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430Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousnessTrends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10): 418-425. 2001.
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424Neurophenomenology - integrating subjective experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10): 31-52. 2003.The paper presents a research programme for the neuroscience of consciousness called 'neurophenomenology' and illustrates it with a recent pilot study . At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the neurophysiology of consciousness . At a methodological level, the neurophenomenological strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale ne…Read more
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614Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theoriesTopoi 28 (1): 23-30. 2009.This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
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71Neurophenomenology and the spontaneity of consciousnessCanadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 29 133-162. 2003.Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed. Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain.
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3251The feeling body: Towards an enactive approach to emotionIn W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness, Erlbaum. 2008.For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate fro…Read more
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100Affect-biased attention as emotion regulationTrends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (7): 365-372. 2012.
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2Self-No-Self? Memory and Reflexive AwarenessIn Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, no self?: perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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119Sorting out the neural basis of consciousness: Authors' reply to commentatorsJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1): 87-98. 2004.Correspondence: Alva Noë, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-2390, USA. _Email: [email protected]_ Evan Thompson, Philosophy Department, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. _Email: [email protected]_
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18The Spontaneity of ConsciousnessAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1): 125-166. 2010.It is now conventional wisdom that conscious experience — or in Nagel’s canonical characterization, “what it is like to be” for an organism — is what makes the mind-body problem so intractable. By the same token, our current conceptions of the mind-body relation are inadequate and some conceptual development is urgently needed. Our overall aim in this paper is to make some progress towards that conceptual development. We first examine a currently neglected, yet fundamental aspect of consciousnes…Read more
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24This chapter examines Indian views of the mind and consciousness, with particular focus on the Indian Buddhist tradition. To contextualize Buddhist views of the mind, we first provide a brief presentation of some of the most important Hindu views, particularly those of the S¯am . khya school. Whereas..
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258Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to francisco VarelaPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4): 381-398. 2004.This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis
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183Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscienceTrends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3): 104-112. 2011.
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191Colour vision, evolution, and perceptual contentSynthese 104 (1): 1-32. 1995.b>. Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for 'externalism' about perceptual content (content is distal) and 'objectivism' about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticized the 'computational objectivist' position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundmental differences among the colour vi…Read more
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108Autopoiesis and lifelines: The importance of originsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 909-910. 1999.Lifelines provides a useful corrective to “ultra-Darwinism” but it is marred by its failure to cite its scientific predecessors. Rose's argument could have been strengthened by taking greater account of the theory of autopoiesis in biology and of enactive cognitive science.
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34Response to Commentators on Waking, Dreaming, BeingPhilosophy East and West 66 (3): 982-1000. 2016.Let me begin by thanking my commentators for taking the time to read my book and to write such constructive commentaries. I would also like to thank Christian Coseru for organizing and chairing the panel at the International Society for Buddhist Philosophy at the 2015 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, at which three of the commentaries were originally presented together with my response. Finally, I am grateful to Philosophy East and West for publishing th…Read more
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110Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2007.The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness is the first of its kind in the field, and its appearance marks a unique time in the history of intellectual inquiry on the topic. After decades during which consciousness was considered beyond the scope of legitimate scientific investigation, consciousness re-emerged as a popular focus of research towards the end of the last century, and it has remained so for nearly 20 years. There are now so many different lines of investigation on consciousness that th…Read more
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89Neurophenomenology and contemplative experienceIn Philip Clayton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion, Oxford University Press. pp. 226-235. 2006.Accession Number: ATLA0001712130; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 226-235.; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 234-235.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay
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45Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of ConsciousnessCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1): 133-162. 2003.Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed. Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain.
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108Mountains and valleys: Binocular rivalry and the flow of experienceConsciousness and Cognition 16 (3): 623-641. 2007.Binocular rivalry provides a useful situation for studying the relation between the temporal flow of conscious experience and the temporal dynamics of neural activity. After proposing a phenomenological framework for understanding temporal aspects of consciousness, we review experimental research on multistable perception and binocular rivalry, singling out various methodological, theoretical, and empirical aspects of this research relevant to studying the flow of experience. We then review an e…Read more
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78Francisco J. Varela (1946–2001)Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (8): 368. 2001.It is with great sadness that I record the death of Francisco Varela, who passed away at his home in Paris, on May 28, 2001. With his passing, the science of consciousness has lost one of its most brilliant, original, creative, and compas- sionate thinkers
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Neural synchrony and the unity of mind: A neurophenomenological perspectiveIn Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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25Contemplative neuroscience as an approach to volitional consciousnessIn Nancey Murphy, George Ellis & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will, Springer Verlag. pp. 187--197. 2009.
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56Seeing beyond the modules toward the subject of perceptionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3): 386-387. 1999.Pylyshyn's model of visual perception leads to problems in understanding the nature of perceptual experience. The cause of the problems is an underlying lack of clarity about the relation between the operation of the subpersonal vision module and visual perception at the level of the subject or person.
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37Précis of Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and PhilosophyPhilosophy East and West 66 (3): 927-933. 2016.The central idea of Waking, Dreaming, Being is that the self is a process, not a thing or an entity.1 The self isn’t something outside experience, hidden either in the brain or in some immaterial realm. It is an experiential process that is subject to constant change. We enact a self in the process of awareness, and this self comes and goes depending on how we are aware.When we’re awake and occupied with some manual task, we enact a bodily self geared to our immediate environment. Yet this bodil…Read more
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73Witnessing from Here: Self-Awareness from a Bodily versus Embodied PerspectiveIn Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self, Oxford University Press. 2011.This article argues against the no-self or nonegological account of bodily self-awareness. It proposes an account of consciousness that challenges Miri Albahari's forceful defence of a nonegological view of consciousness, particularly its sharp distinction between subject and self. It contends that the subject of experience is a bodily subject and not merely an embodied one and argues that in order to be a subject of experience even in the minimal sense of witnessing-from-a-perspective, one must…Read more
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