Jeremiah Joven Joaquin

The great English philosopher, Freddie Mercury once said, “Time waits for nobody”. Well, he’s not really a philosopher, but many of us would still share his sentiment. Time seems to flow at a steady pace from the past, to the present, and into the future, and it is indifferent to whatever our hopes and dreams might be. But what’s the underlying philosophical idea behind this sentiment? And is this the “right” view to take? Why does it even matter to think about the nature of time in the first place? To guide us through the philosophy of time, we are joined by Graeme A. Forbes, Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Kent.

These interlinking essays are connected by a core theme: the necessary structures in reality that allow certain knowledge of absolute truths. Franklin’s Aristotelian realist philosophy of mathematics shows how mathematical truths are directly about physical reality, and at the same time certainly and provably true. Ranging from mathematics to evidence evaluation to ethics, his philosophy of probability sees the relation of evidence to hypothesis, such as in science and law, as purely logical, hence necessary. Across ethics and the philosophy of religion, the theme of necessity is repeated: basic ethical truths (such as the worth of persons and the wrongness of murder) are shown to have the same certainty as mathematics. Focus on the history of ideas connects the philosophical work in the present with the medieval scholastic tradition, which defended similar necessities but is now neglected. Here is an up-to-date introduction to Franklin’s overall perspective. Recalling Western philosophy to its roots, it reveals the way absolute necessities are discoverable across the abstract fields of mathematics, logical evidence and ethics.

For a dialetheist, it is rational to believe that true contradictions exist. However, we argue that a dialetheist faces a complex dilemma given some bridge principles for rational beliefs that connect possibility and probability, including the so-called ‘Regularity Principle’. Either her belief is not doxastically possible even for her, or she must assign positive credence to the proposition that dialetheia exists. The former makes her belief prima facie self-defeating. The latter seems to compel her to choose between several more fine-grained options, each of which seems undesirable for a regular and rational probability theory. It is unclear how a dialetheist would stay rationally regular, so we pose this challenge, seeking a response from a dialetheist.

According to a traditional conception, romantic love is both constant - if someone loves another, they continue to love them - and exclusive - if someone loves another, they love only the other. In this paper, we argue that the essentiality of constancy and exclusivity is incompatible with the possibilities of fission - roughly speaking, of one person becoming two - and fusion - roughly speaking, of two people becoming one. Moreover, if fission or fusion are possible, then constancy and exclusivity are obligatory features of love only if there are moral dilemmas. We conclude by suggesting this casts doubt on the constancy and especially the exclusivity of love.

In “The Runabout Inference-Ticket,” the New Zealand-born philosopher and logician Arthur N. Prior presented the tonk argument as a case against the inferential role view of logical connectives – the view that the meaning of a given logical connective is completely determined by its roles in deductively valid arguments. This paper evaluates the salient literature surrounding Prior’s argument to draw some insights into what precisely it is supposed to show. In particular, it argues that combined with Prior’s later thoughts expressed in “Conjunction and contonktion revisited,” the tonk argument suggests a more metaphysical-cum-epistemic rather than just a purely (meta) logical view of the nature of logical connectives.

Global Philosophy of Religion is a constructive approach to the philosophy of religion. It aims to incorporate various religious perspectives to diversify the field’s theoretical and practical resources. Proponents of this approach hope that these diverse resources may aid in the progress of the traditional problems of the field. In this introductory chapter, we discuss how the perspectives from Southeast Asia, particularly those from what we call “appropriated religions,” may help in this endeavor.

This book brings together different intercultural philosophical points of view discussing the philosophical impact of what we call the ‘appropriated’ religions of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is home to most of the world religions. Buddhism is predominantly practiced in Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, Laos, and Cambodia; Islam in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei; and Christianity in the Philippines and Timor-Leste. Historical data show, however, that these world religions are imported cultural products, and have been reimagined, assimilated, and appropriated by the culture that embraced them. In this collection, we see that these ‘appropriated’ religions imply a culturally nuanced worldview, which, in turn, impacts how the traditional problems in the philosophy of religion are framed and answered—in particular, questions about the existence and nature of the divine, the problem of evil, and the nature of life after death. Themes explored include: religious belief and digital transition, Theravāda Buddhist philosophy, religious diversity, Buddhism and omniscience, indigenous belief systems, divine apology and unmerited human suffering, dialetheism and the problem of evil, Buddhist philosophy and Spinoza’s views on death and immortality, belief and everyday realities in the Philippines, comparative religious philosophy, gendering the Hindu concept of dharma, Christian devotion and salvation during the Spanish colonial period in the Philippines through the writings of Jose Rizal, indigenous Islamic practices in the Philippines, practiced traditions in contemporary Filipino celebrations of Christmas, role of place-aspects in the appropriation of religions in Southeast Asia, and fate and divine omniscience. This book is of interest to scholars and researchers of philosophy of religion, sociology of religion, anthropology of religion, cultural studies, comparative religion, religious studies, and Asian studies.

This paper reports the policy-responses of different Philippine higher education institutions (HEIs) to the novel coronavirus, COVD-19 pandemic. It compares these responses with those made by HEIs in Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Publicly available data and news reports were used to gauge the general public’s reaction to these policies and how the Philippines’ responses fare with its Southeast Asian neighbors. The paper observes that despite the innovations made by Philippine HEIs in terms of alternative learning modes and technologies for delivering education, there are still gaps and challenges in their responses. It recommends that policy-responses and learning innovations should be grounded on a deeper understanding of distance education and should be sensitive to the call of the times.

In his two articles, F. P. A. Demeterio III attempts to classify works in Filipino philosophy using a list of twelve (or sixteen) supposed discourses that prominent philosophers in the Philippines have engaged in and published over the past few years. From this list, he advises current Filipino philosophers to invest their time and effort in contributing to only five of these because of their alleged higher measure of "developmental potential" as opposed to other discourses. In this paper, we raise some fundamental issues with Demeterio's approach. We show that (i) his work's conclusions rest on questionable methodological assumptions that make (ii) the discourses which the work arrived at and the rankings in terms of "developmental potential" superficial and ungrounded. Finally, (iii) instead of fulfilling the main aim of advancing research in Filipino philosophy, the proposed approach may actually lead to its stagnation and demise. We argue that these issues, if left unanswered, make Demeterio's whole approach to Filipino philosophy unsound and may put into question the employment of such an approach.

Against the pervading opinion, the author takes the positive side of the question "Does logic rest on a metaphysical foundation?" Logic is generally understood as a science that investigates ways of distinguishing good from bad arguments. This conception leads many to think that logic does not rest on any metaphysical foundation - that it is not an ontologically-committing enterprise. To claim that "'Someone is male' logically follows from 'Joey is male"' does not commit one to the existence of maleness or the existence of Joey, even if it is logically true that if Joey is male, then someone is male. This paper, however argues for the contrary thesis. In one possible rendering of what logic means and in one possible understanding of what it is for someone to be ontologically committed to something else, it can be shown that logic is an ontologically-committing activity. From this it is argued that logic has a metaphysical foundation.

Can God change the past? The standard Aquinas line answers this question negatively: God cannot change the past since such an act implies a contradiction; thus is not within the purview of God's omnipotence. While the Aquinas line is well-known, there are other, non-standard solutions to this question. In this paper, I look into such answers. In particular, I explore those answers that employ the resources of gappy and glutty logics. I show how these solutions are motivated and how each offers an alternative conception of what it is for God to be omnipotent. Finally, I consider and reply to potential issues that may be raised against these non-standard answers.