Marco Sgarbi

Nel suo pionieristico lavoro Conditions in Königsberg and the Making of Kant's Philosophy, Giorgio Tonelli lamentava l'assenza di un'indagine approfondita sul contesto intellettuale di Königsberg e sull'eventuale influenza che esso esercitò su alcuni aspetti del pensiero di Kant. Questo libro vuole colmare questa lacuna prestando particolare attenzione alla tradizione aristotelica, alla Schulphilosophie, e alla corrente dell'eclettismo, che dominarono l'ambiente regiomontano sino all'avvento della filosofia critica kantiana. Il lavoro mostra come dai fallimenti dei progetti logici e metafisici precritici, legati alle influenze ricevute dall'ambiente di Königsberg, Kant abbia tratto le idee e gli spunti per la stesura della Kritik der reinen Vernunft.

The present contribute aims to reconstruct, using the methodology of intellectual history, the broad spectrum of metaphysical doctrines that Kant could know during the years of the formation of his philosophy. The first part deals with the teaching of metaphysics in Königsberg from 1703 to 1770. The second part examines the main characteristics of the metaphysics in the various handbooks, which were taught at the Albertina, in order to have an exhaustive overview of all metaphysical positions.O presente trabalho, valendo-se da metodologia da história das idéias, visa reconstruir o amplo espectro de doutrinas metafísicas às quais Kant poderia ter acesso durante os anos de formação de sua filosofia. A primeira parte trata do ensino de metafísica em Königsberg, de 1703 a 1770. A segunda parte examina as principais características da metafísica com base nos diversos manuais em uso na Albertina, a fim de que se tenha um panorama exaustivo de todas as posições então objeto de ensino

In this paper the author aims at showing that Kant’s awakening from the dogmatic slumber, often related to the reading of Hume, finds its full achievement only by means of the assimilation of the Aristotelian doctrines. If Hume provided a critique of the concept of “causality” conceiving it as a mere mental representation, in Kant’s opinion Aristotle provided a “new way” to conceive all the concepts of intellect, even though in a non-systematic way. Kant found the solution of his epistemological problem in the peculiar Aristotelian tradition of Königsberg, according to which the categories are mental constructions or concepts of a mental order. Kant’s debt to Aristotelianism in the matter of the awakening is clear in his “terminological turn” of the years 1771-1772. In those years some important Aristotelian terms such as “category”, “schema”, “dialectic” and “analytic” appear for the first time. At that time, Kant’s awakening, influenced by Aristotelianism, was possible because the philosopher has been working as a librarian at the Schlossbibliothek, where he had at his disposal vast book holdings relating to the Aristotelian tradition

Kant, Rabe e la logica aristotelica - This article shows the influence of the Aristotelian Paul Rabe on Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. In the first part, I reconstruct the status quaestions regarding Rabe in Aristotelian studies and in Kantforschung. The second part looks at Rabe’s life and works. It is demonstrated in the third part that Kant’s definition of dialectic as Logik des Scheins comes from Rabe’s definition of dialectic as logica ex apparentibus. The fourth part shows the Aristotelian origin of Kant’s doctrine of categories and schema and the fifth analyses the meaning of Rabe’s Analytica and its legacy in Kant. In the sixth section, the Aristotelian distinction kat’anthropon-kat’aletheian is examined in Rabe and Kant. The conclusion suggests that the chapter "Idee einer transzendentalen Logik" in Kritik der reinen Vernunft is an Einladungsschrift and that Kant became acquainted with Aristotle’s writings mainly between 1766 and 1772 when he was librarian at the Schlossbibliothek in Königsberg

In this paper I aim to investigate Hume's well-known distinction between impressions and ideas, following the methodology of the history of ideas, and showing its specificity and suggesting a possible source, which has not been given much attention by the scholarship, namely the logical doctrines of the physician and anatomist William Harvey, which provide the key concepts to understand Hume's logic of ideas. After some introductory remarks, the second part deals with the many issues involved in Hume's distinction, and in the third part I examine Harvey's logic of ideas. In conclusion I assess Hume's debt to the English physician

L’articolo mostra come la riscoperta della Poetica di Aristotele nel XVI secolo abbia portato all’emergere della critica d’arte, di contro all’idea tradizionale secondo la quale essa sarebbe nata durante l’Illuminismo. L’articolo si concentra sulla poliedrica figura di Ludovico Dolce il quale, nel suo Dialogo sulla Pittura (1557), utilizza i precetti della poetica aristotelica per stabilire rigidi criteri di giudizio delle opere d’arte. A differenza di molti altri autori suoi contemporanei che scrissero sul medesimo soggetto, le riflessioni di Dolce non offrirono né una storia dell’arte, né un corpus di regole per la pittura o la scultura; piuttosto, si rivolsero alla ricerca dei modi più consoni per interpretare in maniera accurata il lavoro artistico in tutti i suoi aspetti, anche il più soggettivo. Attraverso stringenti paralleli con la Poetica di Aristotele, Dolce delinea quella che può essere considerata una delle prime forme di critica d’arte.

This article deals with the epistemology of Richard Burthogge. Friend and correspondent of Locke, Burthogge published two important epistemological treaties, the Organum Vetus & Novum and the Essay upon Reason, in which he developed a particular theory of knowledge close to idealism and conceptualism. In this theory he 1) elaborated an instrumental conception of logic; 2) limited the boundaries of reason to sensible experience; 3) conceived the mind as a center of activity, energy, and operations; 4) established that all sensible knowledge is filtered by modi concipiendi, such as substance, quantity, quality, and causality; 5) stated that knowledge is merely phenomenal, namely it concerns only the objects as they appear and not as they really are; 5) established that objects have no reality and sense if not in relation to the mind and that they are framed by a priori rules that are constitutive of reason. The aim of the article is to examine in detail Burthogge's theory of knowledge and to show his original position within the historical and cultural setting of his time.

In his article, Kant ’s Ethics as a part of Metaphysics: a possible Newtonian Suggestion? With Some Comments on Kant ’s “Dream of a Seer”, Giorgio Tonelli suggests a possible relation between Isaac Newton’s conception of attraction and the metaphysical foundation of morals in the light of some considerations on Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik. In this paper, I argue that Immanuel Kant ’s notion of Ethics as a part of metaphysics does not simply derive from Newton and his followers, it is also a philosophical necessity triggered by the development of Kant ’s system and his thought on spontaneity 2. I focus the attention especially on Kant ’s early writings of ethics, in which it is evident the breach with the tradition and the formation of the system. The fist part of the paper sketches the placement of ethics in Kant ’s pre-critical works and its status as science. The second part develops the systematic justification of Kant ’s insertion of ethics within metaphysics. The third part deals with the historical debate on soul-body’s relationship. The fourth and fifth parts account for the history of spontaneity and its reception in Kant ’s early writings. The last two, finally, deal with Kant ’s notion of ethics as part of metaphysics from 1770 to critical period

Das Ziel der Begriffsgeschichte ist es, eine kritische und moglichst vollstandige Ubersicht uber den Bedeutungswandel von Begriffen durch die Jahrzehnte zu geben, so Gustav Teichmuller in der Vorrede zu seinen Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe. Ein solches Unterfangen bringt Uberlappungen mit der Terminologiegeschichte, der Wortgeschichte, der Problemgeschichte, der Ideengeschichte und der Sachgeschichte mit sich, denn alle diese Disziplinen untersuchen letztlich den philosophischen Diskurs und seine Wandlungen in der Zeit. Erst die Verdeutlichung ihrer geschichtlichen Wirksamkeit macht Begriffe fur die philosophische Reflexion brauchbar und schafft den ausreichend begrundeten Ruckhalt fur ihre stringente Anwendung. Die Basis dafur bietet der lexikographische Ansatz des Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, das heute das grosste Repositorium von lemmatisierten Texten der Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte ist. Der von Riccardo Pozzo und Marco Sgarbi herausgegebene Band gliedert sich in drei Teile, die sich mit den neuen Entwicklungen in der Methodologie der Geschichte der Philosophie im 21. Jahrhundert befassen. Wahrend der erste Teil die methodischen Aspekte von Begriffs-, Problem- und Ideengeschichte thematisiert und der zweite Teil die Anwendung dieser Methoden auf die neuen Informationstechnologien zeigt, enthalt der dritte und letzte Teil einige Beispiele, an denen die Notwendigkeit der Verschrankung zwischen Begriffs-, Problem- und Ideengeschichte deutlich wird.

Syllogism is a form of logical argument allowing one to deduce a consistent conclusion based on a pair of premises having a common term. Although Aristotle was the first to conceive and develop this way of reasoning, he left open a lot of conceptual space for further modifications, improvements and systematizations with regards to his original syllogistic theory. From its creation until modern times, syllogism has remained a powerful and compelling device of deduction and argument, used by a variety of figures and assuming a variety of forms throughout history. The Aftermath of Syllogism investigates the key developments in the history of this peculiar pattern of inference, from Avicenna to Hegel. Taking as its focus the longue durée of development between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century, this book looks at the huge reworking scientific syllogism underwent over the centuries, as some of the finest philosophical minds brought it to an unprecedented height of logical sharpness and sophistication. Bringing together a group of major international experts in the Aristotelian tradition, The Aftermath of Syllogism provides a detailed, up to date and critical evaluation of the history of syllogistic deduction.

Gli storici della filosofia solitamente attribuiscono ai pensatori moderni l'invenzioni di concetto "soggetto", "oggetto" e "soggettività" e li concepiscono in direttamente in contrasto con la filosofia scolastica e aristotelica. Questo articolo suggerisce la presenza di una proto-teoria della soggettività in Aristotele. La teoria aristotelica della soggettività è fondata principalmente su quattro dottrine. In primo luogo, si può riscontrare nell'epistemologia aristotelica la presenza di una "prospettiva" e di un "punto di vista". Il secondo aspetto significativo è il concetto di determinazione dell'oggetto della conoscenza, che nella filosofia aristotelica è rappresentato dalla nozione di "prosthesis". La terza dottrina si fonda sulla distinzione fra ciò che è più conoscibile per noi e ciò che è più conoscibile per natura. L'ultima dottrina riguarda la seconda natura del soggetto e gli abiti della conoscenza acquisiti attraverso l'esperienza, i quali spiegano perché i soggetti abbiano conoscenze diverse degli stessi oggetti secondo le loro precedenti esperienzePhilosophers usually attribute to modernity the invention of concepts like 'subject', 'object' and 'subjectivity' and they understand them in contrast to Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophies. The present paper suggests the presence of a proto-theory of subjectivity in Aristotle. The Aristotelian theory of subjectivity is grounded principally on four doctrines. First, we can recognize the presence of a 'perspective' and of a 'point of view' in the Aristotelian epistemology. The second relevant aspect is the concept of determination of the object of knowledge, which is in Aristotelian philosophy the notion of 'prosthesis'. The third doctrine lies on the distinction between 'what is more known to us' and 'what is more known by nature'. The last doctrine concerns the 'second nature' of the subject and the habits of knowledge acquired by experience, which explain why knowing subjects have different cognitions of the same object according to their own previous experience.