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91The place of metaphysics in the historiography of scienceFoundations of Physics 26 (4): 483-499. 1996.Legitimating the use of metaphysics in scientific research constituted a farreaching methodological revolution, invalidating the inductivist demands that science be guided by empirical information alone. Thus, science became tentative. The revolution was established when pioneering historians of science, Max Jammer among them, exhibited the working of metaphysics in scientific research. This raises many problems, since most metaphysical ideas are poor as compared with scientific ones. Yet taking…Read more
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88Whatever happened to the positivist theory of meaningJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 18 (1-2): 22-29. 1987.It is getting increasingly difficult to comprehend the history of ideas of the Vienna Circle and only a clear and critical exposition of it will save it from total oblivion; an apologetic presentation will not be understood. Now that the positivist theory of meaning is no longer accepted, only an honest presentation of this fact will enable us to comprehend it and its transformations. An analysis of a paper by Otto Neurath illustrates this: Neurath's inability to present fairly his critics' idea…Read more
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87Who Discovered Boyle's Law?Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 8 (3): 189. 1977.
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85We Socratic Philosophers Know that We Know NothingPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1): 146-151. 2012.This volume is as near an authoritative version of analytic philosophy as can be found in the market these days
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85Duhem versus Galileo (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8 (31): 237-248. 1957.
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84The problem of universalsPhilosophical Studies 28 (4). 1975.The pair democreteanism-Platonism (nothing/something is outside space-Time) differs from the pair nominalism-Realism (universals are/are not nameable entities). Nominalism need not be democretean, And democreateanism is nominalist only if conceptualism is rejected. Putnam's critique of nominalism is thus invalid. Quine's theory is democretean-When-Possible: quine is also a minimalist platonist. Conceptualists and realists agree that universals exist but not as physical objects. Nominalists accep…Read more
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84Review: Koyré on the History of Cosmology (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (35). 1958.
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80The role of the philosopher among the scientists: Nuisance or necessity?Social Epistemology 3 (4). 1989.1. Where is the trouble? Let us take it for granted that a person can be interested in researches that go on in different fields, for example, in physics and in psychology. Undoubtedly, this will raise problems not shared by a person whose research is confined to one field only. There may be difficulty in deciding which of the two is that person's primary field of interest; members of his secondary field of interest may be flattered or feel slighted or even threatened by his intrusion into their…Read more
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78The last refuge of the scoundrelPhilosophia 4 (2-3): 315-317. 1974.Patriotism is a form of loyalty. The range of loyalty is from patriotism to friendship. Liberals were often accused of having no sense of loyalty. They usually tend to deny the charge ââ¬â even while refusing to take a loyalty oath. Even the liberal philosopher Sir Karl Popper has claimed (Open Society, i, ch. 10), that liberals can be better patriots than others. 1 find this line of defense erroneous and morally wrong. I find it much nicer, much more honest, to join Martin Buber in his taki…Read more
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76Presuppositions for LogicThe Monist 65 (4): 465-480. 1982.Positivists identify science and certainty and in the name of the utter rationality of science deny that it rests on speculative presuppositions. The Logical Positivists took a step further and tried to show such presuppositions really no presuppositions at all but rather poorly worded sentences. Rules of sentence formation, however, rest on the presuppositions about the nature of language. This makes us unable to determine the status of mathematics, which is these days particularly irksome sinc…Read more
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76Testing as a bootstrap operation in physicsZeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (1): 1-24. 1973.Science uses its firmest conclusions to arrive at new ones which may well completely destroy these, previously firmest, conclusions. The perceptive may notice that when the previously firmest conclusions are demolished we may remain in the dark with no conclusion worth replacing it with. But only when we replace it with a firmer conclusion can we speak of a bootstrap operation rather than of a refutations. Often, to conclude, the ad hoc nature of a fact-like statement is rooted in the theoretica…Read more
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75Sociologism in philosophy of scienceMetaphilosophy 3 (2). 1972.SummaryIn a nutshell, the present essay claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know?–from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, should I act, believe, etc., this or that? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in accord with the change…Read more
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73The variety of languages in the world is considered a curse by some, who view the phenomenon as a Tower of Babel. Others consider it the most characteristic quality of human language as opposed to animal languages, which are supposedly species specific. The variety is viewed as a symptom of human caprice, arbitrariness, or dependence on mere historical accident by some; and as a symptom of human freedom and of the creative aspect of language by others. And, of course, the human limitation caused…Read more
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72Towards an Historiography of Science (review)Philosophical Review 74 (1): 115-117. 1965.Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science divides thinkers into the scientific and the prejudiced, using as a standard the up-to-date science textbook. Inductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor fal…Read more
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71Turner on MertonPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2): 284-293. 2009.Stephen Turner complains about weaknesses of Robert K. Merton's teachings without noticing that these are common. He puts down Merton's ideas despite his innovations, on the ground that they are not successful and not sufficiently revolutionary. The criteria by which he condemns Merton are too vague and too high. Merton's merit is in his having put the sociology of science on the map and drawn attention to the egalitarianism that was prominent in classical science and that is now diminished. Key…Read more
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71Wittgenstein and PhysicalismGrazer Philosophische Studien 41 (1): 67-97. 1991.In the light of a sketch of the history of modem Anti-Metaphysics up from Francis Bacon Wittgenstein's position - the refusal of the possibility of metaphysical assertions - is compared with the views of Mach, of Camap and Neurath and of Popper. Analysing the notions of 'nonsense', 'meaninglessness' and 'Scheinproblem', their interrelations and connections to physicalism three variants of Anti-Metaphysics are distinguished: the Enlightenment view, the positivistMachian view and the linguistic Wi…Read more
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70Mario Bunge: A Centenary Festschrift (edited book)Springer Verlag. 2019.This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology…Read more
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69Positive evidence in science and technologyPhilosophy of Science 37 (2): 261-270. 1970.If the problem of induction were soluble, it should be solved inductively: by observing how scientists observe, etc. The fact is that scientific research is successful, and the real question is, will it be so in future? If there is a formula of induction by which success is achieved, then by this formula we can say, as long as it will be used science will succeed. If there is no formula it looks as if future success in scientific research is most doubtful. Hence, a transcendental argument for in…Read more
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64The methodology of research projects: A sketchZeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 8 (1): 30-38. 1977.Summary There is a traditional reluctance among methodologists to study the ever increasingly important phenomenon of research-projects, research-project evaluations, etc. The reason for this is that projects are embedded in programs and programs in intellectual frameworks, or conceptual frameworks, or metaphysical systems. It sounds dogmatic to judge the product of research by a reference to a metaphysical system. Yet, first of all, it is not so dogmatic if judgment can go both ways, if we have…Read more
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63Methodological Individualism and Institutional Individualism: A Discussion with Joseph AgassiIn Nathalie Bulle & Francesco Di Iorio (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Methodological Individualism: Volume II, Springer Verlag. pp. 617-631. 2023.This chapter takes the form of a discussion between the editors of this volume and Joseph Agassi, regarding the relationship between methodological individualism and institutional individualism. The focus is on Agassi’s interpretation of traditional methodological individualism in terms of psychologism; the role of institutions and structural factors in social explanation; Popper’s theory of World 3; the application of Weber’s interpretative approach—Verstehen—to typical ways of thinking and act…Read more
Joseph Agassi
York University
D'Annunzio University of Chieti–Pescara
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D'Annunzio University of Chieti–PescaraOther
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
History of Western Philosophy |
Philosophy, Misc |