•  39
    Is Yablo’s paradox non-circular?
    Analysis 61 (3): 176-87. 2001.
  •  158
    A Neglected Qua Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology
    Faith and Philosophy 36 (2): 157-172. 2019.
    We advance a neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table, leaving future debate to tell its ultimate fate. After presenting the view we measure it against standard problems that confront extant QUA views and also against objections peculiar to the proposed view.
  •  71
    Existential claims and platonism
    Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1): 80-86. 2001.
    This paper responds to Colin Cheyne's new anti-platonist argument according to which knowledge of existential claims—claims of the form such-tmd-so exist—requires a caused connection with the given such-and-so. If his arguments succeed then nobody can know, or even justifiably believe, that acausal entities exist, in which case (standard) platonism is untenable. I argue that Cheyne's anti-platonist argument fails
  •  5
    Introductory Remarks
    The Monist 89 (1): 3-8. 2006.
  •  28
    The simple liar without bivalence?
    with Ot&Aacutevio Bueno
    Analysis 62 (1): 22-26. 2002.
  •  45
    This paper presents a new puzzle for certain positions in the theory of truth. The relevant positions can be stated in a language including a truth predicate T and an operation that takes sentences to names of those sentences; they are positions that take the T-schema A ↔ T to hold without restriction, for every sentence A in the language. As such, they must be based on a nonclassical logic, since paradoxes that cannot be handled classically will arise. The bestknown of these paradoxes is probab…Read more
  •  100
    Why Priest's reassurance is not reassuring
    Analysis 72 (3): 517-525. 2012.
    In the service of paraconsistent (indeed, ‘dialetheic’) theories, Graham Priest has long advanced a non-monotonic logic (viz., MiLP) as our ‘universal logic’ (at least for standard connectives), one that enjoys the familiar logic LP (for ‘logic of paradox’) as its monotonic core (Priest, G. In Contradiction , 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First printed by Martinus Nijhoff in 1987: Chs. 16 and 19). In this article, I show that MiLP faces a dilemma: either it is (plainly) unsuitable as…Read more
  •  153
    The story goes that Epimenides, a Cretan, used to claim that all Cretans are always liars. Whether he knew it or not, this claim is odd. It is easy to see it is odd by asking if it is true or false. If it is true, then all Cretans, including Epimenides, are always liars, in which case what he said must be false. Thus, if what he says is true, it is false. Conversely, suppose what Epimenides said is false. Then some Cretan at some time speaks truly. This might not tell us anything about Epimenide…Read more
  •  19
    True, false and paranormal
    Analysis 66 (2): 102-114. 2006.
  •  132
    Where the Paths Meet: Remarks on Truth and Paradox &ast
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 169-198. 2008.
    The study of truth is often seen as running on two separate paths: the nature path and the logic path. The former concerns metaphysical questions about the ‘nature’, if any, of truth. The latter concerns itself largely with logic, particularly logical issues arising from the truth-theoretic paradoxes. Where, if at all, do these two paths meet? It may seem, and it is all too often assumed, that they do not meet, or at best touch in only incidental ways. It is often assumed that work on the metaph…Read more
  •  44
    Truth and the absence of fact
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3). 2003.
    Book Information Truth and the Absence of Fact. By Hartry Field. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xi + 401. Hardback, 45.00, US$65.00. Paperback, 16.99, $24.95
  •  169
    The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays (edited book)
    with Graham Priest and Bradley P. Armour-Garb
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced…Read more
  •  44
    There is no Logical Negation: True, False, Both, and Neither
    Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1). 2017.
    In this paper I advance and defend a very simple position according to which logic is subclassical but is weaker than the leading subclassical-logic views have it.
  •  27
    Curry's Paradox
    Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. CSLI Publications. 2017.
    “Curry’s paradox”, as the term is used by philosophers today, refers to a wide variety of paradoxes of self-reference or circularity that trace their modern ancestry to Curry (1942b) and Löb (1955). The common characteristic of these so-called Curry paradoxes is the way they exploit a notion of implication, entailment or consequence, either in the form of a connective or in the form of a predicate. Curry’s paradox arises in a number of different domains. Like Russell’s paradox, it can take the f…Read more
  •  62
    Spandrels of Truth
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth
  •  93
    True, false and paranormal
    Analysis 66 (2). 2006.
