Ann A. Pang-White

Yuan 怨 (resentment, animosity) appears in early Chinese texts more than 2,000 times. Many passages in the Analects recommend non-resentment as an important virtue in self-cultivation. One reads in Analects 14: 35, “Do not resent Heaven nor hold grudges against men.” Interestingly, Analects 14: 34 adds a thought-provoking comment that one should not repay another’s yuan (resentment/animosity) with virtue. Rather, “repay another’s yuan with straightforwardness (zhi 直) and [only] repay virtue with virtue.” Analects 14: 34 suggests that righteousness (yi 義) demands some sort of retribution – an interesting contrast to Daodejing, Chapter 63, “recompense resentment/animosity with virtue.” Yet, the Analects also instructs that one should not “repay animosity with animosity.” This paper explores Confucian ethics of retribution, the appropriate response to another’s animosity, and the pros and cons of such a theory when applied to women’s suffering of injustice.

This book chapter/article discusses Ban Zhao's subtle and strategic negotiation of gender politics during the reign of the imperial and patriarchal Han dynasty (206 BCE - 220 CE). I argued that contrary to the received opinion, she is arguable the first woman philosopher in ancient China. Beyond her famed Lessons for Women, I explored (and translated) her less known but powerful official memoranda and poetry. They demonstrate Ban Zhao's exceptional bravery, intelligence, and literary achievement in advancing women's causes by her writings and actions, as a woman public intellectual, amid immense social and political pressure in the first-century China.

How would feminist concerns fare in the debate between Confucian role ethics and virtue ethics? Ann Pang-White sketches the contours of a non-dichotomous, role-based virtue ethics that is illuminated by a Confucian feminist account as one possible answer to this query. By reimagining the virtues of chastity and filiality that are indispensable to Confucian contexts, Pang-White seeks to develop a reading that can be useful in defending feminist values and replacing outdated understandings of gender roles in societies informed by Confucian thought today. In continuing the conversation with her, Stephen Angle asks whether a modernized, relational, role-based virtue ethics can really suffice to respond to feminist concerns. Sarah Mattice proposes that Pang-White center intersectional perspectives on feminism for the latter’s project, while Lily Zhang invites her to analyze how certain ethical conflicts that arise within the framework of Confucian ethics between roles and virtues can be resolved from Pang-White’s perspective. Pang-White’s reply to the panel reiterates different aspects of her relational role-based virtue ethical reading of Confucian feminism to argue that a better appreciation of the situatedness and imperfections of morality is needed to understand the imperfections that come in with it. _ _.

Readings in Chinese Women's Philosophical and Feminist Thought gathers 40 original writings on women by 32 authors (many of whom are women) from the Yuan dynasty to the Republics, an important 700-year historical period during which women's learning in China blossomed as a result of economic prosperity, the development of commercial printing, and the interaction between East and West. Selections are made not only from canonical texts on women's virtues, but also from less orthodox literary works such as plays, poetry, novels, essays, and revolutionary writings that illuminate the lived experience of women and the perception of gender. With many texts translated into English for the first time, this reader provides the context needed to understand them. It features: - Chronologically organized readings in the sequence of the Yuan, Ming, Qing dynasties, and the Republics to demonstrate historical progression of thought (or the lack of) - Introductions to each section and chapter covering essential information about the authors and the cultural, historical, and philosophical background to their work - A chronology of dynasties, Republics, key events, and a map Recovering discourse so often neglected in discussion of Chinese thought, this is the first collection to pay special attention to women-authored works from the late 13th to the early 21st century. By bringing these readings together in a single volume, it juxtaposes and compares female and male perspectives from the same time and creates a new narrative of Chinese philosophical thought.

Although Mencius (fourth century BCE) and Augustine (356–430 CE) were centuries apart with very different philosophical vocabulary and metaphysical outlooks, both thinkers were progressive in their positive assessment of feminism characteristics. They brought the hidden feminine element in their respective traditions to the foreground. Both thinkers emphasize the affective dimension of morality and propose a political philosophy built on love and the family model. Contrary to accepted cultural norms, they repudiated the viewpoint that regards the female body and female gender as merely a means to an end. Strongly opposing the stance of social contractarianism and political realism, they espoused a social-political theory based on a developmental and relational account of human being and embraced a complementary model of cooperation, care, and governance rooted in humaneness and rightness, love and justice.

