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Evan Thompson

University of British Columbia
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    131
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 More details
  • University of British Columbia
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Graduate Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1990
Homepage
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
0000-0003-0084-8477
  • All publications (131)
  •  2
    Philosophical theories of consciousness: Asian perspectives
    with George Dreyfus
    In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press. 2007.
    Philosophy of Consciousness, MiscAsian Philosophy
  • Introduction
    with Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi
    In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, no self?: perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions, Oxford University Press. 2011.
    French Philosophy
  •  23
    Sensomotorische Subjektivität und die enaktive Annäherung an Erfahrung
    In Wolfgang Welsch, Christian Tewes & Klaus Vieweg (eds.), Natur und Geist: über ihre evolutionäre Verhältnisbestimmung, Akademie Verlag. pp. 125. 2011.
  •  220
    Primates, monks and the mind: The case of empathy
    with Frans de Waal, Evan Thompson, and J. Proctor
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7): 38-54. 2005.
    A dicussion between Frans de Waal and Evan Thompson with Jim Proctor as interviewer.
    Empathy and Sympathy
  •  64
    Introduction
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement): 7-10. 2003.
    French Philosophy
  •  47
    Living Ways of Sense Making
    In Thiemo Breyer & Oliver Müller (eds.), Funktionen des Lebendigen, De Gruyter. pp. 25-42. 2016.
  •  86
    Is internal realism a philosophy of scheme and content?
    Metaphilosophy 22 (3): 212-230. 1991.
    Internal Realism
  •  7
    Comparative color vision: Quality space and visual ecology
    In Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2000.
    Color
  •  2
    Consciousness: An introduction
    with P. D. Zelano, M. Moscovitch, and E. Thompson
    In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1--3. 2007.
    Philosophy of Consciousness
  •  90
    Strengthening emotion-cognition integration
    with Rebecca Todd and Evan Thompson
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38. 2015.
  •  228
    Planetary thinking/planetary building: An essay on Martin Heidegger and Nishitani Keiji
    Philosophy East and West 36 (3): 235-252. 1986.
    Martin HeideggerNishitani Keiji
  •  103
    Perceptual completion: A case study in phenomenology and cognitive science
    with Evan Thompson, Alva Noe, and Luiz Pessoa
    In Jean Petitot, Francisco J. Varela, Bernard Pachoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Stanford University Press. pp. 161--195. 1999.
    Philosophy of Perception, GeneralPerception and Phenomenology
  •  178
    On the ways to color
    with Adrian Palacios and Francisco J. Varela
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1): 56-74. 1992.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceColorPhilosophy of Linguistics
  •  101
    Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness
    with Robert Hanna
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1): 133-162. 2003.
    Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed. Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain.
    Phenomenology and Consciousness
  •  28
    Filling-In: Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception
    In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, Springer. pp. 145--161. 1999.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  4558
    The feeling body: Towards an enactive approach to emotion
    with Giovanna Colombetti
    In W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness, Erlbaum. 2008.
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate fro…Read more
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved beyond this disembodied stance by conceiving of emotions as involving both cognitive processes (perception, attention, and evaluation) and bodily events (arousal, behavior, and facial expressions), the legacy of cognitivism persists in the tendency to treat cognitive and bodily events as separate constituents of emotion. Thus the cognitive aspects of emotion are supposedly distinct and separate from the bodily ones. This separation indicates that cognitivism’s disembodied conception of cognition continues to shape the way emotion theorists conceptualize emotion.
    Artificial Intelligence MethodologySomatic and Feeling Theories of Emotion
  •  297
    Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Science
    Routledge. 1994.
    Colour fascinates all of us, and scientists and philosophers have sought to understand the true nature of colour vision for many years. In recent times, investigations into colour vision have been one of the main success stories of cognitive science, for each discipline within the field - neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, computer science and artificial intelligence, and philosophy - has contributed significantly to our understanding of colour. Evan Thompson's book is a major contribution t…Read more
    Colour fascinates all of us, and scientists and philosophers have sought to understand the true nature of colour vision for many years. In recent times, investigations into colour vision have been one of the main success stories of cognitive science, for each discipline within the field - neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, computer science and artificial intelligence, and philosophy - has contributed significantly to our understanding of colour. Evan Thompson's book is a major contribution to this interdisciplinary project. Colour Vision provides an accessible review of the current scientific and philosophical discussions of colour vision. Thompson steers a course between the subjective and objective positions on colour, arguing for a relational account. This account develops a novel `ecological' approach to colour vision in cognitive science and the philosophy of perception. It is vital reading for all cognitive scientists and philosophers whose interests touch upon this central area
    Perceptual QualitiesTheories of Color, Misc
  •  148
    Filling-in is for finding out
    with Luiz Pessoa and Alva Noë
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 781-796. 1998.
    The following points are discussed in response to the commentaries: (1) A taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena should rely on both phenomenological and mechanistic criteria. (2) Certain forms of perceptual completion are caused by topographically organized neural processes the view that there must be a pictorial or spatial neural-perceptual isomorphism at the bridge locus – should be rejected. Although more abstract kinds of isomorphism are central to the neural-perceptual mapping, the pe…Read more
    The following points are discussed in response to the commentaries: (1) A taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena should rely on both phenomenological and mechanistic criteria. (2) Certain forms of perceptual completion are caused by topographically organized neural processes the view that there must be a pictorial or spatial neural-perceptual isomorphism at the bridge locus – should be rejected. Although more abstract kinds of isomorphism are central to the neural-perceptual mapping, the perceptual cannot be exhaustively explained in terms of the neural, and therefore the explanation of perception cannot be reduced to uncovering neural-perceptual isomorphisms. (5) The task of vision is to guide action in the world, not to construct a detailed world-model in the head. (6) Neural filling-in facilitates the integration of information and thereby helps the animal find out about its environment. (7) Perceptual content needs to be understood at the level of the person or animal interacting in the world
    Aspects of ConsciousnessPhilosophy of PsychologyScience of Perception
  •  1
    The Problem of Consciousness
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 29. 2003.
