Gyula Klima

This paper confronts a certain modern view of the relation between semantics and ontology with that of the late-medieval nominalist philosophers, William Ockham and John Buridan. The modern view in question is characterized in terms of what is called here “the thesis of onto-semantic parallelism,” which states that the primitive (indefinable) categorematic concepts of our semantics mark out the primary entities in reality. The paper argues that, despite some apparently plausible misinterpretations to the contrary, the late-medieval nominalist program of “ontological reduction” was not driven by considerations that try to “read off” ontology from semantic analysis or those that try to identify semantic primitives in their search for ontological primitives. The medieval authors presented a much more flexible, dynamic view of “Aristotelian naturalism,” which challenges both of the unappealing modern alternatives of “conceptual tribalism” and “conceptual imperialism.”

The lectures presented here are the by-product of my teaching in Yale's Directed Studies program from 1991 through 1993 (hence the title, for want of a better). In fact, being what they are, lecture notes for an introductory philosophy course, they present rather elementary material. Yet, I flatter myself, they do not lack certain originality in the treatment of some of the basic questions of traditional metaphysics and epistemology. In any case, over the past couple of years they proved to be quite useful in teaching my several other courses, especially in medieval philosophy. Thus, being too elementary for transforming them into scholarly papers, on the one hand, yet, containing what I think to be both philosophically interesting and pedagogically useful ideas, on the other, I decided to publish them here, in the Net's formally less stringent medium. Here they can easily be accessed by people who think what they need is a clear and simple discussion of the intriguing philosophical points themselves, rather than the meticulous and sometimes cumbersome scholarly discussions of the texts that raised them (a description which fits, at least, the majority of my students). Given these considerations (as well as the author's lack of time), the lectures are presented here basically unedited, in the form as they were actually delivered, without any notes or references (disregarding the occasionally inserted page numbers, serving as reminders for myself, referring to the texts we used in class). However, anyone who is interested in the more detailed scholarly discussion of some of the topics touched upon here may wish to check some of the papers listed on my..

`Realism', `conceptualism' and `nominalism' are terms that one is most likely to come across in history of philosophy textbooks, presented as ones labeling three major ontological alternatives provided by mediaeval philosophy. The general inadequacy of these labels is perhaps best shown by the desperate efforts to provide further, modified labels , the well-known `moderate' and `extreme' or `exaggerated' versions of the above, in hopes of implying at least a lesser amount of falsehood in hanging..

Buridan's life, works, and influence -- Buridan's logic and the medieval logical tradition -- The primacy of mental language -- The various kinds of concepts and the idea of a mental language -- Natural language and the idea of a formal syntax in Buridan -- Existential import and the square of opposition -- Ontological commitment -- The properties of terms (proprietates terminorum) -- The semantics of propositions -- Logical validity in a token-based, semantically closed logic -- The possibility of scientific knowledge -- Buridan's anti-skepticism -- Buridan's essentialist nominalism.

“The expression ‘free logic’ is an abbreviation for the phrase ‘free of existence assumptions with respect to its terms, general and singular’.”1 Classical quantification theory is not a free logic in this sense, as its standard formulations commonly assume that every singular term in every model is assigned a referent, an element of the universe of discourse. Indeed, since singular terms include not only singular constants, but also variables2, standard quantification theory may be regarded as involving even the assumption of the existence of the values of its variables, in accordance with Quine’s famous dictum: “to be is to be the value of a variable”.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 272-273 [Access article in PDF] Matthew of Orléans. Sophistaria sive summa communium distinctionum circa sophismata accidentium. Edited by Joke Spruyt. Leiden: Brill, 2001. Pp. ix + 581. Cloth, $151.00. Matthew of Orléans is not a famous author (indeed, even his name is given tentatively by the editor on the basis of the explicit of one manuscript). And the Sophistaria was apparently not one the most influential works of its time, the early thirteenth century (its full text is preserved only in a couple of manuscripts, and it has never been printed before). Yet, the Sophistaria of Matthew of Orléans is a fine example of a characteristic genre in the rich tradition of medieval logical literature. The genre itself is an interesting combination of two other characteristic genres: treatises on syncategoremata and sophismata. The sophismata treatises are discussions of problem-sentences (sophismata) usually grouped together to illustrate some logical doctrinal points, especially concerning the resolution of ambiguities caused by the logical behavior of syncategorematic terms in various contexts. The treatises on syncategoremata provide systematic discussions of the logical behavior of syncategorematic words, i.e., logical connectives, themselves. But these treatises also illustrate their doctrinal points by resolving the ambiguities of sophismata, mostly using some commonly accepted distinctions concerning how the function of the syncategoremata is to be construed in the contexts provided by these problem-sentences. The proper subject matter of the sophistaria treatises is the discussion of these common distinctions, dealing especially with ambiguities caused by (what we would describe as) the different possible scopes of the syncategoremata occurring in the paradigmatic sophismata.For example, take the sentence "Someone seeing nothing is someone seeing something." This sentence can be regarded as ambiguous, if we analyze "nothing" into "not... a thing," yielding (1) "Someone not seeing a thing is someone seeing something," which can be taken to be ambiguous between (a) "Someone not seeing anything is someone seeing something" and (b) "Someone not seeing something is someone seeing something," depending on whether we take "not" in (1) to be operating (a) on "seeing a thing," or (b) only on "seeing." On this analysis, the ambiguous sentence is obviously false in the first sense, but may be true in the second, for it may be true of Socrates who does not see Plato but sees Coriscus.To be sure, this is not the only possible way to account for the (genuine or putative) ambiguity of the original sentence. In fact, this is not the account considered by Matthew of Orléans or in a parallel passage by Peter of Spain in their analyses of the corresponding Latin sentence (Nihil videns est aliquid videns), although one of the arguments for the truth of the sophisma they reject would be a good argument for the second reading provided here (cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus [Van Gorcum: Assen, 1972], 220, ll. 10-6, and Sophistaria, 88, ll. 16-20). In any case, the point of the sophistaria treatises is precisely the discussion of the merits and demerits of such possible accounts.The Sophistaria of Matthew of Orléans is a well-organized, highly structured treatise, divided into eight chapters, corresponding to the eight groups of syncategorematic terms [End Page 272] it deals with. The first chapter is devoted to the discussion of common distinctions concerning negations (both propositional and term-negations, including privative negation), the second deals with exclusive words (such as "only"), the third with exceptive words ("besides," "except," "unless"), the fourth with the conditional sign "if," the fifth with the modalities "necessarily" and "contingently," the sixth with the verbs "begins" and "ceases," the seventh with the word "whether," and the eighth with the distributive sign "every," that is, the universal sign that causes the terms it is construed with to be distributed for everything that falls under it.The discussion of these topics in the individual chapters is organized around typical scholastic questions raised concerning the validity of some common distinction in connection with typical sophismata, involving ambiguities in the operation...

