Luis Gonzalez

We show that Wiredu’s result in [26] is not the doom for connexive set theories, not even for those based in logics similar to CC1, one of the original target logics. For this purpose, we present the necessary assumptions for Wiredu’s proof, making some precisions on the connexive requirements. Then we present a non-reflexive variant of CC1 in which Wiredu’s proof can be blocked. Finally, we discuss the prospects of a connexive set theory based on both the non-reflexive and non-transitive variants of CC1, which, even assuming non-triviality, are not very rosy.

This article investigates the intersection between the medical condition of lovesickness and the social phenomenon of rape. While rape in medieval culture has been studied through the disciplinary lens of gender studies, theology, sociology, and legal theory, the influence of medical epistemology on these reprehensible acts of violence has been overlooked. The advent of the branch of knowledge known as medical humanities allows us to fill in this gap by looking into the clinical treatises that circulated widely in medieval Europe and served as curricula in medieval universities. This article argues that because intercourse with the beloved was recommended as therapy for lovesickness in the medical texts on the disease, such texts did more than inform physicians and natural philosophers about the causes, effects, and treatments for this dangerous condition, but helped normalize the hypersexuality of melancholic, lovesick men and, in so doing, provided hermeneutic tools for defending and justifying sexual aggressions. Under these circumstances, women’s bodies were perceived and treated as mere medicinal objects for healing men’s sickness and saving men’s lives.

Following the strategy in [15] to develop inconsistent models for relevant arithmetics, we formulate a connexive variant of arithmetic by replacing the conditional of RM3 with the Belikov–Loginov conditional. We obtain thus the connexive logic cRM3 which serves as a base logic for arithmetics cRM3$^{i}$, cRM3$^{i\sharp }$, cRM$^{\sharp }$, cRMn$^{i}$, and cRM$^\omega $. We compare these with their counterparts RM3$^{i\sharp }$, RM$^{\sharp }$ and $\mathbf{RM}^\omega$ that extend relevant arithmetic $\mathbf{R}^\sharp$.

Mortensen introduced a connexive logic commonly known as 'M3V'. M3V is obtained by adding a special conditional to LP. Among its most notable features, besides its being connexive, M3V is negation-inconsistent and it validates the negation of every conditional. But Mortensen has also studied and applied extensively other non-connexive logics, for example, closed set logic, CSL, and a variant of Sette's logic, identified and called 'P2' by Marcos. In this paper, we analyze and compare systematically the connexive variants of CSL and P2, obtained by adding the M3V conditional to them. Our main observations are two. First, that the inconsistency of M3V is exacerbated in the connexive variant of closed set logic, while it is attenuated in the connexive variant of the Sette-like P2. Second, that the M3V conditional is, unlike other conditionals, "connexively stable", meaning that it remains connexive when combined with the main paraconsistent negations.

Realist dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions in reality. One argument against this idea says that it is impossible because it has to make room for the possibility of a trivial reality, which is metaphysically impossible. Another argument against it says that the metaphysical structure of reality is such that it is impossible to have contradictions in it. I argue here that both arguments fail to establish the impossibility of realist dialetheism because they are based on a misconception about the notions of negation and contradiction, which leads them, in the first case, to wrongly hold that dialetheism has to be compatible with trivialism, and, in the second case, to assume that the validity of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction prevents the existence of dialetheias

Really full blooded platonism (RFBP) is aimed to achieve a complete picture of the mathematical landscape by accepting inconsistent mathematics. I distinguish various senses of completeness relevant to the debate and argue that the move to inconsistency-tolerance might not be enough to achieve a complete picture of the mathematical landscape in any of those senses, for there is positive reason to endorse a richer Platonism with place for trivial parts in the mathematical landscape. © 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

According to common wisdom, the connective tonk defined by Prior trivializes any theory that contains it. However, it should not be forgotten that whether an argument holds or not depends to a large extent on the underlying notion of logical consequence. Logical consequence is usually assumed to be Tarskian, that is, reflexive, transitive and monotonic. However, Belnap had already conjectured that tonk might not be so problematic in a non-transitive logic, which Cook finally proved in 2005. In this paper we improve on Cook’s result in two ways: our hypothesis is simpler (namely, we use fewer interpretations than he did and we do not rely on a disjunctive consequence relation) and it is not ad hoc (namely, our working consequence relation is not designed merely to avoid triviality under tonk).

Científicos del sistema Tierra han demostrado que el planeta es un sistema adaptativo-complejo y que algunos procesos naturales ya no operan en condiciones seguras para preservar la vida. Destaca que poco se ha hecho por explorar las implicaciones en la arena jurídica para responder ante los retos que estas condiciones presuponen para la vida humana y para nuestra supervivencia como especie. Aquí se sostiene que, para mantener el buen funcionamiento planetario, se requiere de una articulación efectiva entre el razonamiento jurídico, su argumentación y la ciencia del sistema Tierra. Al hacer una exploración de la literatura jurídica y del sistema Tierra, este artículo tiene como objetivo exponer el primer esfuerzo sobre cómo debería adaptarse el razonamiento jurídico y su argumentación a un enfoque del sistema Tierra, utilizando para ello diferentes casos de estudio, resoluciones y tesis jurisprudenciales. Al hacerlo, se exhibe la necesidad de erradicar concepciones erróneas subyacentes al antropocentrismo jurídico, para ajustar la interpretación y aplicación del derecho a realidades ecológicas científicamente más precisas.

