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Lydia Amir

Tufts University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    42
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  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • Tufts University
    Department of Philosophy
    Visiting Professor
Tel Aviv University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1987
Medford and Somerville, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Religion
Normative Ethics
19th Century Philosophy
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Religion
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
19th Century Philosophy
20th Century Philosophy
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Continental Philosophy
European Philosophy
4 more
  • All publications (42)
  • Philosophers, Ethics, and Emotions
    Philosophical Practice 4 (2): 447-458. 2009.
    In this paper I continue to probe the roles of philosophy and psychology in moral education. In a previous article published in this journal, I criticized the moral views of various schools of psychotherapy, and argued that philosophers are the sole professionals equipped to teach normative morality in a pluralistic, critical, and reasoned way. In this paper, I argue that effective moral education involves emotional education; that philosophers’ views of emotions tend to be reductive, and when t…Read more
    In this paper I continue to probe the roles of philosophy and psychology in moral education. In a previous article published in this journal, I criticized the moral views of various schools of psychotherapy, and argued that philosophers are the sole professionals equipped to teach normative morality in a pluralistic, critical, and reasoned way. In this paper, I argue that effective moral education involves emotional education; that philosophers’ views of emotions tend to be reductive, and when they are not, they point to an irreducibility of affectivity which is not amenable to philosophical investigation. While emotional and moral education should go hand in hand, philosophers seem poorly equipped for the former. Psychotherapists are trained in educating emotions and in attending the irreducible affectivity of individual emotions. Interested as we might be in psychotherapists’ specialization in emotional education, we cannot dissociate it from moral education, as emotional education is not value-free. Recalling that psychological theories involve views of morality which do not withstand critical examination, we are reluctant to entrust psychotherapists with moral education. Turning once again to psychology, we realize that we have added a new complexity to the initial problematic status of psychological moral education. While emotional and moral education should go hand in hand, the untenable situation that obtains is that philosophers educate us morally while psychologists educate us emotionally. Moral education is impaired whether it is left to psychotherapists or to philosophers. I conclude by sharing some thoughts on the possibilities of amending this situation.
    Ethics
  •  134
    Humor and the Good Life in Modern Philosophy: Shaftesbury, Hamann, Kierkegaard
    State University of New York Press. 2014.
    _An exploration of philosophical and religious ideas about humor in modern philosophy and their secular implications._.
    HumourEarl of Shaftesbury
  • A “Dangerous Idea” – Taking Seriously Thomas Magnell’s Moral Injunction to Direct Thought to Thought
    Homo Oeconomicus 30 (4): 475-479. 2013.
    Mental States and Processes
  •  1
    The Unconscious: Freud versus Sartre
    In Peter Raabe (ed.), Philosophical Practice and the Unconscious, Trivium Publications. pp. 23-78. 2006.
    Sigmund Freud
  • The Good Life Is the Good Laugh: The Comic in the History of Philosophy
    In A. Ziv & A. Sover (eds.), The Importance of Not Being Earnest, Carmel Press. pp. 206-253. 2012.
  • Rationality as Passion: Plato’s Theory of Love
    Practical Philosophy 4 (3): 6-14. 2001.
    Ethics
  • Lydia Amir
    In Bresson Ladegaard Knox, Berg Olsen Friis & J. Kyrre (eds.), Philosophical Practice: 5 Questions, Automatic Press. pp. 1-14. 2013.
  • Doing Philosophy (review)
    Philosophical Practice 9 (1): 1397-1398. 2014.
  •  53
    What’s it all about? A Guide to Life’s Basic Questions and Answers (review)
    Philosophical Practice 2 (2): 125-127. 2006.
  •  3
    The Role of Impersonal Love in Everyday Life
    In H. Herrestad, A. Holt & H. Svare (eds.), Philosophy in Society, Unipub. pp. 217-242. 2002.
    Theories of LoveVarieties of Love
  •  189
    Shaftesbury—An Important Forgotten Indirect Source of Kierkegaard’s Thought
    Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 19 (1): 189-216. 2013.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 19 Heft: 1 Seiten: 189-216.
    Earl of ShaftesburySøren Kierkegaard
  •  3
    Pride, Humiliation and Humility: Humor as a Virtue
    Philosophical Practice 1 (3): 1-22. 2002.
    Ethics
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