Joseph Agassi

SummaryIn a nutshell, the present essay claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know?–from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, should I act, believe, etc., this or that? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in accord with the change in the problem of knowledge, and ask, should we–rather than I–act or believe as we do? and the answer is clear: We should act and believe as we do, because our society is as it is, and should be as it is. This is clearly the same as, we should because we should. Not very enlightening.Sociologism appears as the authoritarian solution to the problem of rationality in works of Polanyi and Kuhn; a variant of it appears as a liberal theory in the studies of Popper and his former students who, however, do not offer any positive theory of what to believe or do; rather, they offer a negative theory of what to reject. They view this as a better solution to the problem of rationality, if not even a better formulation of it.

In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest (rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to specific details of magical thinking within the magical thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism. Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level (rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational thinking.

The paucity of literature on the economics of science renders this book valuable. Also, it includes a few interesting papers. Education and research may become more efficient, and their economic aspects want explanations. The explanations may offer suggestion for improvements. The discussions here are mostly unserious and the serious ones are not far-reaching.They concern patent laws more than seems reasonable and ignore many economic aspects of science, mainly its poor communication systems, including university presses, most of which are inept. Practical proposals should address the worst problems and their implementation need repeated checking. For this, they must be transparent and democratically controlled. The book totally ignores all this.

is an unusual phenomenon. The concern with rights different citizens have in different societies is legal rather than philosophical. It is frequently somewhat a technical matter for jurisprudence to decide exactly what rights a citizen has in a given situation and how he might best exercise his rights. Often, to be sure, the legal technicalities involve matters of principle, and if so these should be made explicit. For this, too, there is a need less for philosophy and more for jurisprudence, for detailed legal study. For example, the problems concerning interests of third parties - related to the questions of when is a third party an aggrieved person, so-called, and what are the rights of the aggrieved third party - have been taken up, in the sixties, by diverse federal courts of the United States, with the aim of increasing individual rights when these are encroached upon by public agencies.1 Although this may call for much philosophical commentary, it is clearly more a legal matter than a philosophical concern. Even the broadly philosophical question of rights within a legal system requires a greater degree of legal than philosophical considerations. Recently H.L.A. Hart, the foremost living legal philosopher, has cited Sir Henry Maine (1891) and William Warwick Buckland (1950) approvingly to support his view that even "Roman law never achieved a clear concept of a legal right." 2 It is not clear to a philosopher what "a clear concept of legal rights" might be, and a philosopher like Hannah Arendt never. concerned herself with this matter when she expressed her admiration for the rights of a Roman citizen to his privacy.3 Regardless of whether we admire or deplore this, we can agree that at least in principle a Roman citizen had more rights and prerogatives within his family than any modern civilized law would ever permit. A philosopher with only a modicum of sensitivity can say that although Rome was not a democracy, and even though in Rome the rights of women and children (not to mention slaves) were not recognized, the rights of citizens to privacy and to be free of the need ever to prove their innocence have nevertheless become the foundation stones of modern liberal individualistic democracy..

The tu quoque argument is the argument that since in the end rationalism rests on an irrational choice of and commitment to rationality, rationalism is as irrational as any other commitment. Popper's and Polanyi's philosophies of science both accept the argument, and have on that account many similarities; yet Popper manages to remain a rationalist whereas Polanyi decided for an irrationalist version of rationalism. This is more marked in works of their respective followers, W. W. Bartley III and Thomas S. Kuhn. Bartley declares the rationalist's very openness to criticism open to criticism, in the hope of rendering Popper's critical rationalism quite comprehensive. Kuhn makes rationality depend on the existence of an accepted model for scientific research (paradigm), thus rendering Polanyi's view of the authority of scientific leadership a sine qua non for scientific progress. The question raised here is, in what sense is a rationalist committed to his rationality, or an irrationalist to his specific axiom? The tradition views only the life‐long commitment as real. Viewing rationality as experimental open‐mindedness, we may consider a rationalist unable to retreat into any life‐long commitment — even commitment to science. In this way the logic of the tu quoque argument is made irrelevant: anyone able to face the choice between rationality and commitment is already beyond such a choice; it is one thing to be still naïve and another — and paradoxical — thing to return to one's naïveté.