This article explores medical responsibility and negligence from an ethical and legal perspective within the Colombian context. It highlights causes of negligence such as deficiencies in professional training and organizational problems. The article emphasizes "objective imputation as key to determining the criminal responsibility of the physician" (Alvarado D. 2019). The objectives include analyzing the current legal framework in Colombia and assessing the link between medical ethics and legal responsibility. The methodology builds upon a thorough examination of specialized literature, including peer-reviewed scientific articles in medicine and law, as well as legal documents and ethical regulations. A targeted search was conducted across various bibliographic databases including Google Scholar, Redalyc, Scielo, Dialnet, Biomed Central, Miguel De Cervantes Virtual Library, and BVS virtual health library.

Logic is an excellent tool for reasoning about most philosophical topics, including logical issues themselves. Discussions about the validity or otherwise of certain principles have been widespread throughout the history of logic. This chapter exemplifies that with the analysis of the debate surrounding connexive logics. In connexive logics, certain principles involving mainly negation and implication hold good, whereas they are not valid in most well-known logics. Despite their intuitiveness, the connexive principles quickly lead to contradictions and even to triviality, i.e. to the truth of every proposition. This chapter surveys the main arguments against the connexive principles and discusses some prospects for challenging those arguments and endorsing the connexive principles.

In this paper I argue, contra Mortensen, that there is a case, namely that of a degenerate topos, an extremely simple mathematical universe in which everything is true, in which no mathematical “catastrophe” is implied by mathematical triviality. I will show that either one of the premises of Dunn’s trivialization result for real number theory –on which Mortensen mounts his case– cannot obtain (from a point of view “external” to the universe) and thus the argument is unsound, or that it obtains in calculations “internal” to such trivial universe and the theory associated, yet the calculations are possible and meaningful albeit extremely simple.

La postura nietzscheana sobre la educación sufre un viraje considerable. En todo momento el individualismo es el centro de su pensamiento. Pero el acento de ese individualismo marca dos modos de abordar el problema. Lo la primera época parte de una noción de educación utópica de marcado carácter romántico y vinculado a un proyecto político. El ideal de educación es el heleno. La cultura consiste en el sometimiento a los dictámenes del individuo: el genio. En Schopenhauer como educador, Nietzsche manifiesta su ruptura tanto con Schopenhauer como consigo mismo y con la tradición. La crítica a la sociedad y al Estado se patentiza. La educación debe, para ser tal y no represión, partir de uno mismo

Nowadays there is a growing tendency in the philosophy of science to think that some phenomena cannot be exhaustively explained, or even described, by a single theory or a particular approach. Thus, we are occasionally required to use various approaches in order to give account of the phenomenon we are analyzing. And sometimes, we can appreciate this as an invitation to be pluralist in certain respects about our understanding of a particular aspect in science. During the last decade applications of pluralism have increased and led to several other relevant debates in the philosophy of science. By the strengthening of pluralism, new questions have emerged, and more importantly, new alternatives have been offered in dealing with problems about how to interpret the ontology and the ontological commitments of particular theories, or how to apply strategies to analyze and understand specific episodes from the history of science, or how to work within different, and sometimes incompatible, explanations about a particular phenomenon, among others. In general, pluralism seems to be a very rich and yet not enough explored path for the philosophy of science in general. Today, it is recognized that, at least for methodological purposes, the application of pluralism to the study of science can offer a great number of benefits. One of them would be the opportunity of analyzing the role that some epistemic virtues -such as scope, fruitfulness, consistency, and simplicity, to name just a few- play in the scientific activity. From the different pluralist positions, a lot has been said about empirical adequacy, refutability and explanatory power yet consistency power, yet, consistency has not been equally dealt with. As a matter of fact, the lack of consistency and its philosophical implications have been studied from an angle that does not necessarily involve a pluralism of any kind. At the moment, it is commonly accepted that inconsistencies are more frequent in scientific development that the traditional philosophy of science could have expected and the idea that inconsistency is not always a synonym of logical anarchy, as it was suggested in the classical literature of logic and the philosophy of science, has been gaining support. All this has been possible, mostly, thanks to the emergence of paraconsistent logics and the availability of case studies that show how inconsistency is not an uncommon phenomenon in science. But pluralism does not necessarily entail inconsistency toleration nor vice versa. Accordingly the main motivation for this volume is to explore the links between pluralism and inconsistency toleration in science, in order to connect the reflections on inconsistency toleration with broader and major issues in philosophy of science. In order to do so, we will suggest two different lines of investigation: first, to focus on the implication of some pluralistic accounts in the philosophy of science, regarding inconsistency; and second to analyze the implications of some paraconsistent approaches regarding pluralism in science.