Colin Macleod

This dissertation examines Ronald Dworkin's liberal theory of political morality. According to Dworkin, liberalism must be conceived as a species of egalitarianism. It provides an interpretation of what is held to be the most fundamental demand of political morality, namely that individuals be regarded as equal moral persons and as entitled consequently to equal concern and respect. I evaluate Dworkin's interpretation of egalitarianism, particularly as this exhibits itself in his theory of equality of resources which provides the framework for the explanation and justification of liberal ideals of distributive justice, individual liberty and state neutrality. At the centre of this theory is the suggestion that the perfectly competitive market of economic theory has an indispensable role to play in the articulation of the constitutive elements of liberalism. Each chapter of my dissertation examines a different aspect of Dworkin's attempt to employ the market in solving central problems of liberal theory. I show that the concern with equality which ultimately animates liberalism is ill-served by sophisticated manipulations of the market model

Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition among the people. (de Tocqueville 1990, 7)There are significant inequalities in the lives of America's children, including inequalities in the education that these children receive. These educational inequalities include not only disparities in funding per pupil but also in class size, teacher qualification, and resources such as books, labs, libraries, computers, and curriculum, as well as the physical condition of the school and the safety of students within it. While not all schools attended by poor children are bad schools, and not all schools attended by well-off children are good schools, there are clear patterns. Poor children are more likely to attend crowded and poorly equipped schools with less qualified teachers than the children of more affluent families. They are less likely to have computers, books, and advanced placement academic courses. (Satz 2007, 623)

Can suggestion, particularly hypnotic suggestion, influence cognition? Addressing this intriguing question experimentally is on the rise in cognitive research, nowhere more prevalently than in the domain of cognitive control and attention. This may well rest on the intuitive connection between hypnotic suggestion and attention, where the hypnotist controls the subject’s attention. Particularly impressive has been the work of Raz and his colleagues demonstrating the modulation and even the complete elimination of classic Stroop color–word interference when subjects are given a posthypnotic suggestion that words are meaningless. Overriding a highly practiced, possibly even automatic response like reading is testament to the attentional control that can be exerted under hypnotic suggestion. What else do we need to know—in the Stroop context and more broadly—to obtain a clear picture of how suggestion can orchestrate attention?

This paper explores tensions in Ronald Dworkin's liberal theory (and liberalism more generally) about the appropriate relationship of the state to the different conceptions of the good that may be adopted by its citizens. Liberal theory generally supposes that the state must exhibit a kind of impartiality to different conceptions of the good. This impartiality is often thought to be captured by an anti-perfectionist ideal of liberal neutrality. But neutrality is often criticized as an ideal that lacks adequate theoretical support and is difficult to reconcile with liberalism's commitment to government support of various elements of a community's culture. Nonetheless, Dworkin has tried to explain systematically how his egalitarian brand of liberalism can explain the appropriateness of a particular variety of neutrality. I argue, however, that Dworkin's account of the relationship between liberalism and the good is ambiguous. I suggest that an ideal of tolerance which embraces a mild form of perfectionism fits better with the egalitarian foundations of Dworkin's liberalism than neutrality. Moreover, tolerance is an ideal through which familiar tensions about the liberal state's relationship to the good may be resolved.

Since the 1980s, there has been a steady growth of interest in the psychological mechanisms that regulate normal emotional experience. In this same period, cognitive-experimental researchers have sought to delineate the information processing biases that characterize emotional disorders. Exciting potential synergies exist between these two areas of investigation. In this article, we consider ways in which reciprocal benefits could be gained by the constructive transfer of theoretical ideas and methodological approaches between emotion regulation researchers and cognitive-experimental investigators. We also discuss how recent innovations within each field can profitably impact upon progress within the other. It is concluded that the overlap in conceptual constructs, and the convergence of complementary investigative techniques, between these two research domains, provide opportunities for creative synthesis that could significantly enrich understanding of normal and abnormal emotion across future years

Three experiments investigated two timed implicit tests of memory—word reading and color naming. Using the study–test procedure, Experiments 1 and 2 showed that studied words caused reliable facilitation in word reading but no interference in color naming relative to unstudied words. Indeed, there was a small amount of facilitation in color naming as well. Experiment 3 further explored the color naming task by alternating shorter study and test intervals and adding control trials consisting of letter strings. Although both studied and unstudied words showed interference relative to the control letter strings, the amounts of interference they showed did not differ. Overall, word reading consistently displayed facilitation whereas color naming never exhibited increased interference due to word priming. Priming appears to be process-specific: It is restricted to facilitating repetition of processing previously applied to a stimulus and does not extend to influencing performance on a different task involving the same studied materials

We investigated the impact of attention during encoding on later retrieval. During study, participants read some words aloud and named the print color of other words aloud . Then one of two memory tests was administered. The explicit test—recognition—required conscious recollection of whether a word was studied. Previously read words were recognized more accurately than were previously color named words. This contrasted sharply with performance on the implicit test—repetition priming in lexical decision. Here, words that were color named during study showed priming equivalent to words that were read during study; both were responded to faster than unstudied words. Thus, an attentional manipulation during study had a strong effect on an explicit test of memory, but almost no effect on an implicit test. Focal attention during study is crucial for remembering consciously but not necessarily for remembering without awareness

Equality is a fundamental but contested facet of justice. There are competing views about how the basic egalitarian character of justice should be conceptualized and about what practical implications ideals of equality have for the evaluation of political institutions, laws, and social practices. This volume brings together the reflections of some of today's leading political philosophers on the basic character and practical significance of equality as an ideal of justice. The topics explored are diverse and the essays offer challenging new perspectives on recent work about justice and equality. The collection features new essays by Elizabeth Anderson, Richard Arneson, Michael Blake, Colin Macleod, Sophia Moreau, Debra Satz and Kok-Chor Tan. The essays provide an excellent indication of the richness and diversity of contemporary egalitarian theory.

This book presents new findings that deal with different facets of the well-being of children and their relevance to the proper treatment of children. The well-being of children is considered against the background of a wide variety of legal, political, medical, educational and familial perspectives. The book addresses diverse issues from a range of disciplinary perspectives using a variety of methods. It has three major sections with the essays in each section loosely organized about a common general theme. The first section focuses on issues concerning the relation between children’s well-being and autonomy or agency. The second section deals with child well-being insofar as the limits of parental authority are concerned. The third section has a more applied orientation and addresses a variety of public policy controversies involving the interpretation of children’s well-being.