Thomas Nemeth

This essay is a study of Vvedenskij's works starting from his 1888 dissertation up to the turn of the century. I attempt to show that although his explicit aim was to update Kant's philosophy of science in light of developments in physics in the 19th century, Vvedenskij departed considerably from Kant's position with respect to both first philosophy and reflection on the achievements of the natural sciences. Vvedenskij's increasing concern with practical philosophy in the 1890s led him to correct a perceived anomaly in Kant's position by postulating a time in itself, an unrecognized consequence of which would be to undermine the apodicticity of mathematics.

In this chapter, we deal first with the immediate reaction among Russian philosophers to the “Geat War” against Germany before turning to the criticisms of Kant from intuitivism, Solov’ëvian metaphysics, and common sense. The diatribe by a young philosopher Ern against Kant, linking the latter to German militarism met with consternation and criticism. However, criticisms of Kant came from several philosophical directions, some of which upheld various aspects of Kant’s thought. We, then, turn to two disciples of Marburg neo-Kantianism.

The two names most closely associated with phenomenology in early twentieth century Russia are Gustav Špet and Aleksej Losev. However, is that judgment warranted with regard to Losev? In just what way can we look on him as a phenomenologist? Losev himself, in the mid-1920s, employed the expression “dialectical phenomenology,” seeing phenomenology as an initial descriptive method to ascertain essences. He was sharply critical of its self-limitation in disavowing all explanation as metaphysical. Yet, earlier that decade Losev approved of Husserl’s opposition to reductionism and of his focus on essences and senses. In this way, the record is unclear: In the short span of a decade he moved from a position of qualified sympathy with phenomenology to an overtly unqualified insouciance. Looking at Losev’s criticisms, however, from the late 20s and early 30s, we find a logical anticipation of Husserl’s own move from a static to a genetic phenomenology.

This book presents a comprehensive study of the influence of Immanuel Kant’s Critical Philosophy in the Russian Empire, spanning the period from the late 19th century to the Bolshevik Revolution. It systematically details the reception bestowed on Kant’s ideas during his lifetime and up to and through the era of the First World War. The book traces the tensions arising in the early 19th century between the imported German scholars, who were often bristling with the latest philosophical developments in their homeland, and the more conservative Russian professors and administrators. The book goes on to examine the frequently neglected criticism of Kant in the theological institutions throughout the Russian Empire as well as the last remaining, though virtually unknown, embers of Kantianism during the reign of Nicholas I. With the political activities of many young radicals during the subsequent decades having been amply studied, this book focuses on their largely ignored attempts to grapple with Kant’s transcendental idealism. It also presents a complete account of the resurgence of interest in Kant in the last two decades of that century, and the growing attempts to graft a transcendental idealism onto popular social and political movements. The book draws attention to the young and budding Russian neo-Kantian movement that mirrored developments in Germany before being overtaken by political events.