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81The philosophy of common sensePhilosophia 17 (4): 421-438. 1987.Philosophers wanted commonsense to fight skepticism. They hypostasized and destroyed it. Commonsense is skeptical--Bound by a sense of proportion and of limitation. A scarce commodity, At times supported, At times transcended by science, Commonsense has to be taken account of by the critical-Realistic theory of science. James clerk maxwell's view of today's science as tomorrow's commonsense is the point of departure. It is wonderful but overlooks the value of the sense of proportion.
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72The Novelty of Popper’s Philosophy of ScienceInternational Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3): 442-463. 1968.
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The Legitimation of ScienceDiálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 15 (35): 27. 1980.
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47The Gentle Art of Philosophical Polemics: Selected Reviews and CommentsOpen Court Publishing Company. 1988.
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147The Manhattan Project and Its Long ShadowPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (4): 574-595. 2011.A sequel to Shapin’s earlier work, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation again solves the problem of induction by observing that researchers are decent. Shapin dismisses most of the literature on both the philosophy of science and (more so) on the sociology of science as ideologically biased and as irrelevant. Approaches to the book as light reading and as serious scholarly reading are considered before a critical summary is offered as a conclusion.
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97This Message is for You. MaybePhilosophy and Literature 7 (1): 95-98. 1983.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THIS MESSAGE IS FOR YOU. MAYBE. by Joseph Agassi There is a mood often enough conjured in science fiction literature to be familiar to every fan, the mood of seemingly intentional yet probably remdom contact between two individuals across immense space-time expanses. The hero of a complicated chase story has lost contact with the mother planet, has long ago leuided on a strange pleuiet, emd there, right now, just walking across the p…Read more
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62The Heuristic BentPhilosophy and Rhetoric 26 (1): 9-30. 1993.The logic of questions is still very limited; there is a need for a specification of what is a problem, and what is a problem-situation — or what is an adequate solution to a problem in a given situation. A problem may seek its wording, and so may do the adequacy conditions or desiderata for its solution. For the inarticulate, there is no distinction between theoretical and practical problems. Their problem is a goal, the situation is the available routes to it, and no adequac y conditions.
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105The methodology of research projects: A sketchZeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 8 (1): 30-38. 1977.Summary There is a traditional reluctance among methodologists to study the ever increasingly important phenomenon of research-projects, research-project evaluations, etc. The reason for this is that projects are embedded in programs and programs in intellectual frameworks, or conceptual frameworks, or metaphysical systems. It sounds dogmatic to judge the product of research by a reference to a metaphysical system. Yet, first of all, it is not so dogmatic if judgment can go both ways, if we have…Read more
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6The Message of Philosophical InvestigationsIn Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: An Attempt at a Critical Rationalist Appraisal, Springer Verlag. pp. 205-223. 2018.Wittgenstein’s discussions of language games and of forms of life are parts of his theory of meaning. They led him to a fragmented view of language and so he proposed a search for the rules that each of the different fragments follows. The mention of forms of life was only a hint in that direction, and the better commentators overlook mere hints. Whereas young Wittgenstein centered his discussion on “sentences of the natural sciences”, mature Wittgenstein centered on everyday language. He always…Read more
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78The Limited Rationality of TechnologyPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (2): 160-166. 2019.Ingemar Nordin’s Using Knowledge: On the Rationality of Science, Technology, and Medicine is a critical rationalist examination of medicine as a social system, largely science-based, but including quackery. Thus rationality is limited, as befits the author’s fallibilism.
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141The last refuge of the scoundrelPhilosophia 4 (2-3): 315-317. 1974.Patriotism is a form of loyalty. The range of loyalty is from patriotism to friendship. Liberals were often accused of having no sense of loyalty. They usually tend to deny the charge ââ¬â even while refusing to take a loyalty oath. Even the liberal philosopher Sir Karl Popper has claimed (Open Society, i, ch. 10), that liberals can be better patriots than others. 1 find this line of defense erroneous and morally wrong. I find it much nicer, much more honest, to join Martin Buber in his taki…Read more
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128The Lakatosian revolutionIn R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Reidel. pp. 9--21. 1976.
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28the walls of the academy. The wall is defended by the idea that not only do experts possess knowledge beyond the ken of lay people, which is trivially true, but that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the two. The aim of this presentation, then, is to discuss the possibility of building a bridge between the ordinary educated citizen and the expert. The tool for this is the famous effort to disseminate scientific literacy, or more generally, any specific sophisticated literacy. The subject-mat…Read more
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37The system of higher education always has a significant place in national political affairs. Politically indifferent academics may legitimately ignore this. Those concerned with the welfare of the system of higher education, however, cannot afford this luxury. Further, intellectuals, including academics, are a significant political factor even when passive. Even were all of them to ignore all politics, including the ever-present political importance of the educational system for national politic…Read more
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112The Inductivist PhilosophyHistory and Theory 2 1-3. 1963.Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science divides thinkers into the scientific and the prejudiced, using as a standard the up-to-date science textbook. Inductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor fal…Read more
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28The logic of consensus and of extremesIn Fred D'Agostino & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Freedom and Rationality: Essays in Honor of John Watkins, Reidel. pp. 3--21. 1989.
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64The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of ScienceInternational Studies in Philosophy 34 (4): 168-170. 2002.
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19Towards Honest Public Relations of SciencePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 49 39-58. 1996.
Joseph Agassi
York University
D'Annunzio University of Chieti–Pescara
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D'Annunzio University of Chieti–PescaraOther
Areas of Specialization
| Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| History of Western Philosophy |
| Philosophy, Misc |