Colin Macleod

What happens when the expression of parental values in child rearing runs contrary to the claim of children to be loved and respected by parents? This chapter asks whether parents who hold, and seek to express, attitudes and beliefs that are contemptuous of sexual minorities are competent parents. We argue that homophobic views held by parents can pose a serious threat to the well-being of children and that adults who harbour such views fall below the threshold of competency requisite to acquiring and maintaining the moral right to parent. We explore this issue by considering whether conservative religious fundamentalists who hold and express strongly homophobic beliefs should be considered competent parents. Some religious fundamentalists seem unwilling to love and respect children who are or might be gay. The systematic denial of love and respect to gay youth by homophobic parents causes a great deal of harm to children and arguably constitutes a form of abuse. The basic structure of the argument we set out is simple: (a) children have a right to affective caring; (b) competent prospective parents must be able to reliably provide affective caring to children; but (c) strongly homophobic parents cannot reliably provide affective to caring to children who are gay; so (d) strongly homophobic adults are not competent parents.

We expect decent parents will discharge their responsibilities to children properly and exercise their authority over children in a reasonable fashion. However, some would-be parents are either unable or unwilling to be decent parents. Such people fail to meet standards of parental competency, and their right either to become parents with authority over children or to continue as parents can be called into question. Although some failures of parental competency are obvious, there are significant controversies about what constitutes decent parenting. This chapter explores parental competency along three dimensions. First, what are the principal elements of a satisfactory account of parental competency? Second, to what degree are there feasible strategies for tracking both prospective parental competency and actual parental competency? Third, how are judgments of parental competency (whether prospective or actual) relevant to determining who has either a right to become a parent or the right to continue as parent?

This chapter examines the nature and normative strength of associative duties of parenthood. Such duties require parents to devote special attention to promoting the interests of their children and permit parents to devote less attention to meeting the needs and interests of other persons. These duties appear to conflict with considerations of distributive justice that seem particularly morally urgent in the unjust world in which we currently live. The chapter argues that there are genuine parental associative duties but the conflict between these duties and considerations of justice is not as deep as is commonly assumed.

This chapter examines how memory might be influenced by a variety of emotional states and conditions experienced by people with anxiety disorders. It reviews research performed with people who describe themselves as generally anxious, as well as with people who have been diagnosed as experiencing generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, phobias, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and panic disorder. In the context of research on “mood congruent” memory, one might expect that these individuals will better remember stimuli that “fit” with their anxious thoughts and beliefs. In some cases, anxious people do show evidence of anxiety-related memory bias, but these probably result from special instances of emotional interpretation of events with ambiguous meaning. Under conditions less prone to interpretive ambiguity, anxious people tend not to remember in emotionally special ways.

The concept of human dignity has remained surprisingly absent from philosophical discussions about the ethics of childhood so far. Likewise, children as a group are mostly neglected in the ongoing discourse on human dignity. In this paper, we attempt to close this double gap by showing that there is, first, a meaningful way to speak of children’s dignity, and that, second, considering children as a group can be illuminating for dignity theorists in general. After an analysis of the reasons why the debates on human dignity and the ethics of childhood have been conducted almost entirely separately, we develop a concept of respecting children as respecting their dignity. Drawing upon personhood accounts of human dignity, we suggest that respecting a child’s dignity means respecting her activity, which means essentially developing and maintaining a perspective of one’s own. Construed in that way, respecting children’s dignity is in some important respects different from concerns about their well-being and their autonomy. In the last section, we will take a step back from the debate about the ethics of childhood and point to some possible conclusions for the debate about human dignity in general.

This book brings together a team of leading theorists to address the question 'What is the right measure of justice?' Some contributors, following Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, argue that we should focus on capabilities, or what people are able to do and to be. Others, following John Rawls, argue for focussing on social primary goods, the goods which society produces and which people can use. Still others see both views as incomplete and complementary to one another. Their essays evaluate the two approaches in the light of particular issues of social justice - education, health policy, disability, children, gender justice - and the volume concludes with an essay by Amartya Sen, who originated the capabilities approach.

