks in several of the papers, it turns to the individual papers. The subjects discussed include coordination, conversation, collective beliefs and emotions, joint commitment, obligations and rights, patriotism, promises, the pronoun …Read more
    This discussion responds to a collection of papers that relate in one way or another to the author’s work in the philosophy of social phenomena. It focuses on those passages that deal most directly with that work. After making some general points that respond to remarks in several of the papers, it turns to the individual papers. The subjects discussed include coordination, conversation, collective beliefs and emotions, joint commitment, obligations and rights, patriotism, promises, the pronoun “we”, and what it is to tell someone something.
    Approaches to Social Ontology, Misc
  •  115
    Folk psychology takes sociality seriously
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (4): 707-708. 1989.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Psychology
  •  107
    Collective Wrongdoing
    Social Theory and Practice 28 (1): 167-187. 2002.
    Value TheoryValue Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  62
    Coordination problems and the evolution of behavior
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1): 106. 1984.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Psychology
  •  722
    Collective epistemology
    Episteme 1 (2): 95--107. 2004.
    This paper introduces the author's approach to everyday ascriptions of collective cognitive states as in such statements as we believe he is lying. Collective epistemology deals with these ascriptions attempting to understand them and the phenomena in question.
    Collective Epistemology
  •  9
    Book Reviews (review)
    Mind 103 (412): 560-563. 1994.
  •  101
    Book reviews (review)
    with E. D. Klemke, E. D. Klemke, and Charles E. M. Dunlop
    Philosophia 12 (3-4): 423-445. 1983.
  •  52
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 103 (412): 423-445. 1994.
  •  434
    Belief and acceptance as features of groups
    ProtoSociology 16 35-69. 2002.
    In everyday discourse groups or collectives are often said to believe this or that. The author has previously developed an account of the phenomenon to which such collective belief statements refer. According to this account, in terms that are explained, a group believes that p if its members are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. Those who fulfill these conditions are referred to here as collectively believing* that p. Some philosophers – here labeled rejectionists – have argued tha…Read more
    In everyday discourse groups or collectives are often said to believe this or that. The author has previously developed an account of the phenomenon to which such collective belief statements refer. According to this account, in terms that are explained, a group believes that p if its members are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. Those who fulfill these conditions are referred to here as collectively believing* that p. Some philosophers – here labeled rejectionists – have argued that collective belief* is not belief but rather acceptance. This paper presents several arguments against rejectionism. One has to do with the proper methodology for arriving at an account of belief. Two address rejectionist claims to the effect that collective beliefs* lack key features of belief in general, the features in question being “aiming at truth” and having a particular relation to the will. A fourth notes that there is a phenomenon more apt for the label of “collective acceptance” than is the phenomenon of collective belief*
    Collective Mentality, MiscCollective BeliefCollective EpistemologyCollective IntentionalitySocial Gr…Read more
    Collective Mentality, MiscCollective BeliefCollective EpistemologyCollective IntentionalitySocial Groups
  •  152
    A Real Unity of Them All
    The Monist 92 (2): 268-285. 2009.
    The Unity of ConsciousnessApproaches to Social Ontology, Misc
  •  1820
    Agreements, coercion, and obligation
    Ethics 103 (4): 679-706. 1993.
    Typical agreements can be seen as joint decisions, inherently involving obligations of a distinctive kind. These obligations derive from the joint commitment' that underlies a joint decision. One consequence of this understanding of agreements and their obligations is that coerced agreements are possible and impose obligations. It is not that the parties to an agreement should always conform to it, all things considered. Unless one is released from the agreement, however, one has some reason to …Read more
    Typical agreements can be seen as joint decisions, inherently involving obligations of a distinctive kind. These obligations derive from the joint commitment' that underlies a joint decision. One consequence of this understanding of agreements and their obligations is that coerced agreements are possible and impose obligations. It is not that the parties to an agreement should always conform to it, all things considered. Unless one is released from the agreement, however, one has some reason to conform to it, whatever else is true. In this sense, one is under an obligation to the other parties. The relevance of these points to the issue of political obligation is discussed.
    Social and Political Philosophy
  • Part III. Individual and collective epistemology. Social roots of human knowledge / Ernest Sosa ; Belief, acceptance, and what happens in groups : some methodological considerations
    with Daniel Pilchman
    In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2014.
  •  198
    Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints
    Mind 111 (442): 399-403. 2002.
    Rationality
  •  74
    Promising, Intending, and Moral Autonomy
    Philosophical Review 100 (2): 315. 1991.
    AutonomyPromises
  •  212
    Social Rules: Some Problems for Hart’s Account, and an Alternative Proposal (review)
    Law and Philosophy 18 (2): 141-171. 1999.
    What is a social rule? This paper first notes three important problems for H.L.A. Hart's famous answer in the Concept of Law. An alternative account that avoids the problems is then sketched. It is less individualistic than Hart's and related accounts. This alternative account can explain a phenomenon observed but downplayed by Hart: the parties to a social rule feel that they are in some sense 'bound' to conform to it.
