•  5
    Review of Jean-Luc Marion, Cartesian Questions (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2): 241-242. 2001.
  •  40
    On the value of natural relations
    Environmental Ethics 19 (2): 173-183. 1997.
    In “A Refutation of Environmental Ethics” Janna Thompson argues that by assigning intrinsic value to nonhuman elements of nature either our evaluations become (1) arbitrary, and therefore unjustified, or (2) impractical, or (3) justified and practical, but only by reflecting human interest, thus failing to be truly intrinsic to nonhuman nature. There are a number of possible responses to her argument, some of which have been made explicitly in reply to Thompson and others which are implicit in t…Read more
  •  134
    Integrity and the Fragile Self
    with Marguerite La Caze and Michael P. Levine
    Ashgate. 2003.
    This book examines the centrality of integrity in relation to a variety of philosophical and psychological concerns that impinge upon the ethical life.
  •  125
    Agent-based Theories of Right Action
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5): 505-515. 2006.
    In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail …Read more
  •  51
    The trouble with truth-makers
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1). 1997.
    This paper argues that theories of truth which seek to specify the ontological ground of true statements by appealing to an ontology of truth‐makers face a severe and possibly insurmountable obstacle in the form of logically complex statements. I argue that there is no apparent way to develop an account of logically complex truth within the confines of a modest and plausible ontology of truth‐makers and to this end criticize independent attempts by Armstrong and Pendlebury to develop such an acc…Read more
  •  65
    Realism and Epistemic Theories of Truth
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4): 473-486. 2001.
    This paper explores the relation between epistemic conceptions of truth and different kinds of commitment to realism and antirealism. It argues that all epistemic conceptions of truth are versions of antirealism. Although epistemic conceptions of truth can make various concessions to realist intuition, these remain concessions only. One cannot concede all claims to antirealism and remain within the orbit of a genuinely epistemic conception of truth
  •  30
    Judgment, Deliberation, and the Self-effacement of Moral Theory
    Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (3): 289-302. 2012.
    ExtractIn developing moral theories, philosophers seek to fulfill at least two tasks: to guide moral judgment and to guide moral deliberation. In moral judgment, moral agents assess moral status. In moral deliberation, moral agents decide how to act. It is important to work out how these two things are related. One suggestion is to posit a direct connection between them according to which moral agents are required to deliberate in terms of correct moral judgment. There are various ways of spelli…Read more
  •  118
    Goodman and Putnam on the making of worlds
    Erkenntnis 58 (1). 2003.
    Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.
  •  37
    Believing Badly
    Philosophical Papers 33 (3): 309-328. 2004.
    This paper explores the grounds upon which moral judgment of a person's beliefs is properly made. The beliefs in question are non-moral beliefs and the objects of moral judgment are individual instances of believing. We argue that instances of believing may be morally wrong on any of three distinct grounds: (i) by constituting a moral hazard, (ii) by being the result of immoral inquiry, or (iii) by arising from vicious inner processes of belief formation. On this way of articulating the basis of…Read more
  •  8
    Review of Soren Haggqvist, Thought Experiments in Philosophy (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 120-132. 1998.
  •  7
    On the Value of Natural Relations
    Environmental Ethics 19 (2): 173-183. 1997.
    In “A Refutation of Environmental Ethics” Janna Thompson argues that by assigning intrinsic value to nonhuman elements of nature either our evaluations become arbitrary, and therefore unjustified, or impractical, or justified and practical, but only by reflecting human interest, thus failing to be truly intrinsic to nonhuman nature. There are a number of possible responses to her argument, some of which have been made explicitly in reply to Thompson and others which are implicit in the literatur…Read more
  •  31
    BOOK REVIEW Extract: Integrity, it seems, is a matter of remaining true to oneself, or rather, it is a matter of remaining true to what one reasonably judges to be the best of oneself. In Integrity and the Virtues of Reason, Greg Scherkoske seeks to overturn this piece of conventional wisdom. It is a fine book and I learned a lot from it. Scherkoske elaborates and defends the idea that integrity is an epistemic virtue; that it is not fundamentally a matter of being true to oneself but of being a…Read more
  •  11
    Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics
    International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2): 241-242. 2001.
  •  16
    Academic Virtues: Site Specific and Under Threat
    Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (4): 753-767. 2016.
    Extract: Clearly, academic life takes place at the intersection of many social practices. If MacIntyre is right, the role-specific virtues of academic life should be understood in terms of these practices.2 Academic virtues are those excellences required to obtain the internal goods of the social practices constituting academic life. And the social practices of academic life are sustained, competitive and cooperative attempts to achieve a set of academic goals and realize academic forms of excel…Read more