•  1473
    Story Size
    Philosophical Papers 44 (2): 121-137. 2015.
    The shortest stories are zero words long. There is no maximum length.
  •  1216
    Images, intentionality and inexistence
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3): 522-538. 2009.
    The possibilities of depicting non-existents, depicting non-particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude.
  •  794
    A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction (review)
    British Journal of Aesthetics 56 (4): 427-429. 2016.
    Review of A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction by Alberto Voltolini.
  •  1815
    Distance and Dissimilarity
    Philosophical Papers 48 (2): 211-239. 2018.
    This paper considers whether an analogy between distance and dissimilarlity supports the thesis that degree of dissimilarity is distance in a metric space. A straightforward way to justify the thesis would be to define degree of dissimilarity as a function of number of properties in common and not in common. But, infamously, this approach has problems with infinity. An alternative approach would be to prove representation and uniqueness theorems, according to which if comparative dissimilarity m…Read more
  •  1237
    Pictures, perspective and possibility
    Philosophical Studies 149 (2): 135-151. 2010.
    This paper argues for a possible worlds theory of the content of pictures, with three complications: depictive content is centred, two-dimensional and structured. The paper argues that this theory supports a strong analogy between depictive and other kinds of representation and the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance.
  •  101
  •  2253
    Two Conceptions of Similarity
    Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270): 21-37. 2018.
    There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first, the degree of dissimilarity between two particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. According to the second, the degree of similarity between two particulars is a function of the number of (sparse) properties they have in common and not in common. This paper argues that these two conceptions are logically independent, but philosophically inconsonant.
  •  871
    Maps and Meaning
    Journal of Philosophical Research 35 123-128. 2010.
    It's possible to understand an infinite number of novel maps. I argue that Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi's compositional semantics of maps cannot explain this possibility, because it requires an infinite number of semantic primitives. So the semantics of maps is puzzlingly different from the semantics of language.
  •  1657
    Depiction and convention
    Dialectica 62 (3): 335-348. 2008.
    By defining both depictive and linguistic representation as kinds of symbol system, Nelson Goodman attempts to undermine the platitude that, whereas linguistic representation is mediated by convention, depiction is mediated by resemblance. I argue that Goodman is right to draw a strong analogy between the two kinds of representation, but wrong to draw the counterintuitive conclusion that depiction is not mediated by resemblance.
  •  1399
    Fact, Fiction, and Fantasy
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1): 46-57. 2015.
    This paper argues: (1) All knowledge from fiction is from imagination (2) All knowledge from imagination is modal knowledge (3) So, all knowledge from fiction is modal knowledge Moreover, some knowledge is from fiction, so (1)-(3) are non-vacuously true.
  •  977
    Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1): 187-189. 2012.
  •  1459
    Defining depiction
    British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (2): 143-157. 2009.
    It is a platitude that whereas language is mediated by convention, depiction is mediated by resemblance. But this platitude may be attacked on the grounds that resemblance is either insufficient for or incidental to depictive representation. I defend common sense from this attack by using Grice's analysis of meaning to specify the non-incidental role of resemblance in depictive representation.