    Philosophy of LawApproaches to Social Ontology, MiscInstitutions
  • Dialogue and Joint Commitment
    with Maura Priest
    In Maura Priest & Margaret Gilbert (eds.), Les Defis de Collectif. forthcoming.
    Philosophy, MiscOther Academic AreasApproaches to Social Ontology, Misc
  •  833
    Social Rules
    with Maura Priest
    In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Sage Publications. 2013.
    Philosophy, MiscOther Academic AreasConstitutive Rules in Social OntologyApproaches to Social Ontolo…Read more
    Philosophy, MiscOther Academic AreasConstitutive Rules in Social OntologyApproaches to Social Ontology, Misc
  •  1099
    Conversation and Collective Belief
    with Maura Priest
    In Alessandro Capone, Franco Lo Piparo & Marco Carapezza (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy, Springer. 2013.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyValue TheoryPhilosophy, MiscOther Academic Areas
  •  59
    Critical notice: Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (review)
    Noûs 33 (2): 295-303. 2002.
    Moral Realism and Irrealism, MiscellaneousMoral Relativism
  •  543
    Who's to blame? Collective moral responsibility and its implications for group members
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1). 2006.
         No abstract available
    Collective ResponsibilityCollective Mentality, MiscCollective Intentionality
  •  278
    Acting together, joint commitment, and obligation
    What is it to do something with another person? In the author's book On Social Facts and elsewhere, she has conjectured that a special type of commitment - joint commitment - lies at the root of acting together and many other central social phenomena. Here she surveys some data pertinent to this conjecture, including the assumption of those who act together that they have associated rights against and obligations towards each other. She explains what joint commitment is, how it relates to the da…Read more
    What is it to do something with another person? In the author's book On Social Facts and elsewhere, she has conjectured that a special type of commitment - joint commitment - lies at the root of acting together and many other central social phenomena. Here she surveys some data pertinent to this conjecture, including the assumption of those who act together that they have associated rights against and obligations towards each other. She explains what joint commitment is, how it relates to the data noted, and argues that an appeal to joint commitment does not involve a pernicious form of holism.
    Collective ActionCollective IntentionalityCollective IntentionsCollective ResponsibilityApproaches t…Read more
    Collective ActionCollective IntentionalityCollective IntentionsCollective ResponsibilityApproaches to Social Ontology, Misc
  •  767
    Shared intention and personal intentions
    Philosophical Studies 144 (1). 2009.
    This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intent…Read more
    This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.
    Collective IntentionsCollective IntentionalityApproaches to Social Ontology, Misc
  •  243
    Rationality, coordination, and convention
    Synthese 84 (1). 1990.
    Philosophers using game-theoretical models of human interactions have, I argue, often overestimated what sheer rationality can achieve. (References are made to David Gauthier, David Lewis, and others.) In particular I argue that in coordination problems rational agents will not necessarily reach a unique outcome that is most preferred by all, nor a unique 'coordination equilibrium' (Lewis), nor a unique Nash equilibrium. Nor are things helped by the addition of a successful precedent, or by comm…Read more
    Philosophers using game-theoretical models of human interactions have, I argue, often overestimated what sheer rationality can achieve. (References are made to David Gauthier, David Lewis, and others.) In particular I argue that in coordination problems rational agents will not necessarily reach a unique outcome that is most preferred by all, nor a unique 'coordination equilibrium' (Lewis), nor a unique Nash equilibrium. Nor are things helped by the addition of a successful precedent, or by common knowledge of generally accepted personal principles. Commitments like those generated by agreements may be necessary for rational expectations to arise. Social conventions, construed as group principles (following the analysis in my book On Social Facts), would suffice for this task.
    RationalitySocial GroupsCommon Knowledge
  •  5
    Larry May and Stacey Hoffman, eds., Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 13 (4): 168-170. 1993.
    Collective Responsibility
  •  242
    Collective wrongdoing: Moral and legal responses
    This is a review essay of Christopher Kutz's Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, and Jonathan Bass's Stay The Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. Topics addressed include the nature of collective intentions and actions, the possibility of collective guilt, the moral responsibility of individuals in the context of collective actions.
    Philosophy of Action, Misc
  •  3890
    Belief, Acceptance, and What Happens in Groups: Some Methodological Considerations
    with Daniel Pilchman
    In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.
    Collective Epistemology
  •  1423
    Collective guilt and collective guilt feelings
    The Journal of Ethics 6 (2): 115-143. 2002.
    Among other things, this paper considers what so-called collective guilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimes appropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed be guilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collective to intend to do something and to act in light of that intention. An account of collective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting. Finally, a "plural subject" account of collective guilt feelings is articula…Read more
    Among other things, this paper considers what so-called collective guilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimes appropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed be guilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collective to intend to do something and to act in light of that intention. An account of collective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting. Finally, a "plural subject" account of collective guilt feelings is articulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt as a body.
    EthicsAction Theory, MiscellaneousCollective ActionCollective Intentionality
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