Joseph Agassi

The traditional, dogmatic educational sys tem was reinforced by the addition of science instruction to its curriculum. Three errors are reinforced by this move and the subsequent split of the system into streams. a) Pressure is confused with coercion, b) Interactive study is confused with assigned e x e r c i s e s a n d w i t h s e l f- instruction, and c) Aptitude (disposition) is confused with talent (ability). Reform must begin in the public educational system, at least until experimental schooling becomes the norm; yet research must now repudiate traditional v iews and develop the theory of, and the tools for, free interactive study, aiming at imparting universal literacy, including science literacy.

The ill?named debate between postmodernists and postlibertarians should be transcended; this requires the abandonment of both foundationalism and its converse, without abandoning common sense as well (which is no mean trick). Similarly, the debate over ?minimal statism? versus the planned economy is outdated. Instead of claiming to be in possession of foundations of our scientific?cum?political knowledge in broad terms, and instead of severely limiting our knowledge to given proofs, we offer the putative heuristics of critique in general and the critical evaluations of contexts in particular.

The main concern of these notes is objectivity. The demand of traditional rationalism for absolute objectivity is excessive; the license of hermeneuticists and post-modernists to replace objectivity by frank ethnocentrism by endorsing local prejudices is unfortunate. Most social observers still attempt to overcome ethnocentrism, by the use of statistics and of the field method of participant observation and of other means, knowing that no guarantee is possible. As the volume at hand concerns the sociology of one religion in one place, it may serve as a case study. A little objectivity should prevent the camouflage of the deterioration of religious life caused by discrimination

Der Kunsthistoriker Ernst Hans Josef Gombrich hat einen „wissenschaftlichen“ oder kognitiven Ansatz zur Erforschung der Geschichte und Psychologie der Künste entwickelt, der sehr maßgeblich von der Wissenschaftstheorie seines engen Freundes Karl Popper beeinflusst worden ist. Die geistige Nähe zwischen beiden wird in Gombrichs zentraler Arbeit zur Wiederentdeckung der Repräsentation in der Renaissance und zur Historiografie der Kunst deutlich. Ihre Differenzen verdienen allerdings ebenfalls Beachtung. Gombrichs Ansicht zufolge verändern sich Geschmack und Stil entsprechend der von ihm so genannten „Logik der Mode“. Gombrich hat dargelegt, auf welch vielfältige Weise Veränderungen in der Kunst sich vollziehen. Während sich die Moden in der Kunst auf unvorhersehbare, launenhafte Weise wandeln, tauchen technische Veränderungen als Lösungen für technische Probleme auf und werden im Modus von Versuch und Irrtum ermittelt. Auf diese Weise stieß Gombrich auf eine Antinomie in der Kunsttheorie: Handwerkliche Fähigkeiten und Können wandeln sich durch rationalen Fortschritt, während sich Stile durch den irrationalen Mitläufereffekt verändern. In der Kunst ist der relativistische Pluralismus zur Mode geworden, und diese Mode hat seine Antinomie ignoriert – und zwar, sofern er richtig liegt, recht willkürlich.

Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science divides thinkers into the scientific and the prejudiced, using as a standard the up-to-date science textbook. Inductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor false. Conventionalism is useless for reconstructing and weighing conflicts between schools, and overemphasizes science's internal organic growth. For Popper, not for inductivists or conventionalists, the successful criticism of theories is the heart of science. Popper's view admits the existence of valuable errors and enables us to avoid being wise after the event, thereby improving our understanding of the history of science through reconstructions of the actual interplay of theories and facts

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of his passing, this special book features studies on Alexandre Koyré, one of the most influential historians of science of the 20th century, who re-evaluated prevalent thinking on the history and philosophy of science. In particular, it explores Koyré’s intellectual matrix and heritage within interdisciplinary fields of historical, epistemological and philosophical scientific thought. Koyré is rightly noted as both a versatile historian on the birth and development of modern science and for his interest in philosophical questions on the nature of scientific knowledge. In the 1940s and 1950s his activities in the United States established a crucial bridge between the European historical tradition of science studies and the American academic environments, and an entire generation of historians of science grew up under his direct influence. The book brings together contributions from leading experts in the field, and offers much-needed insights into the subject from historical, nature of science, and philosophical perspectives. It provides an absorbing and revealing read for historians, philosophers and scientists alike.

PREFACE This volume is a sequel to yet independent of our Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis, Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston, 1976. Whereas our first book centered on diagnosis, this centers on treatment. In our first volume, all discussions of nosology (theory of illness) and of treatment was ancillary to our discussion of diagnosis; similarly all discussion of this volume dealing with nosology - there is very little on diagnosis here - is ancillary to our discussion of psychotherapy. It is still our profoundest conviction that to speak of treatment without diagnosis is meaningless, if not irresponsible, since otherwise one does not know what one is talking about. Hence, our present study, though it centers on theories of treatment, links psychotherapy with psychopathology. It is the rationale of psychotherapy which is of importance, and the rationale dwells in this link. We wish our present study to be self-contained and understood by readers who are not familiar with our first book - or with any specific literature. Our discussion of medicine in general, meaning the rationale of therapy in general, helps the uninitiated reader, as well as the initiated, we hope: it certainly has helped us. We did not see how else can we study a branch of medicine; we felt the need for some idea of how medicine is supposed to work.