-
Quine a realismusReflexe: Filosoficky Casopis 31 61-76. 2006.Článek se pokouší o koherentní interpretaci Quinových nečetných vyjádření na téma realismus. Autor konstatuje, že Quinovy názory vykazují různorodé tendence: Quine ve svých textech přechází od úvah, které bychom označili za idealistické , k pozici spíš realistické. Článek má dvě části. První je věnována Quinovu chápání positů a jeho tezím o naturalizaci filosofie a imanenci pravdy teorii. Druhá část pak obsahuje úvahu o Quinově známé tezi o nevymezitelnosti reference a jejích důsledcích pro otáz…Read more
-
22Searle on realism and "privileged conceptual scheme"Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (suppl. 2): 31-39. 2012.
-
85What determines content?: the internalism/externalism dispute (edited book)Cambridge Scholars Press. 2006.A distinguished team of fourteen European philosophers addresses the current debates on internalism versus externalism in the philosophy of language and mind. The main objective of the volume is to demonstrate the philosophical significance and fruitfulness of the internalism/externalism debate on a wide range of issues, and to do so in a manner which is sophisticated yet accessible to non-specialists. The issues authors deal with include linguistic deference, interpreting classical externalist …Read more
-
Richard Rorty: Filozofia a zrkadlo prírodyOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 8 (1): 107-111. 2001.
-
One world is enough. A note on Goodman's notion of many actual worldsFilosoficky Casopis 60 45-53. 2012.
-
The a-priori, a summer school of analytical philosophy, Florence, June 26 to July 1, 2003Filosoficky Casopis 51 (4): 709-712. 2003.
-
Quine, Goodman a otázka mnohosti světůFilosoficky Casopis 57 93-103. 2009.[Quine, Goodman and the question of the plurality of worlds]
-
L. H. Nelson – J. Nelson, QuineOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (1): 126-128. 2007.
-
Donald Davidson: Čin, mysel, jazykFilosoficky Casopis 47 317-320. 1999.[Donald Davidson: Action, Thought and Language.]
-
Reference a realismus pohledem fenomenologie a analytické filosofieReflexe: Filosoficky Casopis 36 93-114. 2009.
-
35Searle on External Realism and “Privileged Conceptual Scheme”Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 31-39. 2012.
-
Gábor Forrai, Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes. A Defense of Internal RealismOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 10 (2): 227-231. 2003.
-
Robert B. Brandom, Articulating Reasons. An Introduction to InferentialismOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 9 (4): 469-472. 2002.
-
16Dvě verze pojmového relativismuOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 10 (2): 148-156. 2003.The paper distinguishes between various versions of conceptual relativism and tries to reduce their number to two final alternatives: those of weak and strong conceptual relativism. The author argues that while a weak, pluralist version of conceptual relativity might be acceptable, the stronger version, as defined in the paper, cannot be coherently formulated. The argument of the paper draws on recent criticism of conceptual relativism by Anthony Brueckner, and tries to extend it further
-
37Putnamovy realismy a pojmová relativitaStudia Neoaristotelica 3 (1): 3-16. 2006.The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it expounds the thesis of ‘conceptual relativity’ propounded in a series of writings of the well-known philosopher Hilary Putnam and indicates the alleged manner in which the thesis, according to Putnam, undermines the foundations of metaphysical realism (understood in a peculiar way spelled out in the paper). Second, a critical examination of Putnam’s anti-metaphysical-realist argument is offered. It is argued that Putnam offers examples only of a trivial…Read more
-
43Is Rorty a linguistic idealist?Human Affairs 21 (3): 272-279. 2011.The paper addresses the recurrent charge that Richard Rorty is a “linguistic idealist”. I show what the charge consists of and try to explain that there is a charitable reading of Rorty’s works, according to which he is not guilty of linguistic idealism. This reading draws on Putnam’s well-known conception of “internal realism” and accounts for the causal independence of the world on our linguistic practices. I also show how we can reconcile this causal independence of things and the sense of ou…Read more
-
-
University of West BohemiaRegular Faculty
Prague, Czechia
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |