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11The Concept of Analysis in Comte’s Philosophy of MathematicsPhilosophy Research Archives 8 205-222. 1982.This paper traces August Comte’s attempts to get clear about the concept of mathematical analysis at various stages in his intellectual development. Comte was especially concerned with distinguishing a method of analysis for the resolution of complex prolems from analysis in the sense of a method of drawing inferences. Geometrical analysis serves as his model for the former. In his attempt to get clear about this notion, he discovers an historical succession of different methods all of which may…Read more
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32Durkheim, Jamesian pragmatism and the normativity of truthHistory of the Human Sciences 23 (5): 1-16. 2010.In his lectures on pragmatism presented in the academic year 1913—14 at the Sorbonne, Durkheim argued that James’s pragmatist theory of truth, due to its emphasis on individual satisfaction, was unable to account for the obligatory, necessary and impersonal character of truth. But for Durkheim to make this charge is only to raise the question whether he himself could account for the morally obligatory or normative character of truth. Although rejecting individualism may be necessary for explaini…Read more
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26Review: Rescuing Auguste comte from the philosophy of history (review)History and Theory 47 (2): 291-301. 2008.
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8La nature de la société: Organicisme et sciences sociales au XIXe siècle (review)Isis 97 563-564. 2006.
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4Book Reviews : Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology. Indiana University Press, Bloomington/ Indianapolis, 1988. Pp. xv, 316, US$22.00 (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (1): 121-125. 1991.
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Book Review (review)Economics and Philosophy 10 (2): 203-208. 1994.The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory, Marwell Gerald and Oliver PamelaOn Social Facts, Gilbert Margaret.
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24Review of C. Mantzavinos, Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (6). 2010.
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14Renouvier had argued that Comte's philosophy of science yielded very conservative normative advice regarding the sciences. Fedi, Becquemont, Logue, and Mouy have suggested the same charge could be leveled at Renouvier regarding evolutionary theory, non-Euclidean geometry, and set theory. This paper shows Renouvier's views were not unreasonable given what was known at the time. Further, Renouvier had a deeper appreciation than Comte of human fallibility and did not proscribe any area of research,…Read more
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13Historical Laws and the History and Philosophy of SciencePhilosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 3 647-651. 1988.
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36The Concept of Analysis in Comte’s Philosophy of MathematicsPhilosophy Research Archives 8 205-222. 1982.This paper traces August Comte’s attempts to get clear about the concept of mathematical analysis at various stages in his intellectual development. Comte was especially concerned with distinguishing a method of analysis for the resolution of complex prolems from analysis in the sense of a method of drawing inferences. Geometrical analysis serves as his model for the former. In his attempt to get clear about this notion, he discovers an historical succession of different methods all of which may…Read more
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9Durkheim's philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge: creating an intellectual nicheUniversity of Chicago Press. 1994.
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20Sociology and Hacking's TrousersPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992. 1992.For Hacking, the word "real", like the sexist expression "wear the trousers", takes its meaning from its negative uses. In this essay, I criticize Hacking's reasons for believing that the objects of study of the social sciences are not real. First I argue that the realism issue in the social sciences concerns not unobservable entities but systems of social classification. I then argue that Hacking's social science nominalism derives from his considering social groups in isolation from the entire…Read more
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17Changing conceptions of the philosophy of scienceInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (2). 2001.(2001). Changing conceptions of the philosophy of science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 127-131. doi: 10.1080/02698590120058997
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34Renouvier and the method of hypothesisStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1): 132-148. 2007.Renouvier was among the first philosophers in France to break with the nineteenth-century inductivist tradition and defend the use of hypotheses in science. Earlier in the century, the humanistically-educated eclectic spiritualist philosophers who dominated French academic life had followed Reid in proscribing the use of hypotheses. Renouvier, who was educated in the sciences, took up the Comtean positivist alternative and developed it further. He began by defending hypotheses that anticipate la…Read more
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67Book Reviews : Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology. Indiana University Press, Bloomington/ Indianapolis, 1988. Pp. xv, 316, US$22.00 (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (1): 121-125. 1991.
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15Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation, and Reality in the Natural and Social Sciences. Richard W. MillerIsis 79 (3): 492-493. 1988.
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25Social science, epistemology, and the problem of relativism: Reply to Meja and StehrSocial Epistemology 2 (3). 1988.
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19Claude Blanckaert. La nature de la société: Organicisme et sciences sociales au XIXe siècle. 158 pp., bibl., index. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004. €14 (review)Isis 97 (3): 563-564. 2006.
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13Review of Lawrence E. Cahoone, Cultural Revolutions: Reason Versus Culture in Philosophy, Politics, and Jihad (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8). 2005.
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41This Article does not have an abstract
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54Whither social epistemology? A reply to FullerPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (2): 196-202. 1991.
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14The Empirical Character of Methodological RulesPhilosophy of Science 63 (5). 1996.Critics of Laudan's normative naturalism have questioned whether methodological rules can be regarded as empirical hypotheses about relations between means and ends. Drawing on Laudan's defense that rules of method are contingent on assumptions about the world, I argue that even if such rules can be shown to be analytic in principle, in practice the warrant for such rules will be empirical. Laudan's naturalism, however, acquires normative force only by construing both methods and epistemic goals…Read more
Chicago, Illinois, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
History of Western Philosophy |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
History of Western Philosophy |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |