Jose Pereira

For António Quadros, existence is the first category of being, as opposed to essence, with feeling constituting a gnoseological path that precedes reason; if sensation and reason are articulated in the same process of perception and apperception, reason is still obliged to admit other modes of access and metaphysical revelation of being, whether the symbol, the myth or the dream, which simultaneously signals the speculative in a path different from existential thinking of an ontological or phenomenological nature. There is no “man” but human beings in a concrete situation, a fact that makes any abstract dimension of the human impossible, as well as its subtraction from a cosmic order whose hierarchy comprises the human, the natural and the divine, constituting the nature is the mediator between the other two poles. This mediation occurs through the symbol, the greatest power of aesthetic communicability that every work of art presupposes.

This article discusses the theories of perception of Robert Kilwardby and Peter of John Olivi. Our aim is to show how in challenging certain assumptions of medieval Aristotelian theories of perception they drew on Augustine and argued for the active nature of the soul in sense perception. For both Kilwardby and Olivi, the soul is not passive with respect to perceived objects; rather, it causes its own cognitive acts with respect to external objects and thus allows the subject to perceive them. We also show that Kilwardby and Olivi differ substantially regarding where the activity of the soul is directed to and the role of the sensible species in the process, and we demonstrate that there are similarities between their ideas of intentionality and the attention of the soul towards the corporeal world.

Objetivo primordial desse artigo consiste em apresentar o modo como Thomas Reid delineou em seu pensamento a sua teoria da percepção. Desse modo, o referencial teórico utilizado para a explicitação do nosso propósito serão, sobretudo, as Investigações Sobre a Mente Humana e os Poderes Intelectuais do Homem, as suas duas obras fundamentais. A nossa intenção é expor os principais elementos que compõem e estruturam o processo perceptual, visto que essa temática constitui parte integrante e fundamental da epistemologia do pensador escocês. Assim, no decorrer desse trabalho, inevitavelmente deveremos fazer alusão a alguns temas, tais como, concepção, crença e imediaticidade.

This theoretical essay gathers reflections from three publications by Jürgen Habermas from the 1960s that can contribute to the study of the public communication of science. We use these ideas to create a graphical representation that summarizes a desirable dynamic for practice while considering information flows that pass through politicized universities, the social life-world and the context of political decisions. This essay considers the inclusion of the public in the scientific agenda and in policy decisions related to that agenda. A concept of public communication of dialogical science—now widely advocated but still difficult to operationalize—is present in the German philosopher’s thinking in books published more than 50 years ago.

La pregunta por el ser cuando se hace desde la filosofía de la acción, como la de M. Blondel en su tesis L'Action. Essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de lapratiquede 1893, adquiere un interés inédito pues al integrar las aportaciones de la crítica moderna puede contribuir al replanteamiento de los viejos problemas ontológicos para dar origen a un -realismo superior» con sentido para el hombre de hoy. De la fenomenología integral de la acción se llega inevitablemente al planteamiento necesario del problema del ser. Puesto que la acción implica siempre una opción que es emergente respecto a sus condiciones científicas de posibilidad, ésta se convierte en la condición necesaria para que del conocimiento del ser se pase al ser en el conocimiento. La libertad se pone así en el centro de la ontología sin que ésta pierda su rigor racional.

This article discusses Reid's critical analysis of Locke's theory of personal identity. Two significant consequences of this analysis are pointed out: a) that if the same consciousness can be transferred from one intelligent being to another, then two or twenty intelligences may be the same person; b) that a man can be, and at the same time not be, the person who practices a given action. Taking these consequences as a starting point, Reid expounds some considerations on the topic.Fazer uma abordagem na qual seja apresentada a análise crítica de Reid acerca da teoria da identidade pessoal de Locke constitui-se como o objetivo principal desse artigo. Tal análise aponta para duas consequências significativas: a) se a mesma consciência pode ser transferida de um ser inteligente para outro, então, dois ou vinte seres inteligentes podem ser a mesma pessoa; b) a de que um homem pode ser e, ao mesmo tempo, não ser a pessoa que praticou uma determinada ação. Tendo como ponto de partida essas consequências, Reid explicitará algumas considerações em torno do assunto

It is sometimes asserted that Philo of Alexandria is the creator of systematic theology – not because he created systematics , that is, a body of doctrine classified and integrated by a set of principles defined in philosophical terms, but because he created theology , that is, a mode of philosophizing which derives its main categories from a supernatural revelation. Such a mode was pursued by Philo's Christian disciples, among whom was Origen , one of the first of his faith to attempt, unsuccessfully, to formulate a systematics. Not until John Damascene was the attempt realized, but only in part: for while Damascene does classify the doctrinal truths of the Christian faith in an orderly manner, and through the use of philosophically defined concepts, he does not seek to investigate their inner philosophical intelligibility and cohesiveness. Christian doctrine was too involved for being viewed comprehensively all at once, and while some theologians, like Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor , appear to have grasped its inner architectonics, they seem to have been unable to express it in a clear and structured literary form

RESUMO:Fazer uma abordagem sobre a análise de Nagel sobre o materialismo eliminativo no âmbito da filosofia da mente e, com base nisso, refletir sobre a relação entre ciência e filosofia constituem o objetivo fundamental desse artigo. A nossa abordagem encontra-se organizada a partir de dois momentos. Em primeiro lugar, pretendemos discorrer sobre o materialismo eliminativo, visto que essa corrente de pensamento, no contexto da filosofia da mente, condensa e circunscreve de modo mais explícito as discussões acerca dos problemas da relação mente e cérebro, sob o viés de uma ótica cientificista. Em segundo lugar, tendo em vista os pressupostos teóricos do pensamento de Nagel, o nosso propósito consiste em apontar possíveis problemas, lacunas e limites subjacentes às teses defendidas pelos adeptos do eliminativismo. Ainda, a título de conclusão, pretendemos evidenciar quais as principais implicações para a filosofia, uma vez que esse reducionismo cientificista tende a conceder à ciência ou à explicação científica a última palavra. ABSTRACT:The fundamental aim of this article is to approach Nagel’s analysis of eliminative materialism from the point of view of the philosophy of mind, and, based on this discussion, to reflect on the relationship between science and philosophy. Our approach is organized in two stages. First, we intend to discuss eliminative materialism, since this line of thought, in the context of the philosophy of mind, condenses and circumscribes discussions of the problems of the mind-brain relationship from a scientificist perspective. Second, keeping in view the theoretical presuppositions of Nagel’s thought, our purpose is to point out possible problems, gaps, and limitations underlying the theses defended by supporters of eliminativism. In conclusion, we highlight the main implications of this discussion for philosophy, given that scientificist reductionism tends to impart the last word to both science and scientific explanation

The purpose of the present study is to examine the attitudes of Portuguese chartered accountants with respect to questions of ethical nature that can arise in their professional activity. Respondents were asked to respond to the Ethics Position Questionnaire developed by Forsyth (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39(1), 175–184, 1980), in order to determine their idealism and relativism levels. Subsequently, they answered questions about five scenarios related to accounting practices, with the objective of measuring their ethical judgments. Based on the idealism and relativism levels of our respondents, they were classified into one of four groups, representing different ethical ideologies (absolutism, exceptionism, subjectivism, and situationism). The results indicated that age was the major determinant of relativism. Contrary to previous research, older respondents revealed themselves significantly more relativistic than younger ones. Gender seems to be the most important determinant of ethical judgments; against expectations, men evidenced significantly stricter judgments than women in two of the five scenarios. Findings also indicated that respondents’ ethical judgments did not differ significantly based on their ethical ideology, supporting the idea that ethical ideology is not an important determinant of ethical judgments.

The general properties of measurements in microphysics are studied and the three types of probabilities that, according to the authors, appear in wave mechanics are set up. Such a distinction, together with the principle of the localization of the corpuscle as was laid down at the very introduction of the theory of the double solution, provides a good grasp of certain phenomena whose explanation according to the usual theory (which makes no use of permanent localization and where the three types of probabilities are intermingled) leads to paradoxical or self-contradictory situations.

This article has as its main theme the disorder of self-love, according to the thought of Louis Lavelle. For this philosopher, self-love is something that not only tarnishes man's conscience but also his relationships with others. In the egoist there is a process of losing consciousness, since the idea or image that he has of himself is unfair to reality, it is always exaggerated. This false self-image, for being unfounded, prevents your conscience from being perfect, thus making it impossible for one of the philosopher's basic principles: to know oneself. The article discusses self-love, supported by the notion of sincerity towards oneself. This sincerity is only possible when there is detachment from fantasies, that is, detachment from vanity. The reflection carried out in this article was guided by the reading, analysis and interpretation of texts by Lavelle, such as The error of Narcissus, Conduite à l’égard d’autrui, Traité des valeurs, De l’Acte.

Na contemporaneidade, os debates na área da filosofia da mente no que tange ao cérebro e sua relação com a mente, predominantemente tem seguido os cânones da perspectiva materialista, representada pelas ciências empíricas, sobretudo pela neurociência. É tendo em vista esse tipo de abordagem, frente a um problema tão intrigante que, nesse artigo, pretendemos, por meio das categorias da fenomenologia de Husserl, analisar criticamente os argumentos de uma vertente do materialismo muito discutida no âmbito da filosofia da mente, a saber, o materialismo de identidade. Esse artigo encontra-se organizado e estruturado em torno de dois grandes momentos. Em primeiro lugar, o nosso objetivo consiste em demostrar quais são os aspectos mais relevantes que fundamentam as posições do materialismo de identidade no que diz respeito aos estudos sobre o problema mente e cérebro. Em seguida, a partir dos pressupostos teóricos da fenomenologia de Husserl, o nosso objetivo é demonstrar possíveis lacunas e inconsistências quanto a esse tipo de materialismo.