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James Garvey

  •  Home
  •  Publications
    56
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    1

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  • All publications (56)
  •  68
    Aristotle
    The Philosophers' Magazine 92 99-105. 2021.
  •  15
    Editorial
    The Philosophers' Magazine 92 5-5. 2021.
  •  12
    Editorial
    The Philosophers' Magazine 90 5-5. 2020.
  •  15
    Editorial
    The Philosophers' Magazine 89 5-5. 2020.
  •  60
    Sustainability in Philosophy
    Discourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies 10 (1): 203-223. 2010.
  •  55
    Frank Jackson, Latter Day Physicalist
    The Philosophers' Magazine 88 90-99. 2020.
  •  8
    Editorial
    The Philosophers' Magazine 88 5-5. 2020.
  •  18
    Editorial
    The Philosophers' Magazine 87 5-5. 2019.
  •  12
    Editorial
    The Philosophers' Magazine 86 5-5. 2019.
  •  11
    Editorial
    The Philosophers' Magazine 85 5-5. 2019.
  •  21
    Editorial
    The Philosophers' Magazine 84 5-5. 2019.
  •  12
    Editorial
    The Philosophers' Magazine 79 5-5. 2017.
  •  21
    Editorial
    The Philosophers' Magazine 83 5-5. 2018.
  •  25
    From the editor
    The Philosophers' Magazine 52 4-4. 2011.
  •  47
    “Naming names would kill our career chances”
    with Jeremy Stangroom
    Philosophers' Magazine 60 (-1). 2013.
  •  477
    What Does McGinn Think We Cannot Know?
    Analysis 57 (3): 196-201. 1997.
    Exactly what is McGinn saying when he claims that we cannot solve the mind-body problem? Just what is cognitively closed to us? The text suggests at least four possibilities. I work through each them in some detail, and I come to two principal conclusions. First, by McGinn's own understanding of the mind-body problem, he needs to show that we are cognitively closed to how brains generate consciousness, but he argues for something else, that we are cognitively closed to the brain property in virt…Read more
    Exactly what is McGinn saying when he claims that we cannot solve the mind-body problem? Just what is cognitively closed to us? The text suggests at least four possibilities. I work through each them in some detail, and I come to two principal conclusions. First, by McGinn's own understanding of the mind-body problem, he needs to show that we are cognitively closed to how brains generate consciousness, but he argues for something else, that we are cognitively closed to the brain property in virtue of which the brain is the basis of consciousness. Second, it turns out that McGinn is not entitled to any of the four closure possibilities
    Cognitive ClosureExplaining Consciousness, MiscThe Explanatory Gap
  •  124
    Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind By Tye Michael MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1995, xvi + 239 pp. (review)
    Philosophy 72 (282): 606-. 1997.
    Representationalism
  •  97
    The wickedness of the long hot shower
    The Philosophers' Magazine 41 82-86. 2008.
    If it’s correct to think that the West does wrong by doing nothing despite having the room to reduce emissions and the capacity to do so, then it’s correct to think that we’re doing wrong too, in our everyday lives. Your emissions might be as much as 20 times more than others in the world; you might be doing as much as 20 times the damage to the planet compared to other people. The bulbs are not enough
    Topics in Environmental EthicsClimate Change
  •  2
    Interview: Richard Sorabji
    with Jeremy Stangroom
    Philosophers' Magazine 60 (-1). 2013.
  •  62
    McGinn resigns
    The Philosophers' Magazine 62 7-7. 2013.
    Cognitive Closure
  •  792
    Frank Jackson Interview
    The Philosophers' Magazine 59 (59): 66-75. 2012.
    The Knowledge Argument
  •  90
    Doubt all ye who enter
    The Philosophers' Magazine 37 58-61. 2007.
    French Philosophy
  •  72
    Consciousness and absence
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8): 44-60. 2006.
    Theories of Consciousness, MiscellaneousContent Internalism and ExternalismConsciousness and ContentRead more
    Theories of Consciousness, MiscellaneousContent Internalism and ExternalismConsciousness and ContentInternalism and Externalism about Experience
  •  129
    Climate change in 1,000 years
    Think 6 (17-18): 211-218. 2008.
    In issue 15, John Shand addressed the moral issue of climate change and suggested that what might happen in 1,000 years time is not as important, morally speaking, as many of us think. Here, James Garvey responds
    Climate Change
  •  362
    Climate Change and Causal Inefficacy: Why Go Green When It Makes No Difference?
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69 157-174. 2011.
    Think of some environmentally unfriendly choices – taking the car instead of public transport or driving an SUV, just binning something recyclable, using lots of plastic bags, buying an enormous television, washing clothes in hot water, replacing something when you could make do with last year's model, heating rooms you don't use or leaving the heating high when you could put on another layer of clothing, flying for holidays, wasting food and water, eating a lot of beef, installing a patio heate…Read more
    Think of some environmentally unfriendly choices – taking the car instead of public transport or driving an SUV, just binning something recyclable, using lots of plastic bags, buying an enormous television, washing clothes in hot water, replacing something when you could make do with last year's model, heating rooms you don't use or leaving the heating high when you could put on another layer of clothing, flying for holidays, wasting food and water, eating a lot of beef, installing a patio heater, maybe even, as some have said lately, owning a dog. Think about your own choices, instances in which you take an action which enlarges your carbon footprint when you might have done otherwise without much trouble. Is there consolation in the thought that it makes no difference what you do?
    Climate ChangeFuture GenerationsSustainabilityEnvironmental Justice
  •  64
    Believing P but Not P
    Cogito 11 (1): 14-16. 1997.
    Epistemological States and Properties
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