Enrico Pasini

The paper (of which an ample Spanish reworking has appeared in 2012, see <http://philpapers.org/rec/PASLTL>) tries to evaluate Leibniz’s enduring fascination with Spinoza and presents an overview in five stages of the development of his complex relationship to his thought, beginning with the time of Mainz, when Leibniz shows a strange urgency to get in epistolary contact with the author of the Theologico-Political Treatise, despite his public rejection of both the work and the author; then Leibniz’s stay in Paris, especially in the year 1675, when he seeks information through Tschirnhaus on Spinoza’s clandestine doctrines; their personal meeting in the Hague, towards the end of the year 1676, and the subsequent distancing of Leibniz from Spinozism; the reading by Leibniz of Spinoza’s Opera Posthuma and the extension of his arguments against Spinozism to discredit Cartesian philosophy in general, and, finally, Leibniz’s retrospective evaluation of Spinoza’s thought in the Theodicy.

To avoid the mystical rapture that seizes interpreters put before the theme of unitas oppositorum in Cusanus and Leibniz, this contribution shall move from the prosaic question: what does ensue from such opposites or from their conjunction? 2) interweave the analysis with some external point of view, notably that of Erasmus. This question will be investigated on the background of two antitethical traditions in dealing philosophically with opposition and contradiction, although in the end we shall try and find out other ways and reasons for connecting the two thinkers on the ground of the various possible unitates oppositorum, than those of the metaphysical doctrine of the opposites

This paper takes its start from the unpublished Leibnizian manuscript of which a critical edition and an Italian translation are presented by the Author in the same issue of “Discipline filosofiche‘ -- in particular from some passages concerning what we might roughly call teleological projections. A parallel analysis of Leibniz’s and Husserl’s attitudes to the attribution of teleological properties, at various levels of complexity, factuality, ideality, to the natural world and to human history, shows in Husserl’s teleology a mix of ingredients very similar to those of Leibniz’s own one -- ingredients that Husserl always relished -- but with quite different results. On the one hand, for Husserl the universal order is teleologically realised in humanity, albeit with a reference to transcendence that has never been made by him completely clear. On the other hand, perhaps thanks to being unaware of Kant’s future contributions to the field, Leibniz seems more capable to avoid certain naïver forms of teleological attribution to which Husserl might seem more prone

La Monadologie est au même temps une oeuvre du philosophe allemand G.W. Leibniz entitulée ainsi par un éditeur qui inventa le mot, et une théorie. Les essais réunis ici en concernent l'origine, l'histoire et l'enjeu philosophique. F. Piro analyse le développements de la conception de l'individuation chez le jeune Leibniz. M. Fichant étudie en détail la constitution du concept de monade. La nature limitée des monades créées est ramenée par G. Mormino à la doctrine leibnizienne de la contingence et de la création. E. Pasini reconstitue la genèse de la Monadologie, prototype du traité monadologique, pour montrer que sa nature n'est pas dans son origine. La monadologie va même inviter les détournements matérialistes du jeune Feuerbach - l'essai de V. Morfino porte sur les insuffisances de sa reformulation purement transcendantale chez Husserl, face à la théorie du transindividuel.

Popkin set Erasmus as the beginner of modern skepticism, and made of him an apologetic sort of sceptic, that uses doubt to make acceptable the tradition and authority of the church. The pivotal moment is the debate concerning free will. Luther is particularly upset by Erasmus’ professions of skepticism in his De libero arbitrio, although it was meant by him as an appeal to moderation: the key to Erasmus’ skepticism isn’t religious incredulity, but putting doubt to good use, in suspending judgements that are not necessary and might be dangerous to peace and concord among christians. Doubt isn’t endorsed by the christian tradition, nor by the literary one, and technical treatments (in logic or rhetorics) are not favored by Erasmus. Moreover skepticism receives the same ambiguous consideration that Erasmus has for philosophy in general. But he practices doubt nevertheless, in both forms of dubitare and ambigere. The latter is particularly important, since this practice of skepticism is particularly useful in avoiding the common error of doing what one had better omit. These ideas of Erasmus play a role in his cultural, theolocial, and ecclesiastical program, developed by him along many years, and specifically in the years of the crudest confrontation among emerging religious factions. In the works of the greats catholic skeptics, such as Huet, skepticism and fideism will be tightly connected, Erasmus supports skepticism as a means to gain for all contending parties a right to doubt and ask for suspension of judgement in matter of warlike controversy, aiming instead to concile intellectual freedom and irenic perspectives

The paper (an ample reworking of a 2005 Italian paper) tries to evaluate Leibniz’s enduring fascination with Spinoza and presents an overview in five stages of the development of his complex relationship to his thought, beginning with the time of Mainz, when Leibniz shows a strange urgency to get in epistolary contact with the author of the Theologico-Political Treatise, despite his public rejection of both the work and the author; then Leibniz’s stay in Paris, especially in the year 1675, when he seeks information through Tschirnhaus on Spinoza’s clandestine doctrines; their personal meeting in the Hague, towards the end of the year 1676, and the subsequent distancing of Leibniz from Spinozism; the reading by Leibniz of Spinoza’s Opera Posthuma and the extension of his arguments against Spinozism to discredit Cartesian philosophy in general, and, finally, Leibniz’s retrospective evaluation of Spinoza’s thought in the Theodicy