Confucian scholars often reference the Yijing 《易經》 (the Classic of Changes), the Liji 《禮記》 (Records of Rituals), and other classics in their advocacy for female chastity. Perplexingly, vocabulary that suggests extremism, which often results in self-imposed – or public sanctioned – suicide, starvation, or physical disfigurement of women during the pre-modern China and the early republic, either does not appear or rarely appears in the Yijing or other early Confucian canons. In these early texts, both zhen 貞 and jie 節 have multiple meanings. Neither term is confined to a specific gender. This fact suggests that the original meanings of zhen and jie in the Yijing, composed around 1046 BCE–771 BCE, had likely been altered and radicalized in later times. I use word frequency analysis, examination of hexagrams, and the method of intertextuality to expose and deconstruct interpretive contradictions and attempt to restore these concepts to their original meaning without distortion.

This paper explores the meaning of Confucian de 德 in the Book of Rites 《禮記》. Using intertextual discussions with texts supplemented by the Analects《論語》, the Mengzi 《孟子》, and the Xunzi《荀子》, I argue that ritual and virtue are closely interrelated. Without ritual, virtue is raw. Without virtue, ritual is barren. De’s interrelationship with ritual is central to Confucian ethics. Ritual is constitutive for all Confucian virtues. This central thesis coupled with subsequent features such as de’s aesthetic dimension and thick interpersonal relationships demonstrate that the Confucian de has multilayered meanings that cannot be fully captured by either the contemporary concept of virtue or the Aristotelian idea of arête.

Augustine of Hippo is often regarded as the champion of the doctrine of weakness of the will. John M. Rist in his 1994 'Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized' draws an interesting analogy between Aristotle's 'akrasia' and Augustine's 'concupiscentia'. However, such an analogy without further qualification is defective and misleading because it implies that Augustine commits himself to the notion that since everyone is perpetually akratic and, thus, always morally blameworthy. I argue that, for Augustine, weakness of the will has equivocal meanings and is manifested in four kinds of case--their scope goes far beyond Aristotle's discussion of 'akrasia' in Book Seven of the 'Nicomachean Ethics'. There are, therefore, considerable differences between Aristotle's and Augustine's account of weakness of the will. Consequently, for Augustine, moral responsibility for the moral agent also varies in each of the four cases.

This work builds on earlier works, which defend Confucianism against charges of sexism and present interpretations of Confucianism compatible with Feminism, but contributors go beyond the much discussed care ethics, and common arguments of how ren (humaneness) can ground an egalitarian humanism that include gender equality. Besides ethics and political philosophy topics, this volume includes discussions in other philosophical areas such as epistemology, metaphysics, and applied philosophy. Through the encounter of Feminism and Confucius’s perspectives, each contributor generates novel answers to the questions addressed. In some cases, authors raise new questions about the chosen topic, inadequacies in how it has been addressed in previous Confucian or Feminist discourse, and/or challenges for either or both Confucianism and Feminism.

In recent discussion on comparative ethics, extensive scholarship has been devoted to a comparative study of Confucian ren 仁 (often translated as humaneness or benevolence) and feminist ethics of care, while such cross‐cultural study on the Daoist concept of ci 慈 (customarily translated as compassion) and its intersection with care ethics has been lacking. This paper explores the reasons and concludes that Daoists do care. However, their conception of care goes beyond the Confucian ren and pure care ethics or even counter‐opposes them so as to bring forward the true meaning of care. Daoist care is a powerful tool in our approach to ecology.

This volume presents the first English translation of the complete set of Confucian classic, Four Books for Women, with extensive commentary by the 17th century literati Wang Xiang, and introductions and annotations by translator Ann A. Pang-White. Written by women for women's education, the Confucian Four Books for Women spanned the 1st to the 16th centuries, and encompass Ban Zhao's Lessons for Women, Song Ruoxin's and Song Ruozhao's Analects for Women, Empress Renxiaowen's Teachings for the Inner Court, and Madame Liu's (Chaste Widow Wang's) Short Records of Models for Women. A female counterpart to the famous Sishu (Four Books) compiled by Zhu Xi, Wang Xiang's Nü sishu provides an invaluable look at the long-standing history and evolution of Chinese women's writing, education, identity, and philosophical discourse, along with their struggles and triumphs, across the millennia and numerous Chinese dynasties. Pang-White's new translation brings the authors of the Four Books for Women to life as real, living people, and illustrates why they wrote and how their work empowered women. This volume reveals the history and evolution of Chinese women's writing, education, identity, and philosophical discourse over a span of 1,600 years.

There has been some controversy about whether or not in the 'Enneads' sensible matter is generated by a higher principle. If not, is sensible matter eternally self-subsisting? If so, what precisely is the manner of its generation? H.-R. Schwyzer argued that sensible matter is not generated because generation implies corruption. Kevin Corrigan, on the contrary, argued not only that sensible matter is generated but also that there are multiple generations of such matter. In this paper, the authors re-examine some key texts and conclude that a careful reading of the 'Enneads' indicates that neither Schwyzer's nor Corrigan's account is plausible. Rather, in the 'Enneads' both intelligible matter and sensible matter are generated by higher principles in the sense that both eternally depend on these higher principles for their existence but not insofar as they have a beginning in time. Moreover, there is exactly one generation of sensible matter rather than multiple generations.

