This paper defends that the both the Buddhist tradition and the Aristotelian allow us to think of the distinction between to reason with contradictions and to accept them, understanding ' accept a contradiction ' by taking it as consistent. From this viewpoint, none of two would disagree with most contemporary paraconsistent views. The conclusions are, thus, that, firstly, there is no compelling reason to endorse any kind of metaphysical dialetheism, and, second, that a coherent form of reasonin…
Read moreThis paper defends that the both the Buddhist tradition and the Aristotelian allow us to think of the distinction between to reason with contradictions and to accept them, understanding ' accept a contradiction ' by taking it as consistent. From this viewpoint, none of two would disagree with most contemporary paraconsistent views. The conclusions are, thus, that, firstly, there is no compelling reason to endorse any kind of metaphysical dialetheism, and, second, that a coherent form of reasoning with contradictory statements is neither opposed to the Aristotelian conception of logic, nor to certain texts in the Buddhist tradition, as the Madhyamikas.
