Kevin Meeker

In this paper I shall closely examine some of Gilbert Harman's cases that purport to show that one can have a justified true belief that does not constitute knowledge because of the social environment. I shall provide an account of these cases that helps us not only understand why the people in these situations lack knowledge, but also why philosophers have a difficult time evaluating these cases. More specifically, I shall argue that in these cases we should conclude that the cognizers lack justification. I shall also show how this account sheds some light on certain aspects of the internalism/externalism debate

This essay addresses the relationship between Hume’s moral theory and his epistemological project. More specifically, it focuses on one particular aspect of the relationship between Hume’s moral theory and his general scepticism with regard to reason. Several philosophers, such as David Owen and Annette Baier, have suggested that Hume’s moral theory provides significant support for his appeal to reason/reasoning. To uncover some of the main obstacles that any future attempts to rest Humean reason on ethics will probably face, this essay critically examines a few of the most prominent examples of such accounts, particularly Michael Ridge’s “Epistemology Moralized: David Hume’s Practical Epistemology,” the most developed account of the possible moral support of reason in Hume‘s philosophy.