
158A Neglected Qua Solution to the Fundamental Problem of ChristologyFaith and Philosophy 36 (2): 157172. 2019.We advance a neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table, leaving future debate to tell its ultimate fate. After presenting the view we measure it against standard problems that confront extant QUA views and also against objections peculiar to the proposed view.

71Existential claims and platonismPhilosophia Mathematica 9 (1): 8086. 2001.This paper responds to Colin Cheyne's new antiplatonist argument according to which knowledge of existential claims—claims of the form suchtmdso exist—requires a caused connection with the given suchandso. If his arguments succeed then nobody can know, or even justifiably believe, that acausal entities exist, in which case (standard) platonism is untenable. I argue that Cheyne's antiplatonist argument fails

45This paper presents a new puzzle for certain positions in the theory of truth. The relevant positions can be stated in a language including a truth predicate T and an operation that takes sentences to names of those sentences; they are positions that take the Tschema A ↔ T to hold without restriction, for every sentence A in the language. As such, they must be based on a nonclassical logic, since paradoxes that cannot be handled classically will arise. The bestknown of these paradoxes is probab…Read more

100Why Priest's reassurance is not reassuringAnalysis 72 (3): 517525. 2012.In the service of paraconsistent (indeed, ‘dialetheic’) theories, Graham Priest has long advanced a nonmonotonic logic (viz., MiLP) as our ‘universal logic’ (at least for standard connectives), one that enjoys the familiar logic LP (for ‘logic of paradox’) as its monotonic core (Priest, G. In Contradiction , 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First printed by Martinus Nijhoff in 1987: Chs. 16 and 19). In this article, I show that MiLP faces a dilemma: either it is (plainly) unsuitable as…Read more

153The story goes that Epimenides, a Cretan, used to claim that all Cretans are always liars. Whether he knew it or not, this claim is odd. It is easy to see it is odd by asking if it is true or false. If it is true, then all Cretans, including Epimenides, are always liars, in which case what he said must be false. Thus, if what he says is true, it is false. Conversely, suppose what Epimenides said is false. Then some Cretan at some time speaks truly. This might not tell us anything about Epimenide…Read more

132Where the Paths Meet: Remarks on Truth and Paradox &astMidwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 169198. 2008.The study of truth is often seen as running on two separate paths: the nature path and the logic path. The former concerns metaphysical questions about the ‘nature’, if any, of truth. The latter concerns itself largely with logic, particularly logical issues arising from the truththeoretic paradoxes. Where, if at all, do these two paths meet? It may seem, and it is all too often assumed, that they do not meet, or at best touch in only incidental ways. It is often assumed that work on the metaph…Read more

44Truth and the absence of factAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3). 2003.Book Information Truth and the Absence of Fact. By Hartry Field. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xi + 401. Hardback, 45.00, US$65.00. Paperback, 16.99, $24.95

169The Law of NonContradiction : New Philosophical Essays (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2004.The Law of NonContradiction  that no contradiction can be true  has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twentythree of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced…Read more

44There is no Logical Negation: True, False, Both, and NeitherAustralasian Journal of Logic 14 (1). 2017.In this paper I advance and defend a very simple position according to which logic is subclassical but is weaker than the leading subclassicallogic views have it.

27Curry's ParadoxEdward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. CSLI Publications. 2017.“Curry’s paradox”, as the term is used by philosophers today, refers to a wide variety of paradoxes of selfreference or circularity that trace their modern ancestry to Curry (1942b) and Löb (1955). The common characteristic of these socalled Curry paradoxes is the way they exploit a notion of implication, entailment or consequence, either in the form of a connective or in the form of a predicate. Curry’s paradox arises in a number of different domains. Like Russell’s paradox, it can take the f…Read more

62Spandrels of TruthOxford University Press. 2009.In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, socalled dialetheic theory of transparent truth

64Further remarks on truth and contradictionPhilosophical Quarterly 52 (207): 217225. 2002.We address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondencetheoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. We argue that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. We close by highlighting, but not attempting to resolve, two further challenges for dialetheism whi…Read more

252Two Flavors of Curry’s ParadoxJournal of Philosophy 110 (3): 143165. 2013.In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: cCurry, the standard conditionalCurry paradox, and vCurry, a validityinvolving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving ccurry. A uniﬁed treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a uniﬁed treatment of both cCurry and vCurry. If, as is often thought, cCurry paradox is to be solved via nonclassical logic, then vCurry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity…Read more

121Shrieking against gluts: the solution to the 'just true' problemAnalysis 73 (3): 438445. 2013.This paper applies what I call the shrieking method (a refined version of an idea with roots in Priest's work) to one of – if not the – issues confronting gluttheoretic approaches to paradox (viz., the problem of ‘just true’ or, what comes to the same, ‘just false’). The paper serves as a challenge to formulate a problem of ‘just true’ that isn't solved by shrieking (as advanced in this paper), if such a problem be thought to exist

106On the identity theory of truthPhilosophy 75 (1): 127130. 2000.According to the socalled identity theory of truth. A proposition is true if the given proposition is identical to some fact. But with which fact must a proposition be identical if it is to be true? This question, according to some philosophers (notably Stewart Candlish), raises serious problems for the identity theory of truth. The worry is that the identity must specify the "right fact" if it is to be an acceptable theory. The current paper aims to help the identity theory by dissolving the a…Read more

272On the Ternary Relation and ConditionalityJournal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3). 2012.One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the RoutleyMeyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions o…Read more

21Not so deep inconsistency: a reply to EklundAustralasian Journal of Logic 5 7484. 2007.In his “Deep Inconsistency?” Eklund attacks arguments to the effect that some contradictions are true, and especially those based on the liar paradox, to be found in Priest’ In Contradiction. The point of this paper is to evaluate his case.

47StrictChoice Validities: A Note on a Familiar PluralismErkenntnis 79 (S2): 301307. 2014.My aim here is a modest one: to note another example in which the theory of validity and the theory of ‘inference’ naturally come apart. The setting is multipleconclusion logic. At least on one philosophy of multipleconclusion logic, there are very clear examples of where logic qua validity and logic qua normative guide to inference are essentially different things. On the given conception, logic tells us only what follows from what, what our ‘choices’ are given a set of premises; it is simply…Read more

98From full blooded platonism to really full blooded platonismPhilosophia Mathematica 7 (3): 322325. 1999.Mark Balaguer argues for full blooded platonism (FBP), and argues that FBP alone can solve Benacerraf's familiar epistemic challenge. I note that if FBP really can solve Benacerraf's epistemic challenge, then FBP is not alone in its capacity so to solve; RFBP—really full blooded platonism—can do the trick just as well, where RFBP differs from FBP by allowing entities from inconsistent mathematics. I also argue briefly that there is positive reason for endorsing RFBP

Logic: The BasicsRoutledge. 2010._Logic: The Basics_ is an accessible introduction to several core areas of logic. The first part of the book features a selfcontained introduction to the standard topics in classical logic, such as: · mathematical preliminaries · propositional logic · quantified logic · English and standard ‘symbolic translations’ · tableau procedures. Alongside comprehensive coverage of the standard topics, this thoroughly revised second edition also introduces several philosophically important nonclassical lo…Read more
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