Gillian Brock

In this paper I argue that if we are to have any defensible property rights at all, we must recognize a fundamental commitment to helping those in need. The argument has significant implications for all who claim defensible property rights. In this paper I concentrate on some of the implications this argument has for redefining business obligations. In particular, I show why those who typically would be quite resistant to the idea that businesses have any obligations to assist others in need must acknowledge this fundamental obligation. I also suggest how this argument contributes to our understanding of the normative basis of Stakeholder Theory.

Machine generated contents note: Preface; Introduction; Part I. Global Health, Definitions and Descriptions: 1. What is global health? Solly Benatar and Ross Upshur; 2. The state of global health in a radically unequal world: patterns and prospects Ron Labonte and Ted Schrecker; 3. Addressing the societal determinants of health: the key global health ethics imperative of our times Anne-Emmanuelle Birn; 4. Gender and global health: inequality and differences Lesley Doyal and Sarah Payne; 5. Heath systems and health Martin McKee; Part II. Global Health Ethics, Responsibilities and Justice: Some Central Issues: 6. Is there a need for global health ethics? For and against David Hunter and Angus Dawson; 7. Justice, infectious disease and globalisation Michael Selgelid; 8. International health inequalities and global justice: toward a middle ground Norman Daniels; 9. The human right to health Jonathan Wolff; 10. Responsibility for global health? Allen Buchanan and Matt DeCamp; 11. Global health ethics: the rationale for mutual caring Solly Benatar, Abdallah Daar and Peter Singer; Part III. Analyzing Some Reasons for Poor Health: 12. Trade and health: the ethics of global rights, regulation and redistribution Meri Koivusalo; 13. Debt, structural adjustment and health Jeff Rudin and David Sanders; 14. The international arms trade and global health Salahaddin Mahmudi-Azer; 15. Allocating resources in humanitarian medicine Samia Hurst, Nathalie Mezger and Alex Mauron; 16. International aid and global health Anthony Zwi; 17. Climate change and health: risks and inequities Sharon Friel, Colin Butler and Anthony McMichael; 18. Animals, the environment and global health David Benatar; 19. The global crisis and global health Stephen Gill and Isabella Bakker; Part IV. Shaping the Future: 20. Health impact fund: how to make new medicines accessible to all Thomas Pogge; 21. Biotechnology and global health Hassan Masun, Justin Chakma and Abdallah Daar; 22. Food security and global health Lynn McIntyre and Krista Rondeau; 23. International taxation Gillian Brock; 24. Global health research: changing the agenda Tikki Pang; 25. Justice and research in developing countries Alex John London; 26. Values in global health governance Kearsley Stewart, Gerald T. Keusch and Arthur Kleinman; 27. Poverty, distance and two dimensions of ethics Jonathan Glover; 28. Teaching global health ethics James Dwyer; 29. Towards a new common sense: the need for new paradigms of global health Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill; Index.

What kind of role, if any, can immigration policies play in moving us towards global justice? On one view, the removal of restrictions on immigration might seem to constitute great progress in realizing the desired goal. After all, people want to emigrate mainly because they perceive that their prospects for better lives are more likely to be secured elsewhere. If we remove restrictions on their ability to travel, would this not constitute an advance over the status quo in which people are significantly prevented, through tough immigration restrictions, from seeking a better life for themselves and their dependants? In particular, it might seem that a cosmopolitan must be committed to reducing restrictions on immigration. On one common account of what cosmopolitanism is, the central idea is that every person has global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal respect and consideration no matter what her citizenship status or other affiliations happen to be. It is frequently supposed that a cosmopolitan must be committed to more open borders, and that developed countries restricting entry to people from developing countries is unjust and inconsistent with a commitment to our equal moral worth. However, as I argue, removing restrictions on immigration could constitute a considerable step backward for global justice. In order to appreciate why this is the case, we need to review some relevant empirical evidence that our policy recommendations must take into account. As we see, considerable benefits accrue to the immigrant and host nation, but significant costs must often be born in states of origin. As one example, we consider the effects of remittances often believed to be highly beneficial to the global poor. I discuss evidence indicating that patterns associated with remittances are not always at all desirable. Migration policies need to be better managed so that they do benefit the relevant stakeholders. In section 4 I give examples of how this might work. In section 5 we investigate what kinds of policy recommendations would be best given our findings