It is a commonplace in the historiography of medieval philosophy that theology represents philosophy's culmination in the later Middle Ages, and specifically, that it is in the work of theologians and theologically-trained Arts Masters that we find philosophy in its purest and most advanced form. By comparison, the philosophy produced by thinkers who worked exclusively or primarily in the Faculty of Arts is seen as inferior -- by which is usually meant that it is shallow, unsophisticated, immature, and driven by disparate curricular and pedagogical concerns rather than by the more single-minded commitment to rationally articulate that sacred doctrine which, as Aquinas says, "extends [by virtue of its oneness] to things which belong to different philosophical sciences.".

Of those that exist, some are said of a subject, but are in no subject: as man is said of some subject, namely of some man, but is in no subject. Others, however, are in a subject, but are said of no subject. And I say that to be in a subject which, while it is in something not as a part, cannot exist apart from the thing in which it is. For example, some particular literacy is in a subject, namely in the soul, but is not said of any subject, and this whiteness is in a body as in its subject, for any color is in a body. Others both are said of and are in a subject. For example, knowledge is in the soul, and is said of a subject, say, of literacy. Still others neither are in a subject, nor are said of a subject, for example, some particular man, or some particular horse: for none of these is either in or is said of a subject. In general, individuals, and what are numerically one are said of no subject, but nothing prevents them from being in a subject, for some particular literacy is in a subject.

This paper argues that Aquinas's conception of the human soul and intellect offers a consistent alternative to the dilemma of materialism and post-Cartesian dualism. It also argues that in their own theoretical context, Aquinas' arguments for the materiality of the human soul and immateriality of the intellect provide a strong justification of his position. However, that theoretical context is rather "alien" to ours in contemporary philosophy. The conclusion of the paper will point in the direction of what can be done to render Aquinas's position more palatable to contemporary philosophers.

This volume is the first annotated translation in any language of the entire text of the Summulae de dialectica, by the Parisian master of arts John Buridan (1300-1358). One of the most influential works in the history of late medieval philosophy, the Summulae is Buridan's systematic exposition of his nominalist philosophy of logic. Buridan's doctrine spread rapidly and for some two hundred years was dominant at many European universities. His work is of increasing interest today not only to historians of medieval philosophy but also to modern philosophers, several of whom find in Buridan's ideas important clues to problems of contemporary philosophy. Gyula Klima provides a substantial introduction to Buridan's life and work and discusses his place in the history of logic. Through extensive notes Klima assists philosopher and medievalist alike to read Buridan with understanding and insight. Those with a philosophical interest in the relations among the structures of language, thought, and reality will find much to ponder in the Summulae.

This is a brief, accessible introduction to the thought of the philosopher John Buridan (ca. 1295-1361). Little is known about Buridan's life, most of which was spent studying and then teaching at the University of Paris. Buridan's works are mostly by-products of his teaching. They consist mainly of commentaries on Aristotle, covering the whole extent of Aristotelian philosophy, ranging from logic to metaphysics, to natural science, to ethics and politics. Gyula Klima argues that many of Buridan's academic concerns are strikingly similar to those of modern philosophy and his work sometimes quite directly addresses modern philosophical questions

This paper examines the multiple semantic functions Aquinas attributes to the verb ‘est’, ranging from signifying the essence of God to acting as a copula of categorical propositions to expressing identity. A case will be made that all these apparently radically diverse functions are unified under Aquinas’s conception of the analogy of being, treating all predications as predications of being with or without some qualification (secundum quid or simpliciter). This understanding of the multiplicity of the semantic functions of this verb as conceived by Aquinas will enable us to have a better understanding of the meaning of his metaphysical claims and arguments. In particular, with this understanding of Aquinas’ conception of being, we will be able to see how Aquinas’s famous “intellectus essentiae” argument for the thesis of the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures can work, despite Anthony Kenny’s arguments to the contrary in his recent book Aquinas on Being.

“The problem of universals” in general is a historically variable bundle of several closely related, yet in different conceptual frameworks rather differently articulated metaphysical, logical, and epistemological questions, ultimately all connected to the issue of how universal cognition of singular things is possible. How do we know, for example, that the Pythagorean theorem holds universally, for all possible right triangles? Indeed, how can we have any awareness of a potential infinity of all possible right triangles, given that we could only see a finite number of actual ones? How can we universally indicate all possible right triangles with the phrase ‘right triangle’? Is there something common to them all signified by this phrase? If so, what is it, and how is it related to the particular right triangles? The medieval problem of universals is a logical, and historical, continuation of the ancient problem generated by Plato's (428-348 B.C.) theory answering such a bundle of questions, namely, his theory of Ideas or Forms.