-
41Potentiality and possibilia: A reply to JokicJournal of Social Philosophy 26 (3): 139-141. 1995.
-
1338Why there still are no peoplePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 174-191. 2005.This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminati…Read more
-
171‘Unlucky’ Gettier CasesPacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3): 421-430. 2013.This article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two ‘unlucky’ Gettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad ‘anti‐luck’ codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed. First, if epistemic luck isn't distinctive of Gettier cases, what is? Second, what do Gettier cases reveal about knowledge?
-
265Parfit and the Buddha: Why there are no peoplePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (March): 519-32. 1988.
-
3541Dreaming and certaintyPhilosophical Studies 45 (May): 353-368. 1984.I argue that being wide awake is an epistemic virtue which enables me to recognize immediately that I'm wide awake. Also I argue that dreams are imaginings and that the wide awake mind can immediately discern the difference between imaginings and vivid sense experience. Descartes need only pinch himself.
-
1223A Theory of ReligionReligious Studies 27 (3): 337-351. 1991.An account of what all and only religions share in virtue of which they are religions.
-
168Why Potentiality MattersCanadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (4): 815-829. 1987.Do fetuses have a right to life in virtue of the fact that they are potential adult human beings? I take the claim that the fetus is a potential adult human being to come to this: if the fetus grows normally there will be an adult human animal that was once the fetus. Does this fact ground a claim to our care and protection? A great deal hangs on the answer to this question. The actual mental and physical capacities of a human fetus are inferior to those of adult creatures generally thought to l…Read more
-
2803Skepticism as a theory of knowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 527-545. 2000.Skepticism about the external world may very well be correct, so the question is in order: what theory of knowledge flows from skepticism itself? The skeptic can give a relatively simple and intuitive account of knowledge by identifying it with indubitable certainty. Our everyday ‘I know that p’ claims, which typically are part of practical projects, deploy the ideal of knowledge to make assertions closely related to, but weaker than, knowledge claims. The truth of such claims is consistent with…Read more
-
21Why There Still Are No PeoplePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 174-192. 2005.This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminati…Read more
-
69Virtueless knowledgePhilosophical Studies 172 (2): 469-475. 2015.This paper argues that reliabilist virtue epistemology is mistaken. Descartes supposes a supremely powerful deceiver is determined to trick him into believing falsehoods. Beliefs Descartes cannot rationally doubt, even allowing the demon’s best efforts, count as indubitable knowledge. I give an instance of indubitable knowledge and argue that it is not attributable to an epistemic competence. Since not all knowledge is virtuous, knowledge cannot be identified with virtuous true belief.
-
1140Pascal's Wager and the persistent vegetative stateBioethics 21 (2). 2007.I argue that a version of Pascal's Wager applies to the persistent vegetative state with sufficient force that it ought to part of advance directives.
-
933Free will as a gift from God: A new compatibilismPhilosophical Studies 92 (3): 257-281. 1998.I argue that God could give us the robust power to do other than we do in a deterministic universe.
-
1056Contextualism and warranted assertionPacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1). 2007.Contextualists offer "high-low standards" practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is K…Read more
-
32The Human Animal (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 495-497. 2000.'The Biological Approach,' Eric T. Olson writes, 'is the view that you and I are human animals, and that no sort of psychological continuity is either necessary or sufficient for a human animal to persist through time.' Human 'persons' are self-aware human animals which, as they aren't essentially self aware, aren't essentially persons. Ranged against this position is the 'Psychological Approach,' a spectrum of views according to which 'some psychological relation is both necessary and sufficien…Read more
-
Identity and DiscernabilityDissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder. 1983.The dissertation is composed of five papers, each of which either deals with a topic in contemporary metaphysics or uses concepts central to contemporary metaphysics as part of the machinery of its argument. Three papers deal with the problem of personal identity. In Hume on Identity: A Defense I argue that Hume, in maintaining that we are always mistaken in ascribing identity to persons, is presenting a fundamental metaphysical problem about identity through change, not trying to analyze the wa…Read more
New Orleans, Louisiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Applied Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Applied Ethics |