Evan Thompson

Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion rests on (1) a problematic “reconstructionist” conception of vision, and (2) a misconception about the character of perceptual experience.

This paper develops a bridge from AL issues about the symbol–matter relation to AI issues about symbol-grounding by focusing on the concepts of formality and syntactic interpretability. Using the DNA triplet-amino acid specification relation as a paradigm, it is argued that syntactic properties can be grounded as high-level features of the non-syntactic interactions in a physical dynamical system. This argu- ment provides the basis for a rebuttal of John Searle’s recent assertion that syntax is observer-relative (1990, 1992). But the argument as developed also challenges the classic symbol-processing theory of mind against which Searle is arguing, as well as the strong AL thesis that life is realizable in a purely computational medium. Finally, it provides a new line of support for the autonomous systems approach in AL and AI (Varela & Bourgine 1992a, 1992b). © 1997 Academic Press

One of the outstanding problems in the cognitive sciences is to understand how ongoing conscious experience is related to the workings of the brain and nervous system. Neurodynamics offers a powerful approach to this problem because it provides a coherent framework for investigating change, variability, complex spatiotemporal patterns of activity, and multiscale processes (among others). In this chapter, we advocate a neurodynamical approach to consciousness that integrates mathematical tools of analysis and modeling, sophisticated physiological data recordings, and detailed phenomenological descriptions. We begin by stating the basic intuition: Consciousness is an intrinsically dynamic phenomenon and must therefore be studied within a framework that is capable of rendering its dynamics intelligible. We then discuss some of the formal, analytical features of dynamical systems theory, with particular reference to neurodynamics. We then review several neuroscientific proposals that make use of dynamical systems theory in characterizing the neurophysiologi-.