After more than three decades of economic reform, is China better off? More importantly, do the Chinese people enjoy a greater sense of well-being? Reflecting on the current state of affairs, Jiwei Ci's Moral China in the Age of Reform is a timely and thought-provoking book.The book is a critique of China's lack of political and moral reform after its economic reform since 1978, detailing Professor Ci's genuine concern for the future of China. His personal experience, as a Chinese who lives and teaches in Hong Kong, lends an additional first-person perspective to a penetrating logical analysis of China's predicament in the postmodern context. In their relentless pursuit of wealth, Ci points out, the people of China...

Weakness of the will is often defined by philosophers, e.g., Aristotle and others, as "the moral state of agents who act against their better judgment." John Rist, a prominent Augustinian scholar, claims that for Augustine, all humans are always weak-willed toward everything. If we adopt the Aristotelian concept of WOW and apply it to Rist's statement, Augustine's position is quite alarming. For according to the Aristotelian concept of WOW, moral agents are said to be weak-willed only when they actually act against their better judgment, and thus are morally blameworthy. According to this, Rist's statement could mean that for Augustine, since we are always weak-willed toward everything, we always act against our better judgment and therefore are always morally blameworthy. But is Augustine's position so counterintuitive? ;Since Augustine's position on this issue underwent several considerable changes during his forty-some years of writing, I have limited my investigation to his anti-Pelagian works. For the encounter with the Pelagian heresy made Augustine rethink his position. In his eleven anti-Pelagian writings, Augustine presents his most mature view on WOW. ;In this dissertation, first, I discuss Augustine's change of views on the ability of the human will. Second, I argue that Augustine distinguishes four different kinds of WOW. Third, I investigate the various factors which cause WOW. Fourth, I infer a theory of two-levelled consent. I then critically evaluate some contemporary scholars' interpretations of Augustine's position. The proper definition of Augustine's idea of WOW is, I argue, the state of mind in which concupiscence is present, or in which both concupiscence and a person's final consent to its enticement are present. Since being "weak-willed" for Augustine is a concept which refers to both a universal condition of fallen human nature and one's actual behavior, being weak-willed in the Augustinian sense does not necessarily entail moral blameworthiness. I conclude that Rist's statement is correct only when it means that all humans, ranging from ordinary people to great saints, always suffer the defect of concupiscence and not that all are always morally blameworthy

The Introductory chapter explains the purpose of the book. To this aim, the chapter contains four subsections: (1)Bring the Past Into the Present, (2)Multiculturalism and Liberal Feminism: Is the Rift Between Them Necessary?, (3)Development of Gender Discourse in Chinese Culture and Thought, (4)Purpose of This Volume and Its Four Main Parts, and (5) What's Next? A Way Forward. Excerpt: "Chinese philosophy, broadly construed, in its varied roots and forms has approximately three thousand years of history, and it continues to exert immense influence on the lives of Chinese people as well as on the world community. Nonetheless, if traditions are not simply to remain as antiquated ideas, they must be able to converse with contemporary readers and address their deepest concerns and longings (Pang-White, 2009b, 2009c, 2011). Premised on the undeniable facts that (1) all persons are embodied and cultural beings and that (2) traditions constitute an essential element of individual identity, it would be a mistake to attempt to eradicate traditions altogether, as certain types of liberal feminists have recommended. Instead, it would be more meaningful to ask: Can we, and how do we, re-read, re-imagine, and reconstruct canonical texts so as to find their new significance in the contemporary world? It is generally agreed that Chinese traditions have had a troubled history in dealing with gender relations—well-known examples include concubinage, foot binding,female infanticide, and so on. For various reasons, Chinese traditions and societies have generally been less enthusiastic in confronting, dialoguing about, and resolving problems of gender disparity. Even though gender studies and feminist theories have populated academic discourse in the West since the 1960s, these topics remain relatively marginalized, often as an afterthought, in Chinese philosophical and cultural discourse. Furthermore, as the growing body of research and our deepened knowledge informs and expands our conception of gender, informed persons must ask themselves how Chinese philosophical traditions would and should engage the LGBT community and their concerns. Gender studies is not and should not be perceived simply as a subject in vogue. Rather, for humanity to flourish in this incredibly interdependent network of reality, it is imperative that we have a better understanding of all members of the human community so as to relate to one another in more inclusive, caring, and just ways. Surely, many of our contemporary concerns and vocabularies are anachronistic in the historical settings of classical texts. However, even within the framework of Western traditions, phrases such as “feminism,” “gender,” and “homosexual” were not part of the existing apparatus of vocabulary until the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries (Jenainati and Groves, 2010). Moreover, with the advancement of . . . "

