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796Newton and Wolff: The Leibnizian reaction to the Principia, 1716-1763Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (3): 459-481. 2012.Newton rested his theory of mechanics on distinct metaphysical and epistemological foundations. After Leibniz's death in 1716, the Principia ran into sharp philosophical opposition from Christian Wolff and his disciples, who sought to subvert Newton's foundations or replace them with Leibnizian ideas. In what follows, I chronicle some of the Wolffians' reactions to Newton's notion of absolute space, his dynamical laws of motion, and his general theory of gravitation. I also touch on arguments ad…Read more
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680Metaphysical Foundations of Neoclassical MechanicsIn Michela Massimi & Angela Breitenbach (eds.), Kant and the Laws of Nature, Cambridge University Press. pp. 214-234. 2017.I examine here if Kant’s metaphysics of matter can support any late-modern versions of classical mechanics. I argue that in principle it can, by two different routes. I assess the interpretive costs of each approach, and recommend the most promising strategy: a mass-point approach.
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626Unity for Kant’s Natural PhilosophyPhilosophy of Science 81 (3): 423-443. 2014.I uncover here a conflict in Kant’s natural philosophy. His matter theory and laws of mechanics are in tension. Kant’s laws are fit for particles but are too narrow to handle continuous bodies, which his doctrine of matter demands. To fix this defect, Kant ultimately must ground the Torque Law; that is, the impressed torque equals the change in angular momentum. But that grounding requires a premise—the symmetry of the stress tensor—that Kant denies himself. I argue that his problem would not ar…Read more
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1276Absolute Space and the Riddle of Rotation: Kant’s Response to NewtonOxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 7 257-308. 2016.Newton had a fivefold argument that true motion must be motion in absolute space, not relative to matter. Like Newton, Kant holds that bodies have true motions. Unlike him, though, Kant takes all motion to be relative to matter, not to space itself. Thus, he must respond to Newton’s argument above. I reconstruct here Kant’s answer in detail. I prove that Kant addresses just one part of Newton’s case, namely, his “argument from the effects” of rotation. And, to show that rotation is relative to m…Read more
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2020Huygens on Inertial Structure and RelativityPhilosophy of Science 83 (2): 277-298. 2016.I explain and assess here Huygens’ concept of relative motion. I show that it allows him to ground most of the Law of Inertia, and also to explain rotation. Thereby his concept obviates the need for Newton’s absolute space. Thus his account is a powerful foundation for mechanics, though not without some tension.
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
General Philosophy of Science |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
19th Century Philosophy |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
History of Physics |
PhilPapers Editorships
Kant: Science, Logic, and Mathematics, Misc |
Kant's Scientific Work |
Christian Wolff |