Joseph Agassi

presents Heidegger as a devout mystic who viewed the Nazi Party as the sacred vessel of a divine message—even though, the author adds, his religion is secular and so it has no divinity and no immortal soul. Rickey sees him as a utopian. This makes some sense: the unique in the Shoah involves the unique descent of a highly cultured, enlightened nation to the rock bottom of barbarism. Ricky’s text belies his effort to exonerate Heidegger. Key Words: Rickey • Heidegger • secular religion • barbarism.

The vision of Horace, combining the sweet and the useful, is an expression of a sense of abundance. It came first and was than supported by Bacon's vision of a science-based technology. Later this was further backed by classical liberalism and by metaphysical progressivism. That technology may impede and even destroy science is obvious. Yet the danger is overlooked--with the aid of the vision of Horace and of neo-conservative (Popperian) politics and of neo-reactionary (Kuhnian) politics of science. The science of science policy needs boosting in order to study means of democratic control of technology.

The chief feature of Gadamer's philosophy is his claim that the humanities obey their own rules concerning reading texts and ensuring certitude. The promise of certitude is illusory, however, and the discourses on interpretation by him and his leading disciples are too confused to instruct the reader. His own sketch of his philosophy, published in his autobiographic Philosophical Apprenticeship, and its reflection in Gadamer and Hermeneutics (Hugh J. Silverman, ed.), shows this and reveals him as still too insensitive to the national tragedy of the Third Reich, which he witnessed.

1. The Real Claim of the Chicago School If anything dramatic has happened in economic theory over the last one hundred years – namely, since the advent of marginalism – then, everyone agrees, it was not the rise of the Chicago neo -classical school which, after all, only synthesized the various versions of marginalism, but the Keynesian Revolution. Assessments of this revolution were repeatedly invited, particularly by opponent, chiefly from Chicago. F. A. von Hayek has explicitly and bitterly blames Keynes for all our economic troubles; Harry Johnson has repeatedly declared the most revolutionary work of Keynes, his General Theory of 1936, so poor that but for its author's name on its title page it would have totally flopped. Can such a flop cause so much damage? Are these two assessments – of Hayek and of Johnson – in conflict or no t? Don Patinkin has raised a different question: how different is Keynes from his Chicago opponents, say, Milton Friedman? How many heads need roll, to use his metaphor, before a revolution may be declared? Patinkin sees Keynes as slightly deviant but stil l a member of the mainstream – the mainstream of the mainstream being Friedman and his Chicago followers, of course. Now, can a minor deviant be a flop? Can minor deviations from the true blue doctrine be to blame for all of our economic woes? I do not kno w. Joan Robinson sees in Keynes a minor deviation from classical theory because he said once his correction of classical theory is implemented, that theory takes over once again. Moreover, Samuelson and Friedman have endorsed a (poor) version of Keynes' theory of shortterm relative price and ignored his general theory of price and money.

Fuller describes the place of intellectuals in the modern world—as researchers, teachers, academics, and citizens. Their job is that of developing and promoting ideas. He explains their failure to perform well and offers advice: say what you think you should say, not necessarily what you think. The advice is unsuitable; it is aimed at advisers and expert witnesses, not at intellectuals. Also, his analysis invites proposals for social reforms aimed at lowering traditional expectations of intellectuals and toward presenting them with clearer and fairer job descriptions instead.

The traditional, dogmatic educational sys tem was reinforced by the addition of science instruction to its curriculum. Three errors are reinforced by this move and the subsequent split of the system into streams. a) Pressure is confused with coercion, b) Interactive study is confused with assigned e x e r c i s e s a n d w i t h s e l f- instruction, and c) Aptitude (disposition) is confused with talent (ability). Reform must begin in the public educational system, at least until experimental schooling becomes the norm; yet research must now repudiate traditional v iews and develop the theory of, and the tools for, free interactive study, aiming at imparting universal literacy, including science literacy.

A good theory of rationality should accommodate debates over first principles, such as those of rationality. The modest challenge made in this article is that relativists try to explain the (intellectual) value of some debates about first principles (absolute presuppositions, basic assumptions, intellectual frameworks, intellectual commitments, and paradigms). Relativists claim to justify moving with relative ease from one framework to another, translating chunks of one into the other; this technique is essential for historians, anthropologists and others. Thus ideas concerning false prophecy are transferable to contemporary discussions. Ancient false prophets offered illusions of overcoming difficult problems cheaply; relativists do that too. The problem that relativism purports to solve cheaply is that of legitimizing pluralism. As the absolutist theory of truth is intuitively problematic, relativism seems intuitively more acceptable, but this intuitive advantage vanishes when it manifests as false prophecy.

The symposium on Francesco Guala’s Understanding Institutions was thought provoking. Five critical papers took issue with Guala’s reconciliation of the game-theoretical view of institutions and the rule-governed view. We offer some critical commentary that adopts a different perspective. We agree that institutions are central to social life and, thus, also to the social sciences; they are also prior to and more fundamental than individuals. We add some historical points on the ways previous philosophers thought about institutions, and we come at this from a philosophical viewpoint that is not that of analytic philosophy but rather that of Popper’s critical rationalism. In that framework, we espouse an idea of the relation between philosophy and the philosophy of science that is different from that of Guala and his commentators, and we recommend a reformist philosophy of institutions that is neither radical nor traditionalist and that makes better sense of the institution of the scholarly symposium than do...