-
102Deflationism and Paradox (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2005.Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of langua…Read more
-
74A Note on Freedom from Detachment in the Logic of ParadoxNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (1): 15-20. 2013.We shed light on an old problem by showing that the logic LP cannot define a binary connective $\odot$ obeying detachment in the sense that every valuation satisfying $\varphi$ and $(\varphi\odot\psi)$ also satisfies $\psi$ , except trivially. We derive this as a corollary of a more general result concerning variable sharing
-
54Eco-Logical Lives: The Philosophical Lives of Richard Routley/sylvan and Val Routley/plumwood, by Dominic Hyde: Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 2014, viii + 265, £60.00 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3): 619-621. 2015.
-
155Can u do that?Analysis 71 (2): 280-285. 2011.In his ‘On t and u and what they can do’, Greg Restall presents an apparent problem for a handful of well-known non-classical solutions to paradoxes like the liar. In this article, we argue that there is a problem only if classical logic – or classical-enough logic – is presupposed. 1. Background Many have thought that invoking non-classical logic – in particular, a paracomplete or paraconsistent logic – is the correct response to the liar and related paradoxes. At the most basic level, the targ…Read more
-
41Algebraic methods in philosophical logicAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3). 2003.Book Information Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic. By J. Michael Dunn and Gary Hardegree. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xv + 470. 60.50.
-
132Dialetheists against PinocchioAnalysis 71 (4): 689-691. 2011.This paper argues that, contrary to P. Eldridge-Smith, the so-called Pinocchio paradox affords no argument against ‘simply semantic dialetheism’
-
28A Neglected Reply to Prior’s DilemmaIn James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor, . 2012.This paper offers a novel reply to Prior’s dilemma (for the Is/Ought principle), advocating a so-called Weak Kleene framework motivated by two not uncommon thoughts in the debate, namely, that ought statements are identified as those that use ‘ought’, and that ought statements are ‘funny’ in ways that is statements aren’t (e.g., perhaps sometimes being ‘gappy’ with respect to truth and falsity).
-
154Future ContradictionsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3): 547-557. 2012.A common and much-explored thought is Łukasiewicz's idea that the future is ‘indeterminate’—i.e., ‘gappy’ with respect to some claims—and that such indeterminacy bleeds back into the present in the form of gappy ‘future contingent’ claims. What is uncommon, and to my knowledge unexplored, is the dual idea of an overdeterminate future—one which is ‘glutty’ with respect to some claims. While the direct dual, with future gluts bleeding back into the present, is worth noting, my central aim is simpl…Read more
-
263Defending logical pluralismIn Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches, Hermes. pp. 1-22. 2001.We are pluralists about logical consequence [1]. We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity. Our pluralism starts with our analysis of consequence. This analysis of consequence is not idiosyncratic. We agree with Richard Jeffrey, and with many other philosophers of logic about how logical consequence is to be defined. To quote Jeffrey.
-
21Adding to Relevant Restricted QuantificationAustralasian Journal of Logic 10 36-44. 2011.This paper presents, in a more general setting, a simple approach to ‘relevant restricted generalizations’ advanced in previous work. After reviewing some desiderata for restricted generalizations, I present the target route towards achieving the desiderata. An objection to the approach, due to David Ripley, is presented, followed by three brief replies, one from a dialetheic perspective and the others more general.
-
224
-
60A simple approach towards recapturing consistent theories in paraconsistent settingsReview of Symbolic Logic 6 (4): 755-764. 2013.I believe that, for reasons elaborated elsewhere (Beall, 2009; Priest, 2006a, 2006b), the logic LP (Asenjo, 1966; Asenjo & Tamburino, 1975; Priest, 1979) is roughly right as far as logic goes.1 But logic cannot go everywhere; we need to provide nonlogical axioms to specify our (axiomatic) theories. This is uncontroversial, but it has also been the source of discomfort for LP-based theorists, particularly with respect to true mathematical theories which we take to be consistent. My example, throu…Read more
-
54End of InclosureMind 123 (491): 829-849. 2014.This paper briefly defends theses in Beall 2014 against objections advanced in Weber et al. 2014. The second part of the paper both defends and fortifies an objection to the ‘inclosure’ argument for glut theory, spelling an end to the inclosure strategy (or at least its application to the sorites)
Notre Dame, Indiana, United States of America