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601[This is an earlier (1997), much longer and more detailed version of my entry on LOTH in the _Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_] The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, though…Read more
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913How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist ProposalReview of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1): 119-133. 2014.A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commona…Read more
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102Connectionism and the language of thoughtCSLI Technical Report. 1995.Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical
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70Critical comments on Williams and Craig’s recent proposal for revising the definition of painPAIN 158 (2): 362-363. 2017.[DOI: 10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000765] Amanda Williams and Kenneth Craig, in a recent article in the IASP official journal _Pain_ (DOI: 10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000613), have argued that it is time to revise the IASP's well-entrenched definition of 'pain'. They propose an alternative definition. We critically discuss their proposed revision and argue that it admits clear counterexamples as both sufficient and necessary conditions. We further discuss the wisdom of replacing 'unpleasant' in the I…Read more
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411Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-perso…Read more
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69Pain, philosophical aspects ofIn Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness, . pp. 495-498. 2009.The ordinary conception of pain has two major threads that are in tension with each other. It is this tension that generates various puzzles in our philosophical understanding of pain. This is a short encyclopedia entry surveying some of the major philosophical puzzles about pain.
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415Is introspection inferential?In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Ashgate. 2003.I introduce the Displaced Perception Model of Introspection developed by Dretske which treats introspection of phenomenal states as inferential and criticize it
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170Emotions or emotional feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion)Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 192-194. 2000.It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, n…Read more
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823I argue that if we have a rich enough description of perceptual experiences from an information-theoretic viewpoint, it becomes surprisingly difficult (to put it mildly) to positively conceive philosophical zombies (as complete physical/functional duplicates that lack phenomenal consciousness). Hence, it is at best an open question whether zombies are positively conceivable. My argument requires paying close attention to the direct relation between phenomenology and information.
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136On the relation between phenomenal and representational propertiesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 151-153. 1997.We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and …Read more
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403Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind RevisitedIn Gurol Irzik & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), Boston Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Springer. 2005.I argue that Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM) and a naturalistic narrow content functionalism run on a Language of Though story have the same exact structure. I elaborate on the argument that narrow content functionalism is either irremediably holistic in a rather destructive sense, or else doesn't have the resources for individuating contents interpersonally. So I show that, contrary to his own advertisement, Stich's STM has exactly the same problems (like holism, vagueness, observer-rela…Read more
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136Language of ThoughtOxford Bibliographies Online. 2017.Annotated online bibliography on the Language of Thought Hypothesis.
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242Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about painConsciousness and Emotion 2 (1): 29-73. 2001.This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against …Read more
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1Introduction: A critical and quasi-historical essay on theories of painIn Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2005.
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387Consciousness, conceivability arguments, and perspectivalism: The dialectics of the debateCommunication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2): 99-122. 2001.
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244An analysis of pleasure vis-a-vis painPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3): 537-570. 2000.I take up the issue of whether pleasure is a kind of sensation or not. This issue was much discussed by philosophers of the 1950’s and 1960’s, and apparently no resolution was reached. There were mainly two camps in the discussion: those who argued for a dispositional account, and those who favored an episodic feeling view of pleasure. Here, relying on some recent scientific research I offer an account of pleasure which neither dispositionalizes nor sensationalizes pleasure. As is usual in the t…Read more
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14The main difficulty with painIn Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. pp. 123-136. 2005.Consider the following two sentences: " I see a dark discoloration in the back of my hand. I feel a jabbing pain in the back of my hand. " They seem to have the same surface grammar, and thus prima facie invite the same kind of semantic treatment. Even though a reading of ‘see’ in where the verb is not treated as a success verb is not out of the question, it is not the ordinary and natural reading. Note that if I am hallucinating a dark discoloration in the back of my hand, then is simply false.…Read more
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209Pure informational semantics and the narrow/broad dichotomyIn Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics, Maribor. pp. 157. 1997.The influence of historical-causal theories of reference developed in the late sixties and early seventies by Donnellan, Kripke, Putnam and Devitt has been so strong that any semantic theory that has the consequence of assigning disjunctive representational content to the mental states of twins (e.g. [H2O or XYZ]) has been thereby taken to refute itself. Similarly, despite the strength of pre-theoretical intuitions that exact physical replicas like Davidson's Swampman have representational menta…Read more
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466Language of thought: The connectionist contributionMinds and Machines 7 (1): 57-101. 1997.Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a comb…Read more
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670Fodor on concepts and Frege puzzlesPacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4): 289-294. 1998.ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege…Read more
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723Affect: Representationalists' HeadachePhilosophical Studies 170 (2): 175-198. 2014.Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it
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1815A short primer on situated cognitionIn Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 3--10. 2009.Introductory Chapter to the _Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition_ (CUP, 2009)
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574Pain: Perception or Introspection?In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain, Routledge. 2017.[Penultimate draft] I present the perceptualist/representationalist theories of pain in broad outline and critically examine them in light of a competing view according to which awareness of pain is essentially introspective. I end the essay with a positive sketch of a naturalistic proposal according to which pain experiences are intentional but not fully representational. This proposal makes sense of locating pains in body parts as well as taking pains as subjective experiences.
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642Some foundational problems in the scientific study of painPhilosophy of Science Supplement 69 (3): 265-83. 2002.This paper is an attempt to spell out what makes the scientific study of pain so distinctive from a philosophical perspective. Using the IASP definition of ‘pain’ as our guide, we raise a number of questions about the philosophical assumptions underlying the scientific study of pain. We argue that unlike the study of ordinary perception, the study of pain focuses from the very start on the experience itself and its qualities, without making deep assumptions about whether pain experiences are per…Read more
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Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Perception, General |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
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Metaphysics |
Meta-Ethics |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |