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2468“Il n’y a pas de hors-texte”—Once MoreSymposium 18 (2): 98-124. 2014.Spivak translates Derrida’s “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” as “there is nothing outside the text.” By considering how the aphorism works within his study of Rousseau on sexual and textual supplements, and by reviewing related expressions in French, a mistranslation is revealed. This is not a simple error, however. The distortion is generated by Derrida’s own broader context. We must not only distinguish signification from reference but also place the aphorism within Derrida’s allusion, in the firs…Read more
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40Book Reviews (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4): 611-612. 2003.Book Information The Analytic Imaginary. The Analytic Imaginary Marguerite La Caze, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. ix + 194, $US32.50. By Marguerite La Caze. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Pp. ix + 194. $US32.50.
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101What is Popper's problem of an empirical basis?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3). 1969.
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36Michèle Le Dœuff: operative philosophy and imaginary practice (edited book)Humanity Books. 2000.No Marketing Blurb.
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117Hintikka's conception of epistemic logicAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2). 1969."hintikka's conception of epistemic logic" is a critical comment on hintikka's defence of his philosophical method ("epistemic logic and the methods of philosophical analysis", "a.J.P." no.1, 1968). There is a discussion of the symbolization and analysis of "a knows that p", "a knows that he knows that p", And the notions of virtual equivalence and virtual implication. The conclusion drawn is that whereas hintikka thought his critics misunderstood his method, In fact they were attacking his empl…Read more
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156A Note on Saying and DisbelievingAnalysis 25 (3): 53-57. 1965.It is argued that 'p but I do not believe that p' seems close to a contradiction because if the speaker is correct in all that s/he says then what s/he says is false. Similarly,what is wrong with 'p, but I have no opinion whether p' is that, whether 'p' or 'not-p', if the speaker believes it, s/he cannot be completely correct. The argument assumes that 'I believe that' is not a mere parenthesis as in 'p, I believe', and that to say 'I believe that p' is not only to claim a certain mentality, but…Read more
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86Stories, Pictures, ArgumentsPhilosophy 62 (240). 1987.There is a tradition of philosophy—a conception we can easily under-stand as a limit of a tendency of our own thinking—that philosophy consists only of argument. The rest of the vast prepon-derance of words in philosophical texts is simply embroidery. ‘Naturally’, it will be conceded, actual philosophy books contain more or less of verbal pictures, words and phrases whose purpose is to evoke images, and many stories—examples, hard cases for definitions, and 4 anecdotes. These, it will be said, ‘…Read more
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89In sensible judgementAshgate. 2013.Achieving judgment -- In sensible judgment -- Sentencing -- Dissenting -- Making judgments -- Judging as right -- Living on the premises -- Inferring, judging, arguing -- Questioning critique -- Sting of reason -- Critique's mystique -- Enigma absolute -- Moving establishment -- Being nomadic -- Chasing after modernity -- When to forget.
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University of QueenslandProfessor (Part-time)
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Philosophical Traditions |