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4Why There Still Are No PeoplePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 174-192. 2005.This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminati…Read more
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4Virtueless knowledgePhilosophical Studies 172 (2): 469-475. 2015.This paper argues that reliabilist virtue epistemology is mistaken. Descartes supposes a supremely powerful deceiver is determined to trick him into believing falsehoods. Beliefs Descartes cannot rationally doubt, even allowing the demon’s best efforts, count as indubitable knowledge. I give an instance of indubitable knowledge and argue that it is not attributable to an epistemic competence. Since not all knowledge is virtuous, knowledge cannot be identified with virtuous true belief.
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111Pascal's Wager and the persistent vegetative stateBioethics 21 (2). 2007.I argue that a version of Pascal's Wager applies to the persistent vegetative state with sufficient force that it ought to part of advance directives.
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124Free will as a gift from God: A new compatibilismPhilosophical Studies 92 (3): 257-281. 1998.I argue that God could give us the robust power to do other than we do in a deterministic universe.
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186Contextualism and warranted assertionPacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1). 2007.Contextualists offer "high-low standards" practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is K…Read more
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8The Human Animal (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 495-497. 2000.'The Biological Approach,' Eric T. Olson writes, 'is the view that you and I are human animals, and that no sort of psychological continuity is either necessary or sufficient for a human animal to persist through time.' Human 'persons' are self-aware human animals which, as they aren't essentially self aware, aren't essentially persons. Ranged against this position is the 'Psychological Approach,' a spectrum of views according to which 'some psychological relation is both necessary and sufficien…Read more
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Identity and DiscernabilityDissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder. 1983.The dissertation is composed of five papers, each of which either deals with a topic in contemporary metaphysics or uses concepts central to contemporary metaphysics as part of the machinery of its argument. Three papers deal with the problem of personal identity. In Hume on Identity: A Defense I argue that Hume, in maintaining that we are always mistaken in ascribing identity to persons, is presenting a fundamental metaphysical problem about identity through change, not trying to analyze the wa…Read more
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105Advance directives, autonomy and unintended deathBioethics 8 (3). 1994.Advance directives typically have two defects. First, most advance directives fail to enable people to effectively avoid unwanted medical intervention. Second, most of them have the potential of ending your life in ways you never intended, years before you had to die.
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6Why counterpart theory and modal realism are incompatibleAnalysis 69 (4): 650-653. 2009.I find a lost wallet containing the owner's address and a lot of cash. Shall I keep it or return it? Suppose I have the ‘liberty of indifference’: whatever I do, I could have done otherwise. Indeed, part of what is meant in saying I act freely is that either way what I do is up to me. And let's allow this liberty requires that my choice is not a logical consequence of the past and natural laws. If I return the wallet, I could have kept it without violating a law of nature or changing the past. L…Read more
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196Games and Family ResemblancesPhilosophical Investigations 17 (No. 2). 1994.An account of the feature all games share in virtue of which they are games.
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10Abortion as murder?: A responseJournal of Social Philosophy 26 (1): 129-146. 1995.I argue that people who believe fetuses have the same moral right to life as the rest of us have sufficient reasons to refuse to classify abortion as legal murder and to refuse to punish abortion as severely as legal murder.
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11Trumping the causal influence account of causationPhilosophical Studies 142 (2). 2009.Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example.
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18Moderate monism: Reply to Noonan and MackieAnalysis 69 (1): 91-95. 2009.Moderate Monism is the position that permanent, but not temporary, coincidence entails identity. Harold Noonan writes: " According to the moderate monist if God creates ex nihilo a bronze statue and later annihilates it, destroying both the statue and the bronze of which it is composed , the statue and the bronze are identical. If, however, God simply radically reshapes the bronze at t10 the statue ceases to exist and the piece of bronze survives, so despite their coincidence up to t10 the statu…Read more
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20Counterpart theory v. the multiverse: reply to WatsonAnalysis 71 (1): 96-100. 2011.Suppose that reality consists of parallel universes of every variety imaginable. No path through space and time leads from one to another, and each universe is causally isolated from the rest. Some physicists believe a ‘multiverse’ hypothesis not terribly distant from this one simplifies quantum mechanics and provides an elegant explanation of why our universe has its particular laws. Suppose as science advances we come to accept the multiverse hypothesis, so construed.
New Orleans, Louisiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Applied Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Applied Ethics |