This chapter begins with an overview of John Rawls's four‐stage sequence account of how to apply justice as fairness to institutions. It focuses on the facets of institutional design: (i) How should basic democratic institutions and processes be structured so as to realize the fair value of the basic political liberties? (ii) What kinds of educational and health institutions are needed to secure fair equality of opportunity? (iii) How do principles of justice apply to the family? (iv) What implications does the difference principle have for the structure of a market economy? Rawls's extension of the original position via the four‐stage sequence proceeds against the background of three kinds of pluralism. According to Rawls, occupational choice means that there is a diversity of positions open to all citizens, and no one is forced to hold or pursue specific kinds of employment.

Despite the diversity and important disagreement which characterizes theorizing in political philosophy, most contemporary theories of justice yield remarkably similar verdicts on the moral adequacy of current distributions of wealth, income, and opportunity. By almost any standard of justice defended today, we live in a profoundly unjust world. It is obvious, for instance, that utilitarianism, the difference principle, equality of resources, and even modest-sounding principles of equality of opportunity all condemn the yawning gulf which separates the rich and the poor of the world. Even Nozick's recommendation that the difference principle be used as a rough principle for rectifying historical injustice indicates how little immediate practical difference there is between Rawls's theory and its supposed libertarian antithesis. All this suggests that there is a surprising theoretical consensus about the immediate practical demands of justice. In short, moving toward justice requires substantially reducing the dramatic inequalities which plague our world.

Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition among the people. (de Tocqueville 1990, 7)There are significant inequalities in the lives of America's children, including inequalities in the education that these children receive. These educational inequalities include not only disparities in funding per pupil but also in class size, teacher qualification, and resources such as books, labs, libraries, computers, and curriculum, as well as the physical condition of the school and the safety of students within it. While not all schools attended by poor children are bad schools, and not all schools attended by well-off children are good schools, there are clear patterns. Poor children are more likely to attend crowded and poorly equipped schools with less qualified teachers than the children of more affluent families. They are less likely to have computers, books, and advanced placement academic courses. (Satz 2007, 623)

Cet article propose une réponse critique à quelques thèmes du livre de Kyle Johannsen,A Conceptual Investigation of Justice. La discussion se penche sur l’analyse du pluralisme fondamental de la valeur proposée par Johannsen et met en cause cette même analyse. Je soutiens que l’analyse proposée par Johannsen ne parvient pas à expliquer comment des conflits entre des valeurs fondamentales peuvent être résolus et qu’il y a davantage de convergence entre des valeurs fondamentales que ne le reconnaît Johannsen.

Many people place great stock in the importance of civic virtue to the success of democratic communities. Is this hope well-grounded? The fundamental question is whether it is even possible to cultivate ethical and civic virtues in the first place. Taking for granted that it is possible, at least three further questions arise: What are the key elements of civic virtue? How should we cultivate these virtuous dispositions? And finally, how should schools be organized in order to make the education of citizen possible? These interrelated questions are the focus of this collection. By considering these questions from a variety of philosophical perspectives ranging from moral psychology, philosophy of education, and political philosophy, the nine essays assembled here advance our understanding of the challenges we face in trying to shape children to be virtuous citizens.

have recently provided a compelling demonstration of enhanced attentional control under post-hypnotic suggestion. Using the classic color-word interference paradigm, in which the task is to ignore a word and to name the color in which it is printed (e.g., RED in green, say ''green''), they gave a post-hypnotic instruction to participants that they would be unable to read. This eliminated Stroop interference in high suggestibility participants but did not alter interference in low suggestibility participants. replicated this pattern and further demonstrated that it is not due to a visual strategy (such as blurring or looking at a different location). As a historical footnote, we describe a ''case study'' from 18 years ago in which we observed the same result using a hypnotic instruction to a single highly suggestible individual that he could not read. The elimination of Stroop interference has important implications for both the study of attention and the study of hypnosis.