Thomas Nemeth

Vladimir Solovyov’s youthful but quite audacious magister’s thesis The Crisis of Western Philosophy proclaimed that modern philosophy as abstract theory had reached an impasse having articulated all possible subjectivist options. Solovyov saw this culmination in the pessimistic philosophies of Schopenhauer and the now largely forgotten Eduard von Hartmann. With the passing years, Solovyov seldom mentioned this work and even less its underlying theme. As a result, it has escaped critical attention. In this paper, I investigate the earlier treatments of Schopenhauer and Hartmann by Russian authors from the political left and right before turning to Solovyov’s own assessment of their role in the supposed crisis in philosophy.

This chapter deals with the first published Russian translation of the Critique of Pure Reason as well as the positivist critic and the positivistic assimilation of that work during the 1870s. That decade also saw the emergence of a recognition of Kant as an epistemologist, rather than merely a critic of metaphysics and religion. However, at this time the young Solov’ëv portrayed Kant as an important, though transitional, figure in the development of Western philosophy, leading eventually to its exhaustion.

This work is a historical study of the philosophical writings emerging from Imperial Russia's theological "academies" – Orthodoxy’s higher educational institutions that ran parallel to the secular universities – from their inception to the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution. Unlike with nineteenth century Russian revolutionary thought, there are few secondary studies of the philosophical works stemming from the academies. These philosophical works focused on ontology and, as such, stand in sharp contrast to the shift toward epistemology in that century as happened in Germany. Another feature of the "academy" philosophies was the continual and explicit attempt to set themselves apart from the pervasive "subjectivism" of Western philosophical systems, although a largely unacknowledged influence persisted. At no time did the academy philosophers look to rational inquiry for more than an assist in understanding their theology. Instead they appealed to tradition and to an alleged direct insight into religious truths at the expense of logic and rational argument. The ultimate result was the pecular historical insularity of their community and concomitantly a subservience to the political state, traits that persist to this day.

This volume offers a critical examination of the early works of Vladimir Solov'ëv, Russia's most famous and systematic philosopher. It presents a philosophical critique of his early writings up to 1881 from an immanent viewpoint and examines Solov'ëv's intended contributions to philosophy against the background of German Idealism, including Schopenhauer, and the positivism of his day. Examining contemporary reactions to his writings by leading figures of his day, such as Chicherin and Kavelin, The Early Solov'ëv and His Quest for Metaphysics reveals the small but vibrant philosophical community in Russia during the immediate decades before the Bolshevik Revolution. It provides a detailed discussion of Solov'ëv's confrontation with his philosophical opponents and shows how his emphasis on developing a metaphysical ontology rather than epistemology exerted a virtual paradigmatic influence on Russian philosophy for years to come. This volume also sets Solov'ëv's writings against a detailed intellectual biography of these early years, drawing on letters to friends and relatives including reminiscences, and challenges many of the received claims concerning his actions and positions, particularly his alleged youthful mystical visions. In addition, the book features two appendices: one that sketches the early Russian reception of French positivism against which Solov'ëv reacted in the name of metaphysics and another that presents a fascinating look at the Solov'ëv family background, which produced at once intellectual as well as dysfunctional members. Presenting a rare picture of the non-Marxist intellectual scene in 19th century Russia, The Early Solov'ëv and His Quest for Metaphysics will be of interest to graduate students and researchers looking for a philosophically informed approach to this unique thinker and era.

This new English translation of Solov'ëv's principal ethical treatise, written in his later years, presents Solov'ëv's mature views on a host of topics ranging from a critique of individualistic ethical systems to the death penalty, the meaning of war, animal rights, and environmentalism. Written for the educated public rather than for a narrow circle of specialists, Solov'ëv's work largely avoids technical vocabulary while illustrating his points with references to classical literature from the ancient Greeks to Goethe. Although written from a deeply held Christian viewpoint, Solov'ëv emphasizes the turn from his earlier position, now allegedly developing the independence of moral philosophy from metaphysics and revealed religion. Solov'ëv sees the formal universality of the idea of the moral good in all human beings, albeit that this idea is bereft of material content. This first new English-language translation in a century makes a unique contribution to the study of Solov'ëv's thought. It uses the text of the second edition published in 1899 as its main text, but provides the variations and additions from the earlier versions of each chapter in running notes. Other unique features of this translation are that the pagination of the widely available 1914 edition is provided in the text, and the sources of Solov'ëv's numerous Biblical quotations and references as well as literary and historical allusions.

