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True and False - As IfIn Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction, Clarendon Press. 2004.
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82Deflationism: the basicsIn J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth, Open Court. pp. 1--1. 2005.
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23Knowability and possible epistemic odditiesIn Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press. pp. 105--125. 2009.
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18Dialetheism and the Probability of ContradictionsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1): 114-118. 2001.
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20Deflation and Paradox (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2005.In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox.
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25Truth and paradox: a philosophical sketchIn Dale Jacquette (ed.), Philosophy of Logic, North Holland. pp. 187--272. 2002.
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15Modelling the 'Ordinary View'In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Relativism, Clarendon Press. pp. 61--76. 2006.
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112Can deflationists be dialetheists?Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6): 593-608. 2001.Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for…Read more
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83Deflated truth pluralismIn Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 323. 2012.
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190On truthmakers for negative truthsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2). 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
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39Understanding truthAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2). 2001.Book Information Understanding Truth. By Soames Scott. Oxford University Press. New York. 1999. Pp. ix + 268. Cloth
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25Liars and heaps: new essays on paradox (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2003.Semantic and soritical paradoxes challenge entrenched, fundamental principles about language - principles about truth, denotation, quantification, and, among others, 'tolerance'. Study of the paradoxes helps us determine which logical principles are correct. So it is that they serve not only as a topic of philosophical inquiry but also as a constraint on such inquiry: they often dictate the semantic and logical limits of discourse in general. Sixteen specially written essays by leading figures i…Read more
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31TruthAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2). 2001.Book Information Truth. Truth Enrique Villanueva Atascadero, CA Ridgeview Publishing Company 1997 i + 446 Edited by Enrique Villanueva . Ridgeview Publishing Company. Atascadero, CA. Pp. i + 446.
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53Is the observable world consistent?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1). 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
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41Possibilities and paradox: an introduction to modal and many-valued logicOxford University Press. 2003.Extensively classroom-tested, Possibilities and Paradox provides an accessible and carefully structured introduction to modal and many-valued logic. The authors cover the basic formal frameworks, enlivening the discussion of these different systems of logic by considering their philosophical motivations and implications. Easily accessible to students with no background in the subject, the text features innovative learning aids in each chapter, including exercises that provide hands-on experience…Read more
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45Mancosu (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2): 376-376. 2010.This Article does not have an abstract
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244Logical ConsequenceStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2019.A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich will enrol…Read more
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146Revenge of the liar: new essays on the paradox (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2007.The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth (and semantic notions in general). A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since it says (only) that it is false. How, then, should we classify Liar senten…Read more
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320On mixed inferences and pluralism about truth predicatesPhilosophical Quarterly 50 (200): 380-382. 2000.
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1Vague Intensions: A Modest Marriage ProposalIn Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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68The new theory of reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its origins (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2). 2001.Book Information The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins. Edited by Paul Humphreys and James Fetzer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Boston. Pp. xiii + 290. Hardback, US$105
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51Trivializing sentences and the promise of semantic completenessAnalysis 75 (4): 573-584. 2015.This paper challenges defenders/advocates of the semantic-completeness route towards gluts to explain, in simple and plausible terms, why the ‘trivializer paradox’, framed in terms of closure relatives on theories, fails to undermine their argument.
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1True and false–as if. Ch. 12 of G. Priest, Jc Beall and B. Armour-GarbIn Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. 2004.
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31Review of Stewart Shapiro (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9). 2005.
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Lou Goble, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic (review)Philosophy in Review 22 411-415. 2002.
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56Review of Paradox and Paraconsistency (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2003.When physicists disagree as to whose theory is right, they can (if we radically idealize) form an experiment whose results will settle the difference. When logicians disagree, there seems to be no possibility of resolution in this manner. In Paradox and Paraconsistency John Woods presents a picture of disagreement among logicians, mathematicians, and other “abstract scientists” and points to some methods for resolving such disagreement. Our review begins with (very) short sketches of the chapter…Read more
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