Ovidiu Stanciu

The purpose of this enquiry is to lay out the core features of Garelli’s conception of the world as a “pre-individual field,” as they emerge from his confrontation with Heidegger’s thought. In the first part, I am exploring Garelli’s interpretation of the “poetical expression” and the consequences he draws from it with regard to the process of “worlding” (Verweltlichung). Then, I am restating his criticism with regard to the concept of the world Heidegger developed within the framework of “fundamental ontology” and show why, on Garelli’s account, an understanding of the world as an “existential structure of Dasein” fails to grasp its proper meaning. In the final part, I expose Garelli’s objections to Heidegger’s later understanding of the world as “Fourfold” (Geviert) and underline the dependency of this conception on a set of assumptions which perpetuate the theoretical privilege of individual being.

The purpose of this paper is to lay out the similarities between the philosophical projects of Patočka and Merleau-Ponty, with respect to the question of the “limits of phenomenology”. We suggest that both these authors propose two complementary strategies in their attempt of overcoming the Husserlian phenomenology. The first one consists in extending the field of phenomenology so as for it to be able to encompass phenomena either insufficiently explored or misinterpreted by the conceptuality that Husserl put forth; the second strategy, more ambitious, aims to overpass the very standpoint of phenomenology in favour of an ontological approach. We try to show that what profoundly motivates these attempts is a radical – and hence, ontological – reinterpretation of the Lebenswelt

Dans ses Essais hérétiques sur la philosophie de l’histoire, Jan Patočka donne de la première guerre mondiale une interprétation située dans le sillage de l’interrogation historiale de Heidegger, dont il marque les limites et propose une radicalisation qui fait surgir la solidarité entre la technique et la guerre. Pour Patočka, qui s’appuie sur les récits de guerre de Jünger et de Teilhard de Chardin, la pensée historiale et les témoignages du front s’éclairent mutuellement : la saisie de la première guerre comme « culmination du règne de la force » permet de rendre visibles un certain nombre d’expériences, dont celle du sacrifice. L’expérience du front contient le ferment d’un renversement, d’un « metanoein colossal et inouï », seul capable de miner les bases du système qui a conduit à la guerre et d’ouvrir ainsi une « paix véritable ».