Is a reconciliation possible between Chinese philosophy and woman when taking into account infamous gender-oppressive cultural practices such as foot-binding, concubinage, etc., in premodern Chinese societies? The article tackles the complexity of the subject by calling the readers' attention to texts from Confucian classics that indeed support intellectual equality of the sexes and classless access to education, while noting diverging historical cultural evidences of women's education and their social status in premodern, modern, and postmodern Chinese societies. The article challenges the belief that Confucian philosophy is unequivocally a sexist ideology to be a foregone conclusion. While not intending to exonerate Confucian philosophy from its opponents' charges, the article questions the adequateness of Western liberal feminism as the means to reappropriate Confucian philosophy. It suggests that a more culturally sensitive approach coupling with better historical and contextual analysis would prove to be both helpful and necessary.

This article reappraises Zhu Xi's philosophy of women. First, it examines Zhu's descriptive texts. Second, it analyzes Zhu's didactic texts on li, qi, yin, yang, and gender. It finds that (i) surprisingly Zhu exhibited a level of flexibility toward women on subjects of education, property rights, and household management; (ii) his view on the male/yang and female/yin relationship was inconsistent; and (iii) improvement on Zhu's social-political teaching on women's role could result from a more consistent development of his metaphysics. When thus modified, his metaphysics of yin-yang and li-qi could make a considerable contribution to contemporary feminist discourse

What is philosophy? What is metaphor? Could thinking take place metaphorically? If one follows the mainstream Western definition of philosophy, the answer to the latter question would certainly be negative. Metaphors are perceived as primitive, pre-analytical, and imprecise—thus pre-philosophical! Drawing on multiple cross-cultural resources, Metaphor and Metaphilosophy: Philosophy as Combat, Play, and Aesthetic Experience by Sarah A. Mattice insightfully challenges this widespread assumption in the current...

Afin d'aller au-delà de la critique formulée par Rowe sur la défense de la prescience divine et du libre-arbitre par Augustin, l'A. affirme qu'il y a deux raisonnements dans le De Liberio Arbitrio III, ii-iv. Il fait la distinction entre la capacité à vouloir x, la capacité à vouloir simpliciter et le pouvoir d'accomplir la volonté. La capacité à vouloir simpliciter fait partie du pouvoir de l'individu. Ainsi, pour Augustin, la capacité à vouloir se réduit à la capacité à vouloir simpliciter. Son argumentation est cohérente du point de vue interne

In “Non-self, Agency, and Women: Buddhism’s Modern Transformation,” Ann A. Pang-White argues that “non-self (anātman 無我)” and “emptiness (śūnyatā 空)” necessarily entail nonduality. Buddha nature is neither male nor female. Nonetheless, conflicting teachings are found in various Theravada and Mahayana texts. The more conservative texts have historically resulted in long-standing patriarchal practices: Buddhist nuns receive much less respect and financial support than monks, often facing the possibility of extinction. In Taiwan, however, in a complete reversal, Buddhist nuns outnumber male monks in an astonishing 75 percent to 25 percent ratio, with the largest number of Buddhist nuns in the world. Many Taiwanese nuns are highly educated and socially engaged activists. Nonetheless, to assert one’s autonomy to become a nun is extremely difficult in a Confucian society. How do Taiwanese women, society, and Buddhism mutually transform each other? In addition to an analysis of selected essential Buddhist texts, Pang-White investigates two Buddhist communities of women to shed light on Buddhism’s modern transformation. She concludes that to reform Buddhism from within is not only theoretically possible but also practically achievable.

I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMAkrasia (or, weakness of the will), often defined as “the moral state of agents who act against their better judgment”—a definition first given by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, depicts one of the most human of predicaments.Risto Sarrinen, Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan (New York: E. J. Brill, 1994), p. 1. Similar definitions can be found in, e.g., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII, 1045b10–15; Donald Davidson, “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?” in Moral Concepts, ed. J. Feinberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 93; William Charlton, Weakness of Will (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 1. We know what we ought to do, and we try. But, for one reason or other, we sometimes choose to act contrary to our better judgment.Being influenced by Socratic reasoning, some philosophers have argued that, in principle, one cannot freely and intentionally choose to act against one’s better judgment, if (1) one rationally judges what is best for oneself, (2) one prefers to act according to one’s rational judgment, and (3) one is free to make one’s own choice. See, e.g., Davidson, “How is Weakness,” pp. 93–113; and R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 78–79. Despite the logical difficulty, many believe that weakness of the will is a fact.