Michael Förster

This article offers a broad-ranging comparison of practical philosophy in the West and in China with a view to enabling not only better mutual understanding between the two sides but also better self-understanding on each side. Contrary to widespread Western conceptions that Chinese practical philosophy may have contributed some important principles in first-order morality but has contributed little in the area of meta-ethics as compared to the West, it is argued here that Chinese practical philosophy did indeed make important contributions in first-order morality, but that in addition it is generally superior to Western practical philosophy in the area of meta-ethics. There are, however, certain exceptions to this rule on both sides. In the end, therefore, a comparison of the two traditions can contribute not only to a better mutual understanding, but also to a better self-understanding and improvement on each side.

The modern concept of critique was originally formed mainly by Kant but was subsequently taken over and modified by the tradition of Hegel, Marx, and the Frankfurt School. This article considers Kant’s concept of critique in some detail, including his historical and autobiographical conception that metaphysics passes from dogmatism to skepticism to critique. It also sketches the modification of the concept by Hegel, Marx, and the Frankfurt School into one of social critique, a theory of social ideology. Neither of these concepts of critique was concerned with relations between societies or cultures. However, the article argues that both of them can and should be developed in such a direction. For the concept of social ideology applies just as much to competition between societies as it does to competition between classes within a single society. And even Kant’s conception of history as a progression from dogmatism to skepticism to critique lends itself to transformation into a powerful critical explanation of Western society’s intolerant attitude toward other societies and into a program for reforming it.

What is the nature of a conceptual scheme? Are there alternative conceptual schemes? If so, are some more justifiable or correct than others? The later Wittgenstein already addresses these fundamental philosophical questions under the general rubric of "grammar" and the question of its "arbitrariness"--and does so with great subtlety. This book explores Wittgenstein's views on these questions. Part I interprets his conception of grammar as a generalized version of Kant's transcendental idealist solution to a puzzle about necessity. It also seeks to reconcile Wittgenstein's seemingly inconsistent answers to the question of whether or not grammar is arbitrary by showing that he believed grammar to be arbitrary in one sense and non-arbitrary in another. Part II focuses on an especially central and contested feature of Wittgenstein's account: a thesis of the diversity of grammars. The author discusses this thesis in connection with the nature of formal logic, the limits of language, and the conditions of semantic understanding or access. Strongly argued and cleary written, this book will appeal not only to philosophers but also to students of the human sciences, for whom Wittgenstein's work holds great relevance.

I would like in this article to make some tentative comparative observations about several sorts of reasoning in Western and Chinese philosophy. I try to say something about three important forms of reasoning: logic, skepticism, and practical reason. In each of these cases one can find strands of Chinese philosophy that are strikingly similar to counterparts in Western philosophy. And while in two of the cases in question the strands involved are less common and less fully developed than their Western counterparts, in the third case they are highly sophisticated and in many ways superior to their Western counterparts.

Johann Gottfried von Herder is one of the most important German philosophers of the eighteenth century, who had enormous influence on later thinkers such as Hegel, Schleiermacher and Nietzsche. His wide-ranging ideas were formative in the development of linguistics, hermeneutics, anthropology and bible scholarship, and even today they retain their vitality and relevance to an extraordinary degree. This volume presents a translation of Herder's most important and characteristic philosophical writings in his areas of central interest, including philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of history and political philosophy, as well as his general philosophical program. An introduction sets the writings in their historical context and examines their philosophical achievement.

Herder already very early in his career, in the 1760s, established two vitally important and epoch-making principles in the philosophy of language: that thought is essentially dependent on and bounded by language; and that meanings or concepts should be identified - not with such items as the referents involved, Platonic forms, or empiricist 'ideas' - but with word-usages. What did Herder do for an encore? His Treatise on the Origin of Language from 1772 might seem the natural place to look for an answer to this question (since it is his best known work in the philosophy of language by far), but it is really the wrong place to look, because it temporarily regresses to a more conventional and less philosophically interesting position. However, Herder did succeed in making impressive progress in a broader array of works, namely by striving to identify prima facie problem cases confronting his two principles and to reconcile them with the latter. The main ones which he identified were God, animals, and non-linguistic art. In each of these cases, having initially proposed a reconciliation which did not work, he went on to develop a much more plausible one, indeed one which (at least in the two cases that really require one: animals and non-linguistic art) seems broadly correct.

What is the nature of a conceptual scheme? Are there alternative conceptual schemes? If so, are some more justifiable or correct than others? The later Wittgenstein already addresses these fundamental philosophical questions under the general rubric of "grammar" and the question of its "arbitrariness"--and does so with great subtlety. This book explores Wittgenstein's views on these questions. Part I interprets his conception of grammar as a generalized version of Kant's transcendental idealist solution to a puzzle about necessity. It also seeks to reconcile Wittgenstein's seemingly inconsistent answers to the question of whether or not grammar is arbitrary by showing that he believed grammar to be arbitrary in one sense and non-arbitrary in another. Part II focuses on an especially central and contested feature of Wittgenstein's account: a thesis of the diversity of grammars. The author discusses this thesis in connection with the nature of formal logic, the limits of language, and the conditions of semantic understanding or access. Strongly argued and cleary written, this book will appeal not only to philosophers but also to students of the human sciences, for whom Wittgenstein's work holds great relevance

Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_ has acquired a paradoxical reputation as one the most important _and_ most impenetrable and inconsistent philosophical works. In _Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit_, Michael N. Forster advances an original reading of the work. His approach differs from that of previous scholars in two crucial ways: he reads the work, first, as a whole—not piecemeal, as it has usually been analyzed—and second, within the context of Hegel's broader corpus and the works of other philosophers. The _Phenomenology of Spirit_ emerges as an extraordinarily coherent work with a rich array of important and original ideas. These include a diagnosis of the ills of modernity in terms of its commitment to a series of dualisms, and a project for overcoming them; a sweeping naturalism; a deep rethinking of and response to problems of skepticism; subtle arguments for social theories of meaning and truth; and ideas based on the insight that human thought changes in fundamental ways over the course of history. Forster's unique and compelling reading unlocks the mysteries of Hegel's seminal work.