Editorial Board: Karl P. Ameriks, Margaret Atherton, Frederick Beiser, Fabien Capeillères, Faustino Fabbianelli, Daniel Garber, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Steven Nadler, Alan Nelson, Christof Rapp, Ursula Renz, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Denis Thouard, Paul Ziche, Günter Zöller The series publishes monographs and essay collections devoted to the history of philosophy as well as studies in the theory of writing the history of philosophy. A special emphasis is placed on the contextualization of philosophical historiography into the areas of the history of science, culture, and the wider scope of intellectual history.

Already in his 1913 Ideen I, Husserl claimed that there are two types of intuition: experiencing, that is, sense, intuition and ideal intuition. The former provides us with contingent facts, whereas the latter provides essences. Commenting on this dichotomy in his own book-length work, Appearance and Sense, published in 1914, Shpet believed Husserl had overlooked an important and distinct type of phenomenon that we call “social” and thereby omitted a corresponding third type of intuition that reveals the social function or purpose of a thing. This oversight on Husserl’s part led him to claim that an “I,” or ego, stood behind or possessed the human individual’s consciousness. Husserl failed to notice that we can and do meaningfully speak of a social consciousness that, as such, belongs to no single individual. Apart from the “evidence” of ordinary language, Husserl’s strict dichotomy leaves unaddressed how we can proceed from external appearances to their understanding, which cognitively is always in terms of concepts, traditionally called “universals.” That is, we frame our experiences and express them verbally, the words employed being meaningful to us and hopefully to “the other.” Realizing the problem of transiting from the intuition of the contingent to that of the ideal, Shpet in early 1917 downplayed the difference, preferring to call them different degrees of seeing with different conscious attitudes. He called the conscious “seeing” associated with an understanding of words “intelligible intuition.” With an interest in historical methodology predating his acquaintance with phenomenology, Shpet recognized that the only tool available to the historian is the words appearing on documents, which serve as signs. How we understand these signs forms the study of hermeneutics, which functions as the epistemology of history. However, the fear remains that if we conceive the understanding of signs and “intelligible intuition” subjectively, we lapse into a psychologism. We must not forget the social origin of language, that language is no more the possession of an individual than is consciousness. The sense of words is established in an intersubjective context. Thus, Shpet turned to a study of language much as he had previously turned to consciousness and saw neither as subjective.

The issue of whether the phenomenology presented in Ideas I was a metaphysical realism or an idealism came to the fore almost immediately upon its publication. The present essay is an examination of the relation of Gustav Shpet, one of Husserl’s students from the Göttingen years to this issue via his understanding of phenomenology and, particularly, of the phenomenological reduction, as shown principally in his early published writings. For Shpet, phenomenology employs essential intuition without regard to experiential intuition. If we look on transcendental idealism as the label for this methodology, which disregards but does not deny either the empirical or its correlative species of intuition, then Shpet was such an idealist, all the while adhering to a metaphysical realism. In this way, Shpet could proclaim phenomenology to be the fundamental philosophical discipline without precluding the possibility of other philosophical disciplines insofar as they were conducted in relation to consciousness taken not as the “possession” of a human individual, but eidetically and thus not a “possession.”

The St. Petersburg Theological Academy was the first of the four academies in the early years of the nineteenth century to undergo a remodeling along the lines of a new charter for the empire’s church-affiliated educational institutions. Instruction in philosophy was mandated, but the academy faced staffing issues at the outset. Courses were taught following Wolffian guidebooks that many found to be antiquated, raising pedagogical dilemmas for the teachers. Nevertheless, a divorce between faith and reason was proscribed, and adherence to a Christianized Plato remained prescribed and seen as central to the Orthodox religion.

This volume offers a critical examination of the later philosophical views of Vladimir Solov’ëv, arguably Russia’s most famous and most systematic philosopher. It offers a philosophically informed approach to this pivotal figure and to his era. Inside, readers will discover a detailed portrait of the often overlooked evolution of the philosopher’s views during the final two decades of his life. The author explores Solov’ëv’s still evolving aesthetic philosophy and his entry into the lively Russian discussion of free will. The work then turns to the philosopher’s mature statements on many figures from within the history of philosophy. This includes Kant and Hegel. Next, readers will learn about his disagreements with several contemporaries as well as contemporaneous movements. These include positivism and materialism. In addition, the coverage includes an elucidation and examination of Solov’ëv’s final expression of his ethical philosophy as set forth in his major ethical treatise Justification of the Moral Good. The overall picture that emerges is of a much more vibrant and heated philosophical community than typically portrayed in Western secondary literature. The book ends with a reflection on the rise of Solov’ëv as a religious mystic at the expense of a critical evaluation of his thought.