•  83
    Regresses, reasons and grounds
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1). 1973.
  •  2468
    “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte”—Once More
    Symposium 18 (2): 98-124. 2014.
    Spivak translates Derrida’s “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” as “there is nothing outside the text.” By considering how the aphorism works within his study of Rousseau on sexual and textual supplements, and by reviewing related expressions in French, a mistranslation is revealed. This is not a simple error, however. The distortion is generated by Derrida’s own broader context. We must not only distinguish signification from reference but also place the aphorism within Derrida’s allusion, in the firs…Read more
  •  40
    Book Reviews (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4): 611-612. 2003.
    Book Information The Analytic Imaginary. The Analytic Imaginary Marguerite La Caze, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. ix + 194, $US32.50. By Marguerite La Caze. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Pp. ix + 194. $US32.50.
  •  101
  •  36
  •  117
    Hintikka's conception of epistemic logic
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2). 1969.
    "hintikka's conception of epistemic logic" is a critical comment on hintikka's defence of his philosophical method ("epistemic logic and the methods of philosophical analysis", "a.J.P." no.1, 1968). There is a discussion of the symbolization and analysis of "a knows that p", "a knows that he knows that p", And the notions of virtual equivalence and virtual implication. The conclusion drawn is that whereas hintikka thought his critics misunderstood his method, In fact they were attacking his empl…Read more
  •  156
    A Note on Saying and Disbelieving
    Analysis 25 (3): 53-57. 1965.
    It is argued that 'p but I do not believe that p' seems close to a contradiction because if the speaker is correct in all that s/he says then what s/he says is false. Similarly,what is wrong with 'p, but I have no opinion whether p' is that, whether 'p' or 'not-p', if the speaker believes it, s/he cannot be completely correct. The argument assumes that 'I believe that' is not a mere parenthesis as in 'p, I believe', and that to say 'I believe that p' is not only to claim a certain mentality, but…Read more
  •  86
    Stories, Pictures, Arguments
    Philosophy 62 (240). 1987.
    There is a tradition of philosophy—a conception we can easily under-stand as a limit of a tendency of our own thinking—that philosophy consists only of argument. The rest of the vast prepon-derance of words in philosophical texts is simply embroidery. ‘Naturally’, it will be conceded, actual philosophy books contain more or less of verbal pictures, words and phrases whose purpose is to evoke images, and many stories—examples, hard cases for definitions, and 4 anecdotes. These, it will be said, ‘…Read more
  • Subjecting and Objecting
    Philosophy 60 (231): 138-140. 1985.
  •  89
    In sensible judgement
    Ashgate. 2013.
    Achieving judgment -- In sensible judgment -- Sentencing -- Dissenting -- Making judgments -- Judging as right -- Living on the premises -- Inferring, judging, arguing -- Questioning critique -- Sting of reason -- Critique's mystique -- Enigma absolute -- Moving establishment -- Being nomadic -- Chasing after modernity -- When to forget.
  •  1079
    Remembering
    with C. B. Martin
    Philosophical Review 75 (2): 161-96. 1966.
  •  93
    Popper's problem of an empirical basis
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3). 1968.