Joseph Agassi

The liberal approach to ethics quite naturally tends toward the classic individualistic theory of society, to reductionism or psychologism so-called, that is, to a reduction of all social action to individual action. For example, liberalism allows one to experiment with new medications on one's own body. By extension, liberalism allows one to experiment, it seems, on another person's body with new medication if one acts as the other person's agent, that is, if one has the other person's proper consent. We all know that new medicines are introduced into the market experimentally; indeed, government agencies, such as food and drug administrations, are supposed to supervise such experimentations and eliminate from the market as quickly as possible new (or old) medications that prove harmful. Hence, the very introduction of a new medicine into the market requires the consent of the public - in the form of proper permits to manufacture and market new (and old) drugs and other medications. Yet there is a flaw in this description. The act of permission is not made by individual citizens to doctors who act as their agents.

Karl R. Popper is “the outstanding philosopher of the twentieth century” (Bryan Magee), even “the greatest thinker of the [twentieth] century” (Gellner). He felt affinity with thinkers of the Age of Reason and developed a new version of rationalism: critical rationalism. As a champion of science and of democracy he was the most influential philosopher of the post-WWII era. He was a close follower of Bertrand Russell and of Albert Einstein in that all three advocated problem-oriented fallibilism (during the peak of the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein who did not), valued commonsense, taking its theories to be approximations to the scientific truths of the day, and considered scientific truths as series of approximations to the absolute truth [Agassi, 1981, 112-16]. In particular, all three viewed science as the bold flight of the imagination checked and tempered by experience [Russell, 1931, 102]; [Einstein, 1949, 680]. Insofar as Russell adumbrated Popper’s philosophy, it may be fair to consider the latter a streamlined version of the former (the way both Berkeley and Hume deemed their philosophies streamlined versions of Locke’s [Hattiangadi, 1985]; [Wettersten, l985]. Russell raised the level of rational discourse in philosophy while remaining within the empiricist tradition; Popper continued and consolidated Russell’s achievements, adding a broad modification of the rationalist tradition [Popper, 1945, Ch. 24], thus forging new ways of philosophizing [Lakatos, 1978, 10]. Many sought a via media between rationalism and irrationalism, between individualism and collectivism, as well as between radicalism and traditionalism. Many sought a via media between empiricism and intellectualism. Popper’s philosophy is the only viable comprehensive rationalist suggestion in these directions (although it is open to modifications, of course), being thoroughly fallibilist and reformist, thus achieving a new and intensified commonsense philosophy, the only one that is integrated..

On September 17, 1994, Karl Popper died at the age of 92.He was described as the official opposition of the “ Vienna Circle”, the philosophical club which in the inter-war period was glamorous and which espoused the then popular doctrine of logical positivism, so-called. His relations with that club were friendly-hostile, to use the term with which he liked to characterize the relations between scientific researchers. He is the last of that generation (unless it is Carl G. Hempel, who, however, sees himself as too young to belong there). The public aspect of Popper’s friendly-hostile relations with his Viennese peers was unfortunately more hostile than friendly. Somehow, philosophers have managed to keep the accounts open for too long. The end of the era is the time to close accounts so as to be able to go on with the job at hand, since the intermingling of personal affairs with objective knowledge is unhealthy. Yet most of the leading heirs of the “ Vienna Circle” still coast around the issues raised by Popper, and so they can neither overlook him nor quote him correctly. If past evidence is reliable here, then this will alter just about now. Is it?

Karl Popper's methodology can be seen as the situational logic of research. Popper called his method "Epistemology without a Knowing Subject." It was dismissed as metaphysical by those who refuse to give up an ideal knowing subject (a perfect human inductive processor). This article surveys the failure of modem discussions of this ideal, from the earliest (the writings of Sir Francis Bacon) to the latest (Kripke). The knowing subject exits at last, but leaves behind interesting results. The ideal knowing subject embodied ideal rationality, outside culture and history. Giving up this ideal invites us to integrate science with its background, to grade rationality (from magic to science), and to integrate different degrees of rationality under one rule.

SummaryAccording to classical rationalism prejudiced people cannot conduct proper research. This is refuted by cases of prejudiced and even Nazi scientists. According to classical rationalism all error is prejudice. This was refuted when crucial experiment between Newton and Einstein favored Einstein. Contemporary popular irrationalists claim crucial experiments are impossible. Their ability to convince rests on the cowardice of the leadership of science which fails to admit openly the present need for a new theory of rationality.RésuméSelon la rationalisme classique, seuls des individus sans préjuges peuvem faire de la bonne recherche. Ce qui est réfuté par des exemples de savants partisans et en particulier nazis. Selon le rationalisme classique, toute erreur est préjugé. Ce qui a été réfuté lorsqu'une expérience cruciale entre Newton et Einstein a tranché en faveur ?on;Einstein. Des irrationalistes contemporains populates prétendent qu'aucune expérience cruciale n'est possible. Leur force de persuasion ne tient Quà la couardise des ténors de la science qui refusent de reconnaître ouvertement le besoin ?on;une nouvelle théorie de la rationalité.ZusammenfassungDem klassischen Rationalismus gemass können voreingenommene Personen nicht wirkliche Forschung betreiben. Diese Ansicht wird widerlegt durch Fälle von voreingenommenen Wissen‐schaftlern – sogar unter der Herrschaft des Nazionalsozialismus. Dem klassischen Rationalismus gemass beruht jeder Irrtum auf Vorurteil. Dies wurde durch die Tatsache widerlegt, dass ein experimentum crucis zugunsten von Einstein gegen Newton entschied. Zeitgenössige populäre Irrationalisten behaupten, dass kein experimentum crucis möglich sei. Ihr Erfolg lasst sich nur durch die Feigheit der für die Wissenschaft Verantwortlichen erklären, die sich weigern, die Not‐wendigkeit einer neuen Theorie der Rationalität einzugestehen

Analogies have been traditionally recognized as a proper part of inductive procedures, akin to generalizations. Seldom, however, have they been presented as superior to generalizations, in the attainability of a higher degree of certitude for their conclusions or in other respects. Though Bacon definitely preferred analogy to generalization1, the tradition seems to me to go the other way-until the recent publication of works by Mary B. Hesse ([2], pp.21-28 and passim) and, perhaps, R. Harr6 ([1], pp.23-28 and passim). The aim of the present note is to argue the following two points. First, generalizations proper are preferable to predictions from past observations to a single future observation, since the latter are ad hoc. Second, analogies are either generalizations proper-perhaps higher-level ones-or ad hoc. In any case, they are not more certain than generalizations, but they are still equally legitimate

The vision of Horace, combining the sweet and the useful, is an expression of a sense of abundance. It came first and was than supported by Bacon's vision of a science-based technology. Later this was further backed by classical liberalism and by metaphysical progressivism. That technology may impede and even destroy science is obvious. Yet the danger is overlooked--with the aid of the vision of Horace and of neo-conservative (Popperian) politics and of neo-reactionary (Kuhnian) politics of science. The science of science policy needs boosting in order to study means of democratic control of technology.

presents Heidegger as a devout mystic who viewed the Nazi Party as the sacred vessel of a divine message—even though, the author adds, his religion is secular and so it has no divinity and no immortal soul. Rickey sees him as a utopian. This makes some sense: the unique in the Shoah involves the unique descent of a highly cultured, enlightened nation to the rock bottom of barbarism. Ricky’s text belies his effort to exonerate Heidegger. Key Words: Rickey • Heidegger • secular religion • barbarism.