Asger Sørensen

Videnskabsteori handler om krav til videnskabelig viden, og disse krav hviler på forudsætninger, der kan ekspliciteres yderligere. Specielt i dag er der dog brug for en bog, der ikke blot analyserer den klassiske videnskabsteori, men i samme diskurs også forholder sig til de meget forskellige tankegange, der i dag giver sig ud for at være videnskabsteori. Om videnskabelig viden til dem, der ønsker et bedre videnskabsteoretisk overblik, og til dem som ønsker at gå mere i dybden med den egentlige filosofiske videnskabsteori. Bogen henvender sig til studerende og færdige kandidater inden for især samfundsvidenskab og humaniora. Asger Sørensens ambition med bogen er at bidrage til klarhed og fornuft i en verden, hvor ideologisk forblændelse ikke blot sker gennem massemedier og underholdningsindustri, men også gennem en akademisk teoriproduktion, der udvikler og anerkender alle mulige programmer for videnskab.

Introducing articles on Kant’s Toward Perpetual Peace, various interpretative questions are discussed. Externally, alleged senility is contrasted with political maturity, just as irony and rhetorics are discussed in relation to (self-)censorship and the French Revolution. Internally, Kant scholars have discussed, e.g. the use of ‘eternal’ vs. ‘perpetual’, the question of preventive war, and, more in general, the relation between Kant’s political writings. In relation to the three definitive articles on state law, law of people and world citizen law, issues are, e.g., Kant’s conception of constitution, democracy and their relation to peace, peace federation vs. world republic, thesis vs. hypothesis, and various ideas of sovereignty, as well as cosmopolitanism vs. world citizen right. Finally, questions concerning morality vs. politics and concerning transcendental publicity are presented.

There is no education, which can avoid being political. Still, the question is in which sense education is political, and if all education must be politics, or, if not, to what extent politics must be made the explicit telos of the formation and upbringing, and how the relation might be between the principles needed for education and those of the political sphere. Today, after the successive collapses of the modern models of the good society, first realised socialism and then neo-liberal market society, the question is what the standards should be for education and especially what the relation should be between these standards and politics. Do we for instance have to raise human beings to become citizens of a civic republic, a world society or a league of nations? Can education limit itself to local concerns or must it transcend the limits to become international, transnational or even global? Should we educate to a global social democracy?

The distinction between teleology and deontology is today almost universally accepted within practical philosophy, but deontology is and has from the beginning been subordinate to utili-tarianism. ‘Deontology’ was constructed by Bentham to signify the art and science of private morality within a utilitarian worldview. The classical distinction was constructed by Broad as a refinement of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, and then adopted by Frankena. To Broad it signified two opposite tendencies in ethics, in Frankena’s textbooks, however, it becomes an exclusive distinction, where de-ontology signifies disregard for consequences, and it is therefore almost impossible to think of deontology as a framework for a com-prehensive ethical theory. This conception, however, is adopted by Rawls, and in his contractarian interpretation of deontology it is in fact no more within the sphere of ethics.

Hegel's influence on post-Hegelian philosophy is as profound as it is ambiguous. Modern philosophy is philosophy after Hegel. Taking leave of Hegel's system appears to be a common feature of modern and post-modern thought. One could even argue that giving up Hegel's claim of totality defines philosophy after Hegel. Modern and post-modern philosophies are philosophies of finitude: Hegel's philosophy cannot be repeated. However, its status as a negative backdrop for modern and post-modern thought already shows its pervasive influence. Precisely in its criticism of Hegel, modern thought is bound up with his thinking.

Filosofi og pædagogik er gamle fæller, og der er et overlap mellem filosofiens historie og pædagogikkens historiske litteratur. Store tænkere som Platon, Aristoteles, Augustin, Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart og Dewey hører hjemme begge steder. I den pædagogiske filosofi kan almene teoretiske og praktisk filosofiske spørgsmål udforskes systematisk og historisk. Gennem diskussioner af sådanne spørgsmål kan man forholde sig mere nysgerrigt, bevidst, begrundet og kritisk til pædagogisk praksis såvel som til pædagogisk teori, empiri og undervisningsteknologi. Fællesskabet er ikke uproblematisk. Pædagogik er ikke filosofi, og pædagogisk filosofi ikke kun pædagogik. Både didaktik og almen pædagogik kan komme i konflikt med pædagogisk filosofi. Hvordan kan almene pædagogiske spørgsmål overhovedet belyses filosofisk, og hvad betyder de for filosofien selv? En pædagogisk filosofisk tilgang forandrer kanon i både pædagogik og filosofi. Udvalget af nøgletekster ændres. Emner, der er værd at diskutere, forskydes. Nye forskningsspørgsmål og prioriteringer viser sig. Et pædagogisk perspektiv på filosofiens udvikling vil fremhæve dens bidrag til at forstå ’den pædagogiske problem- og fænomenverden’, ligesom et filosofisk perspektiv på pædagogikken vil flytte – eller rettere udvide – fokus med hensyn til dens idéhistorie såvel som dens aktuelle teoretiske praksis. Som i al anden filosofi kan man i den pædagogiske filosofi diskutere teoretiske og praktiske, såvel som poetiske og æstetiske spørgsmål; men det er typisk med en særlig vinkel, nemlig den pædagogiske. Man kan således diskutere erkendelse, viden og sandhed, ligeså vel som man kan undersøge ret, retfærdighed og skønhed. Ofte vil det være med en særlig tvist. Den pædagogiske filosofi kan vise sig som særegen både ved sin særlige position og ved at relatere sig til det pædagogiske som genstandsfelt. Hvad denne position og dette genstandsfelt egentlig er, er der dog ingen enighed om. Det kan ikke engang siges at være udelukkende pædagogisk defineret, og derfor må den pædagogiske filosofi forholde sig åbent til begge dele. Studier i pædagogisk filosofi indbyder til denne drøftelse.

Today the idea of cosmopolitanism has become widely accepted as an appropriate answer to what we now call globalization. A key reference is Kant who argues for a Recht of the world citizen, and this is normally understood as a cosmopolitan law. Apparently Kant lets the law of the world citizen be limited to a right to visit, but somehow his peace project must imply something more than just this very modest claim. Following a hint from Kant himself I take a closer look at the material aspect of cosmopolitanism, i.e. the economy of travelling, and it appears that cosmopolitanism can function as an ideology for letting possible investors look for business cases, that is, for promising places for capitalist exploitation. As an answer to such strong material processes cosmopolitanism is insufficient, both as a moral imperative and as a stipulated right. What we need is a more comprehensive political and legal perspective and the solutions this indicates. To get inspiration for this, however, we can turn to Kant again, since it turns out that he does not argue for cosmopolitanism at all, neither as a programme nor as an ideology. For Kant the overall goal is perpetual peace, and the law of the world citizen represents only one subordinate element. As an answer to globalization we should thus drop the limited ideal of cosmopolitanism and follow Kant in his ambition of a threefold political constitution comprising state law, law of the people and law of the world citizen