Daniel Robinson

In the third of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid devotes the fourth chapter to the concept of‘identity’, and the sixth chapter to Locke’s theory of ‘personal identity’. This latter chapter is widely regarded as a definitive refutation of the thesis that personal identity is no more than memories of a certain sort. It is interesting that the terms ‘identity’ and ‘personal identity’ do not appear as chapter or section titles elsewhere in any of Reid’s works; and Hume is neither mentioned nor his theory of personal identity discussed in the two chapters specifically addressed to the matter. Moreover, while Locke, Reid, and Hume are often anthologized in works on personal identity, Reid is always presented as replying only to Locke.

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' Kant is explicit, sometimes to the point of peevishness, in denying anthropology and psychology any part or place in his moral science. Recognizing that this will strike many as counterintuitive he is unrepentant: ‘We require no skill to make ourselves intelligible to the multitude once we renounce all profundity of thought’. That the doctrine to be defended is not exemplified in daily experience or even in imaginable encounters is necessitated by the very nature of morality which cannot be served worse ‘… than by seeking to derive it from examples’. Thus, the project of the moral philosopher begins with the recognition that the moral realm is not mapped by anthropological data and does not get its content therefrom. Rather, moral philosophy must be ‘completely cleansed’ of everything that is appropriate to anthropology

Philosophers of science have devoted volumes to the question of explanation; I've devoted some pages to it myself. In this highly contracted essay I shall offer no more than a comment on the problem of explanation, some vagrant but critical assessments of the dominant approaches to it, and a caution lest we take comfort in some of the recent "success"—or alleged success—in Psychology. I begin with this question: What does it mean to explain an occurrence? And then: What is it about any explanation that makes it good or bad? 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Scientism: The New Orthodoxy is a comprehensive philosophical overview of the question of scientism, discussing the place of science in the humanities and religion. Clarifying and defining the key terms in play in discussions of scientism, this collection identifies the dimensions that differentiate science from scientism. Leading scholars appraise the means available to science, covering the impact of the neurosciences and the new challenges it presents for the law and the self. Illustrating the effect of scientism on the humanities, Scientism: The New Orthodoxy addresses what science is. This provocative collection is an important contribution to the humanities in the 21st century. Contributors include: Peter Hacker, Bastian van Fraassen, Kenneth Schaffner, Roger Scruton, James K.A. Smith, Richard Swinburne, Lawrence Principe and Richard Williams.

The perils and sometimes macabre consequences of Aristotle-worship have been documented historically and serve as a general warning to scholars in every discipline. The necessary course—I might say the "golden mean"—is to be found between an uncritical praise and a final burial. Aristotle's record can only enjoy the lasting respect of all students, but apart from the matter of his just deserts is the enduring usefulness of his contributions. Nonetheless a certain perspective must be maintained if Psychology is to derive due measure of the benefits, while avoiding what is misleading or confused or idle in the surviving works. That this perspective is hard-won can be seen from the tendency even among seasoned Aristotle scholars to misplace it as they move from topic to topic. And so I offer what I hope is to be the somewhat clearer paths to this perspective, though very sketchily and with a modesty fully earned through years of strenuous attention to Aristotle's writings. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Contrary to the estimation of Reid’s close friend and admiring biographer, Dugald Stewart, the correspondence of Thomas Reid is of great interest. Not only do the letters offer more than a hint of the extraordinary breadth of Reid’s interests, but they reinforce conclusions reached by his readers as to the intellectual integrity, the fairness, and the modesty of this central figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. Credit is due to Paul Wood for including all of the known letters to and from Reid, and to the General Editor, Knud Haakonssen, for the entire ten-volume Edinburgh Edition of Reid’s works. It will not be until 2007 that the entire set is available, but the volumes published to date leave no doubt as to the high standards of scholarship and the comparably high production value reserved for this undertaking.

The constant threats to scientific progress are complacency and the diminished capacity for self-criticism. There have been great advances in our understanding of the functional anatomy of the nervous system, advances that stand in vivid contrast to our understanding of the moral, aesthetic and political dimensions of human life. The contrast is so great as to encourage the belief that these dimensions are found beyond the ambit of scientific explanation. How pathetic, then, to witness strident and smug attacks on those who have reached this plausible and profound conclusion.

The sources for this volume are the unpublished papers of Reid contained in the Birkwood Colletion. As the title of the volume indicates, Reid’s teaching as a Regent included Logic, Rhetoric, and the Fine Arts. The regenting system assigned cadres of students to a specific teacher who would pace them through the entire curriculum of study. Broadie cites Reid’s own defenses of this system and the important educational and civic aims achieved by it, at the relatively slight cost of unavoidable superficiality. Today’s academic world might benefit from a consideration of current practices as informed by Reid’s ideas on just this point.