Self-determination does and should play an important role in our conceptions of what it is to treat persons and peoples justly. I write at a time when the Middle East is erupting with demands for more appropriate rule by and for the people . Indigenous peoples around the world have been demanding better control over their traditional lands, over the last few decades in particular. And a serious global recession has affected all local economies since 2008, raising pertinent issues about the wisdom of having a global economy as interlinked as ours has become. Would we not do better to "de-link" from the global economy? Would more robust ideals of self-determination and political and economic autonomy provide better guidance than those that seem to dominate the current discussion of models of global justice?

My primary goals in this article are to show: first, that we can identify and justify which basic freedoms are important ones to protect in the global context; second, that we can monitor whether we are making progress with respect to whether more or fewer people are enjoying the important freedoms; third, that we can identify some key institutions that play a central role in fortifying those freedoms; fourth, that we can help build or fortify local capacity with respect to protecting basic freedoms; fifth, that external support and building international institutions can play an important role in securing local capacity to protect basic liberties. The emphasis is on trying to construct local capacity to protect basic freedoms. However external support has a key role to play. I argue that protecting press freedom and building institutions of international justice play crucial roles in securing local capacity to protect basic liberties. We have obligations to support those institutions that would facilitate progress with respect to protection of basic liberties. So, for instance, we have a range of responsibilities to support press freedom in all countries, along with international efforts to bring to justice violators of basic liberties

The Ethics of Immigration is a wonderfully comprehensive and insightful journey through all the major contemporary ethical issues concerning immigration. Through this outstandingly well-crafted work, Carens builds a compelling case for many important positions on how we should treat migrants. Nevertheless, I believe there are some tensions in his arguments that could do with more analysis. I present some of these issues in this article. These include some important problems with arguments for the right to education for children of irregular migrants and those concerning admission, his general position on refugees, and his views about what is required in order to treat temporary workers fairly.

David Miller offers us a sophisticated account of how we can reconcile global obligations and duties to co?nationals. In this article I focus on four weaknesses with his account such as the following two. First, there remains considerable unclarity about the strength of the positive duties we have to non?nationals and how these measure up relative to other positive duties, such as the ones Miller believes we have to co?nationals to implement civil, political, or social rights. Second, just how responsibilities for enacting our global commitments will be assigned still needs further development. A unifying theme of my criticisms concerns Miller?s account of how we are to mediate responsibilities to fellow?nationals and the partiality we may defensibly show co?nationals. In the final section I sketch an alternative way of conceptualizing our duties to fellow?nationals and duties to non?nationals, which can give more systematic advice about the partiality we may defensibly show co?nationals

I examine how reforming our international tax regime could be an important vehicle by which we can begin to realize global justice. For instance, eliminating tax havens, tax evasion, and transfer pricing schemes are all important to ensure accountability and to support democracies. I argue that the proposals concerning taxation reform are likely to be more effective in tackling global poverty than Thomas Pogge's global resources dividend because they target some of the central issues more effectively. I also discuss many particular proposals for global taxes that have already been floated and implementation prospects and successes.

Are consumers in high-income countries complicit in labor exploitation when they buy good produced in sweatshops? To focus attention we consider cases of labor exploitation such as those of exposing workers to very high risks of irreversible diseases, for instance, by failing to provide adequate safety equipment. If I purchase a product made under such conditions, what is my part in this exploitation? Is my contribution one of complicity that is blameworthy? If so, what ought I to do about such participation? I address these questions at fi rst by applying a comprehensive account recently offered by Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin, and analyzing the results in light of some important empirical issues.

In this paper I argue that needs are tremendously salient in developing any plausible account of global justice. I begin by sketching a normative thought experiment that models ideal deliberating conditions. I argue that under such conditions we would choose principles of justice that ensure we are well positioned to be able to meet our needs. Indeed, as the experiment aims to show, any plausible account of distributive justice must make space for the special significance of our needs. I go on to offer some empirical support for this view by looking at the important work of Frohlich and Oppenheimer. I then present an account of our basic needs that can meet a number of goals: for instance, it provides a robust theoretical account of basic needs which can enjoy widespread support, and it can also provide an adequate framework for designing policy about needs, and thus help us to discharge our global obligations. I then briefly discuss the relationship between basic needs and human rights, arguing why the basic needs standard is more fundamental than—and required by—the human rights approach. Finally, I tackle a few important sets of objections to my view, especially some objections concerning distributing our responsibilities for meeting needs.

Are corporations morally defensible sorts of entities? How might we go about showing that they are? Thomas Donaldson offers us the most detailed contractarian justification for the moral defensibility of corporations. In this paper I show how we can significantly develop this sort of justification to yield a more compelling contractarian justification, though one that is importantly conditional. The primary points I take up in this paper are these:1. The question Donaldson poses to generate his contract is not quite as simple as may appear. The sort of transformation we need to consider is more complex than the sort Donaldson describes.2. Partly because of considerations that arise in discussing the first point, the contract we are considering is a more conditionalagreement. The terms of the agreement will vary depending on the kind of state we are assuming prevails. The sort of contract we wantto draw up is at least a three-way contract: between society, productive organizations and the state. The sort of agreement we reach will have the following form: society a agrees to allow productive organizations of type b to exist if we assume state c will do various things (d1 to dn), productive organizations will do various things (e1 to en) and members of society will do various things (f1 to fn). Importantly, if state c is not doing d1 to dn, productive organizations may not be morally defensible.3. The terms of the contract that can be derived would benefit from the introduction of some of Rawls’s apparatus.4. When we consider the right questions, with more of the background institutions filled in, and when we include some more social contract apparatus, we get a better contract which fills in for us not only the obligations of business but, importantly, many obligationsfor government as well.

Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism - namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values - is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the issue of what, according to the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled.

In a period of rapid internationalization of trade and increased labor mobility, is it relevant for nations to think about their moral obligations to others? Do national boundaries have fundamental moral significance, or do we have moral obligations to foreigners that are equal to our obligations to our compatriots? The latter position is known as cosmopolitanism, and this volume brings together a number of distinguished political philosophers and theorists to explore cosmopolitanism: what it consists in, and the positive case which can be made for it. Their essays provide a comprehensive overview of both the current state of the debate and the alternative visions of cosmopolitanism with which we can move forward, and they will interest a wide range of readers in philosophy, political theory, and law.

Many people believe in what can be described as a 'concentric circles model of responsibilities to others' in which responsibilities are generally stronger to those physically or affectively closer to us - those who, on this model, occupy circles nearer to us. In particular, it is believed that we have special ties to compatriots and, moreover, that these ties entail stronger obligations than the obligations we have to non-compatriots. While I concede that our strongest obligations may generally be to those family and friends with whom we have close personal relationships, those often thought to occupy the inner core, what I want to challenge is the idea that our obligations diminish in strength when we move beyond the boundary of the circles occupied by compatriots and proceed to those more geographically or culturally distant from us. The weight that is typically placed on the boundary between compatriots and non-compatriots in determining the strength of our obligations to others cannot withstand critical scrutiny. In this paper I show that arguments that are supposed to work to justify stronger obligations to compatriots than non-compatriots do not succeed in the ways imagined. I also present the framework of a contractarian-style model which aims to give us a more systematic way to think about our obligations to 'non-core' others, both distant and near. While we can certainly have different kinds of obligations, my analysis shows that our basic obligations to others do not diminish with distance. In addition, my account aims to flesh out what our basic obligations to others are.

In this critical discussion of Simon Caney's global political theory, I focus on two broad areas. In the first area, I consider Caney's suggestions concerning global equality of opportunity and note several problems with how we might develop these ideas. Some of the problems concern aggregation, while others point to difficulties with what equality of opportunity means in a culturally plural world, where different societies might value, construct, and rank goods in different ways. In the second broad area of criticism I argue that Caney has been unfair to contractarians and I rally to their defense.