Kenneth Seeskin

Maimonides’ negative theology has generated controversy ever since it was advanced in The Guide of the Perplexed. Unlike Aquinas,Maimonides does not allow predication by analogy or anything else that compromises the radical separation between God and creatures. The standard objection to Maimonides is that his view is so extreme that it undermines important features of religious life, most pointedly the institution of prayer. I argue that Maimonides was well aware of the problems caused by negative theology and provides us with ingenious ways to handle them. Overall I attempt to show that for Maimonides, religious language is not referentialbut heuristic: rather than depict the structure of an underlying reality, its function is to prepare the mind for a particular kind of reflection.

Although Maimonides' discussion of creation is one of his greatest contributions - he himself claims that belief in creation is second in importance only to belief in God - there is still considerable debate on what that contribution was. Kenneth Seeskin takes a close look at the problems Maimonides faced and the sources from which he drew. He argues that Maimonides meant exactly what he said: the world was created by a free act of God so that the existence of everything other than God is contingent. In religious terms, existence is a gift. In order to reach this conclusion, Seeskin examines Maimonides' view of God, miracles, the limits of human knowledge, and the claims of astronomy to be a science. Clearly written and closely argued, Maimonides on the Origin of the World takes up questions of perennial interest.

In Book I of the Ethics, Spinoza rejects any explanation that uses the will of God to explain natural phenomena. In his paper Spinoza’s argument is discussed by looking at a specific example of the view he was criticizing: Maimonides’ account of particularity. We will see that in some ways, Spinoza is right. But we will also see that Maimonides’ argument is not as naïve as a reader of Spinoza might think and that Spinoza’s own position is not immune from Maimonides’ attack on metaphysical determinism

Although there has never been a shortage of book-length commentaries on Plato's Republic, Descartes's Meditations, or Spinoza's Ethics, the same cannot be said of Maimonides's Guide of the Perplexed. A few Hebrew commentaries exist, but they are neither influential nor readily accessible to English-speaking audiences. So while there has been a noticeable resurgence of interest in Maimonides since the publication of Shlomo Pines's English translation in 1963, there is still a respect in which Ivry's book breaks new ground.The reasons for the lack of such a commentary are several. The original text is written in Judeo-Arabic and presupposes advanced knowledge of the Hebrew Bible, rabbinic commentaries on the Bible...

This paper examines erotic love from two perspectives: that offered by Diotima in the Symposium and that offered by the story of Adam and Eve in Genesis 2-3. In the first, love for another person is based on an appraisal of their desirable qualities. As such, it is eventually transcended as the lover comes to realize that more value can be found in institutions, the sciences, and eventually the form of Beauty. In the second, love describes the basic human need for partnership. Even in paradise, when Adam is still innocent and has a direct relationship with God, God recognizes that: «It is not good for man to be alone». The kind of love envisioned here cannot be replaced by a move toward transcendence. In a famous study of the Symposium, Martha Nussbaum argued that the lesson of the dialogue is that a person cannot have it both ways: either one becomes romantically attached to another person or he sees in that person a representation of something higher. I submit that we have no choice try to have it both ways: admitting the need for partnership and transcendence simultaneously

This article discusses a respect in which modern thought differs from ancient: the role of hope. Although mentioned in ancient philosophy, hope is not a cardinal virtue, much less a presupposition of moral action. By contrast, hope takes center stage in the thought of Kant. Kant maintains that moral perfection is possible and always in the process of being realized but never actually comes to pass. No matter how much progress is made, there will always be something more to be accomplished. In this way, the gap between is and ought becomes smaller but is never completely closed. Because it gets smaller, hope is always justified; because it is never completely closed, hope is always needed. But Kant, by his own admission, can offer no systematic reason why human behavior always falls short of its goal. If it is possible to overcome evil, I am perfectly justified in hoping that one day it will be overcome. Kant rejects this position because it would put him dangerously close to Pelagius, whose works were declared heretical because they denied the doctrine of original sin

Monotheism is usually considered Judaism's greatest contribution to world culture, but it is far from clear what monotheism is. This work examines the notion that monotheism is not so much a claim about the number of God as a claim about the nature of God. Seeskin argues that the idea of a God who is separate from his creation and unique is not just an abstraction but a suitable basis for worship. He examines this conclusion in the contexts of prayer, creation, sabbath observance, repentance, religious freedom, and love of God. Maimonides plays a central role in the argument both because of his importance to Jewish self-understanding and because he deals with the question of how philosophic ideas are embodied in religious ritual.

Autonomy in Jewish Philosophy examines an important theme in Jewish thought from the Book of Genesis to the present day. Although it is customary to view Judaism as a legalistic faith leaving little room for free thought or individual expression, Kenneth Seeskin argues that this view is wrong. Where some see the essence of the religion as strict obedience to divine commands, Seeskin claims that God does not just command but forms a partnership with humans requiring the consent of both parties. Looking at classic texts from Biblical, Rabbinic, and philosophical literature, Seeskin shows that Judaism has always respected freedom of conscience and assigned an important role to the power of human reason. The book considers both existing arguments and presents new ideas about the role of autonomy in Judaism. Clear and concise, it offers a refreshing alternative to the mysticism and dogmatism prevalent in much of the recent literature.