    Philosophy of Consciousness`Hard' and `Easy' Problems
  •  165
    Witnessing from Here: Self-Awareness from a Bodily versus Embodied Perspective
    with Aaron Henry
    In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self, Oxford University Press. 2011.
    This article argues against the no-self or nonegological account of bodily self-awareness. It proposes an account of consciousness that challenges Miri Albahari's forceful defence of a nonegological view of consciousness, particularly its sharp distinction between subject and self. It contends that the subject of experience is a bodily subject and not merely an embodied one and argues that in order to be a subject of experience even in the minimal sense of witnessing-from-a-perspective, one must…Read more
    This article argues against the no-self or nonegological account of bodily self-awareness. It proposes an account of consciousness that challenges Miri Albahari's forceful defence of a nonegological view of consciousness, particularly its sharp distinction between subject and self. It contends that the subject of experience is a bodily subject and not merely an embodied one and argues that in order to be a subject of experience even in the minimal sense of witnessing-from-a-perspective, one must be prereflectively aware of oneself as a living body. It also argues in defence of the necessary presence of a minimal bodily sense of self as a constitutive feature of perspectival awareness of the world.
    Bodily AwarenessSelf-Consciousness
  •  63
    Response to Commentators on Waking, Dreaming, Being
    Philosophy East and West 66 (3): 982-1000. 2016.
    Let me begin by thanking my commentators for taking the time to read my book and to write such constructive commentaries. I would also like to thank Christian Coseru for organizing and chairing the panel at the International Society for Buddhist Philosophy at the 2015 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, at which three of the commentaries were originally presented together with my response. Finally, I am grateful to Philosophy East and West for publishing th…Read more
    Let me begin by thanking my commentators for taking the time to read my book and to write such constructive commentaries. I would also like to thank Christian Coseru for organizing and chairing the panel at the International Society for Buddhist Philosophy at the 2015 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, at which three of the commentaries were originally presented together with my response. Finally, I am grateful to Philosophy East and West for publishing this exchange. Philosophy East and West published my first academic paper, so I am especially happy to have this exchange appear here.1In what follows, I have arranged my response according to the topics and issues raised by...
    Asian PhilosophyChinese Philosophy: Topics
  •  816
    Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories
    with Mog Stapleton
    Topoi 28 (1): 23-30. 2009.
    This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
    Embodiment and Situated CognitionPhilosophy of Cognitive Science, MiscAutonomy and Moral PsychologyE…Read more
    Embodiment and Situated CognitionPhilosophy of Cognitive Science, MiscAutonomy and Moral PsychologyExtended Cognition, Misc
  •  24
    Asian Perspectives: Indian Theories
    with Georges Dreyfus
    This chapter examines Indian views of the mind and consciousness, with particular focus on the Indian Buddhist tradition. To contextualize Buddhist views of the mind, we first provide a brief presentation of some of the most important Hindu views, particularly those of the S¯am. khya school. Whereas..
    Asian Philosophy
  • Figures
    with Diego Cosmelli
  •  352
    Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience
    with Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli, and Dorothée Legrand
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3): 104-112. 2011.
    Self-Consciousness in ActionNonconceptual/Prereflective Self-ConsciousnessSelf-Consciousness in Psyc…Read more
    Self-Consciousness in ActionNonconceptual/Prereflective Self-ConsciousnessSelf-Consciousness in Psychology
  •  182
    Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness
    Imprint Academic. 2001.
    This book puts that right, and goes further by also including decriptions of animal "person-to-person" interactions.
    First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness, MiscTibetan PhilosophyEastern Approaches to…Read more
    First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness, MiscTibetan PhilosophyEastern Approaches to Consciousness
  •  846
    The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
    with Francisco J. Varela and Eleanor Rosch
    MIT Press. 1991.
    The Embodied Mind provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience.
    Embodiment and Situated Cognition
  •  119
    Beyond the grand illusion: What change blindness really teaches us about vision
    with Alva Noë and Luis Pessoa
    Visual Cognition 7 (1-3): 93-106. 2000.
    Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion …Read more
    Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion rests on (1) a problematic “reconstructionist” conception of vision, and (2) a misconception about the character of perceptual experience.
    Change/Inattentional Blindness
  •  119
    Sensory Qualities
    Philosophical Review 104 (1): 130. 1995.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  127
    Précis of Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy
    Philosophy East and West 66 (3): 927-933. 2016.
    The central idea of Waking, Dreaming, Being is that the self is a process, not a thing or an entity.1 The self isn’t something outside experience, hidden either in the brain or in some immaterial realm. It is an experiential process that is subject to constant change. We enact a self in the process of awareness, and this self comes and goes depending on how we are aware.When we’re awake and occupied with some manual task, we enact a bodily self geared to our immediate environment. Yet this bodil…Read more
    The central idea of Waking, Dreaming, Being is that the self is a process, not a thing or an entity.1 The self isn’t something outside experience, hidden either in the brain or in some immaterial realm. It is an experiential process that is subject to constant change. We enact a self in the process of awareness, and this self comes and goes depending on how we are aware.When we’re awake and occupied with some manual task, we enact a bodily self geared to our immediate environment. Yet this bodily self recedes from our experience if our task becomes an absorbing mental one. If our mind wanders, the mentally imagined self of the past or future overtakes the self of the present moment.As we start to fall asleep, the...
    Asian PhilosophyIndian Philosophy
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