Michael Losonsky

A theory of reference for proper names according to which reference is fixed solely in terms of the contents of language users' minds is an idealist theory. A theory of reference for proper names in which reference is fixed not in terms of the contents of language users' minds, but in terms of causal chains connecting users to referents is a materialist theory. A dualist theory is one in which reference is fixed both by the contents of minds and causal chains. The main reason materialists and dualists have for rejecting an idealist account of reference for proper names is that it supposedly cannot deal with certain facts of reference. These facts of reference, pointed out by Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke, are cases in which a name's user appears to associate beliefs or intentions with a name whose contents are either false of the referent or too meagre to identify it, but nevertheless the name succeeds in referring to its referent. In addition to telling a tale about a cataclysm that attempts to motivate an idealist account of reference, in this paper I will show that an idealist can handle these facts of reference. In the problematic cases the idealist can very well point to a content of the mind that identifies the referent: the referent's individual essence.

English translation by Kneller and Losonsky of Klaus Reich, Die Vollständigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel "This classic of Kant scholarship, whose first edition appeared in 1932, deals with one of the most controversial and difficult topics in the Critique of Pure Reason: Kant's table of judgments and their connection to the table of categories. Kant's attempt to derive the latter from the former is called the "Metaphysical Deduction," and it paves the way for the Transcendental Deduction that is universally recognized as the heart of the Critique." "Many commentators have passed over the Metaphysical Deduction in silence, as if embarrassed by Kant's fatuity, and his critics are almost unanimous in finding its premise ungrounded, its argument incorrect, and its conclusion false. At the heart of the failure of the Metaphysical Deduction, it is alleged, is Kant's inability to justify the table of the forms of judgment. Critics argue that Kant simply took these forms of judgment from the logic textbooks of his day and doctored them so as to yield the required categories. Such objections were current even in Kant's time; they were repeated by Hegel, and are commonplaces of Kant criticism today." "This book is the fullest and most systematic evaluation ever made of the Metaphysical Deduction. Reich argues that its principal conclusion is correct even though Kant failed to establish it in the Metaphysical Deduction proper, and he defends the conclusion by using Kant material far removed from the text of the Metaphysical Deduction, notes by Kant that only became available in the 1920's and that remain even now untranslated into English. With the publication of this translation for English-speaking Kant scholars, a neglected and impugned part of the Critique of Pure Reason can finally receive the attention it deserves."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Wilhelm von Humboldt's classic study of human language was first published in 1836, as a general introduction to his three-volume treatise on the Kawi language of Java. It is the final statement of his lifelong study of the nature of language, exploring its universal structures and its relation to mind and culture. Empirically wide-ranging - Humboldt goes far beyond the Indo-European family of languages - it remains one of the most interesting and important attempts to draw philosophical conclusions from comparative linguistics. This volume presents a translation by Peter Heath, together with an introduction by Michael Losonsky that places Humboldt's work in its historical context and discusses its relevance to contemporary work in philosophy, linguistics, cognitive science, and psychology.

According to an idealist theory of reference for proper names the reference of proper names is fixed by what name users express in their beliefs, intentions, thoughts, and so forth. My task is to show that an idealist can defend himself against the proponent of the causal theory of reference, who claims that reference cannot be fixed solely by what is expressed in name users' minds. An idealist can handle certain facts of reference the causal theorist believes idealists cannot handle. Moreover, there are possible tales that undermine the causal theory and motivate an idealist one. The idealist can also gather the material he needs for his defense--essences--from the distinction between a theory of reference and a theory of meaning that causal theorists like to draw. Finally, unlike the causal theorist, the idealist does not leave ontology in the lurch

According to a computational view of mind, thinking is identified with the manipulation of internal mental representations and intelligent behavior is the output of these computations. Although Thomas Hobbes's philosophy of mind is taken by many to be a precursor of this brand of cognitivism, this is not the case. For Hobbes, not all thinking is the manipulation of language-like symbols, and intelligent behavior is partly constitutive of cognition. Cognition requires a 'passionate thought', and this Hobbsian synthesis of inner thought and outer behavior suggests a resolution to the contemporary conflict between cognitive theories of mind that make KNOWING THAT primary and pragmatic theories that make KNOWING HOW primary.

This is an anthology of landmark essays in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and cognitive science since 1950. It includes essays that aim to reflect the fact that philosophy and the science of mind and language have close historical and conceptual ties. Each section begins with a brief and simple overview highlighting the issues and recommending other readings. The combination of this editorial material with a selection of classic essays makes this anthology a very flexible tool for introductory courses in cognitive science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology as well as courses devoted to contemporary analytic philosophy. However, the book also contains significant advanced and recent material, making it suitable for more advanced stud, including beginning graduate courses.

In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke maintains that ?Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing,? including matters of religious faith, and this commitment to the primacy of reason is not abandoned in his later religious writings. This essay argues that with regard to the relation between reason and religious faith, Locke is primarily concerned not with evidence, but with consistency, meaning, and how human beings ought to respond to their inclinations, including their inclinations to believe. Leibniz, on the other hand, stakes out an alternative conception of the relationship between faith and reason that assigns to faith the role of a primary truth. For Leibniz, some religious propositions can be believed immediately and without an additional examination and evaluation by reason. The essay maintains that the differences between the two regarding faith and reason are tied to a broader disagreement about how much of the human understanding is due, in Locke's words, to ?Labour, Attention and Industry?