  •  64
    Further remarks on truth and contradiction
    Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207): 217-225. 2002.
    We address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondence-theoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. We argue that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. We close by highlighting, but not attempting to resolve, two further challenges for dialetheism whi…Read more
  •  252
    Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox
    Journal of Philosophy 110 (3): 143-165. 2013.
    In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: c-Curry, the standard conditional-Curry paradox, and v-Curry, a validity-involving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving c-curry. A unified treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a unified treatment of both c-Curry and v-Curry. If, as is often thought, c-Curry paradox is to be solved via non-classical logic, then v-Curry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity…Read more
  •  12
    Minimalism, gaps, and the Holton conditional
    Analysis 60 (4): 340-351. 2000.
  •  121
    This paper applies what I call the shrieking method (a refined version of an idea with roots in Priest's work) to one of – if not the – issues confronting glut-theoretic approaches to paradox (viz., the problem of ‘just true’ or, what comes to the same, ‘just false’). The paper serves as a challenge to formulate a problem of ‘just true’ that isn't solved by shrieking (as advanced in this paper), if such a problem be thought to exist
  •  106
    On the identity theory of truth
    Philosophy 75 (1): 127-130. 2000.
    According to the so-called identity theory of truth. A proposition is true if the given proposition is identical to some fact. But with which fact must a proposition be identical if it is to be true? This question, according to some philosophers (notably Stewart Candlish), raises serious problems for the identity theory of truth. The worry is that the identity must specify the "right fact" if it is to be an acceptable theory. The current paper aims to help the identity theory by dissolving the a…Read more
  •  64
    Introductory remarks
    The Monist 89 (1): 3-8. 2006.
  •  272
    On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality
    with Ross T. Brady, J. Michael Dunn, A. P. Hazen, Edwin D. Mares, Robert K. Meyer, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, David Ripley, John Slaney, and Richard Sylvan
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3). 2012.
    One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions o…Read more
  •  21
    Not so deep inconsistency: a reply to Eklund
    with Graham Priest
    Australasian Journal of Logic 5 74-84. 2007.
    In his “Deep Inconsistency?” Eklund attacks arguments to the effect that some contradictions are true, and especially those based on the liar paradox, to be found in Priest’ In Contradiction. The point of this paper is to evaluate his case.
  •  47
    Strict-Choice Validities: A Note on a Familiar Pluralism
    Erkenntnis 79 (S2): 301-307. 2014.
    My aim here is a modest one: to note another example in which the theory of validity and the theory of ‘inference’ naturally come apart. The setting is multiple-conclusion logic. At least on one philosophy of multiple-conclusion logic, there are very clear examples of where logic qua validity and logic qua normative guide to inference are essentially different things. On the given conception, logic tells us only what follows from what, what our ‘choices’ are given a set of premises; it is simply…Read more
  •  98
    From full blooded platonism to really full blooded platonism
    Philosophia Mathematica 7 (3): 322-325. 1999.
    Mark Balaguer argues for full blooded platonism (FBP), and argues that FBP alone can solve Benacerraf's familiar epistemic challenge. I note that if FBP really can solve Benacerraf's epistemic challenge, then FBP is not alone in its capacity so to solve; RFBP—really full blooded platonism—can do the trick just as well, where RFBP differs from FBP by allowing entities from inconsistent mathematics. I also argue briefly that there is positive reason for endorsing RFBP
  • Logic: The Basics
    Routledge. 2010.
    _Logic: The Basics_ is an accessible introduction to several core areas of logic. The first part of the book features a self-contained introduction to the standard topics in classical logic, such as: · mathematical preliminaries · propositional logic · quantified logic · English and standard ‘symbolic translations’ · tableau procedures. Alongside comprehensive coverage of the standard topics, this thoroughly revised second edition also introduces several philosophically important nonclassical lo…Read more