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104Even zombies can be surprised: A reply to Graham and HorganPhilosophical Studies 122 (2): 189-202. 2005.In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” , George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look
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209Vagueness and context-relativityPhilosophical Studies 81 (2-3). 1996.This paper develops the treatment of vague predicates begun in my "Vagueness Without Paradox" (Philosophical Review 103, 1 [1994]). In particular, I show how my account of vague words dissolves an "eternal" version of the sorites paradox, i.e., a version in which the paradox is generated independently of any particular run of judgments of the items in a sorites series. In so doing I refine the notion of an internal contest, introduced in the earlier paper, and draw a distinction within the class…Read more
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89Relativism, Retraction, and EvidencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1): 171-178. 2016.
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107Can we do without concepts?: Comments on Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts (review)Philosophical Studies 149 (3). 2010.
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60Toward a cognitive theory of musical ineffabilityReview of Metaphysics 41 (4): 685-706. 1988.DESPITE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES OF IDEOLOGY, objective, and style, these theorists join in giving voice to what is perhaps the most deeply rooted conviction in modern aesthetics: that aesthetic experience is, in some essential respect, ineffable. In apprehending a work of art we come to know something we cannot put into words.
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Marcus, Ruth BarcanIn Donald M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Supplement, Simon and Schuster Macmillan. pp. 322--323. 1996.
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53First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefsIn C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the internal reality of beliefs. First-person authority (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford University Press. 1998.
Yale University
PhD
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |