Meinong’s early essay, Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Würdigung des Gedächtnisses1, provides, despite its brevity, a very important discussion of mnesic phenomena. In this paper, I investigate some points I believe to be of particular interest: some of them are briefly broached by Meinong, whereas others form an important part of his argument. Moreover, I will connect the discussion with more recent concerns in analytical philosophy. This presentation is structured in the following way. In section,…
Read moreMeinong’s early essay, Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Würdigung des Gedächtnisses1, provides, despite its brevity, a very important discussion of mnesic phenomena. In this paper, I investigate some points I believe to be of particular interest: some of them are briefly broached by Meinong, whereas others form an important part of his argument. Moreover, I will connect the discussion with more recent concerns in analytical philosophy. This presentation is structured in the following way. In section, I present Meinong’s definition of memory, and contrast it with more recent conceptions. In section, I present his epistemological discussion of memory judgements, which is further investigated in section, where I discuss the notion of presumptive evidence via the criticisms it elicited from Franz Brentano. At the end of this presentation, we will understand why Meinong’s essay is a landmark in the philosophical investigation of memory.