Ricardo Sousa Silvestre

This special issue of Logica Universalis (Springer) deals with the relations between logic and religion, broadly conceived. It contains the following articles: Logic and Religion, by Jean-Yves Beziau and Ricardo Silvestre; Thinking Negation in Early Hinduism and Classical Indian Philosophy, by Purushottama Bilimoria; Karma Theory, Determinism, Fatalism and Freedom of Will, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre; From Logic in Islam to Islamic Logic, by Musa Akrami; Leibniz’s Ontological Proof of the Existence of God and the Problem of Impossible Objects, by Wolfgang Lenzen; A Logical Analysis of the Anselm’s Unum Argumentum (from Proslogion), by Jean-Pierre Desclés; Monotonic and Non-monotonic Embeddings of Anselm’s Proof, by Jacob Archambault; Computer-Assisted Analysis of the Anderson–Hájek Ontological Controversy, by C. Benzmüller, L. Weber and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo.

Ao mesmo tempo que o malogro da assim chamada teoria clássica dos conceitos - de acordo com a qual definições são a maneira apropriada de caracterizar conceitos - é um consenso, a filosofia metafísica da religião parece ainda lidar com o conceito de Deus de forma predominantemente definicional. Podemos então nos perguntar: Seria esse malogro suficiente para inviabilizar uma caracterização definicional do conceito de Deus? Meu propósito central neste artigo é responder essa pergunta. Adoto uma ênfase representacional. Em outras palavras, desejo analisar até que ponto os problemas mais importantes levantados contra a teoria clássica dos conceitos afetam uma abordagem definicional-representacional do conceito de Deus. Como resultado desse esforço, mostro que as críticas à teoria clássica que ameaçam tal abordagem dependem da pluralidade característica ao contexto inter-religioso, que por si só cria outros problemas.

My purpose in this paper is to shed some light on two questions: In what sense is logic philosophical? And what is philosophical logic? I take these two questions as co-extensive: an answer to one of them is also (or can easily be converted into) an answer to the other. I approach the problem from three perspectives: a conceptual, a descriptive and a prescriptive perspective. In other words, I try to answer the following questions: (i) In what sense can logic be taken as philosophical? (ii) In what sense has logic been taken as philosophical? (iii) In what sense should logic be taken as philosophical? To this end, I analyze excerpts from five works in which meanings are attributed to the expression “philosophical logic”. The meanings are then object of critical analysis: I try to assess which of these semantical alternatives do not hold up as satisfactory answers to (iii). The result of this analysis is then used as a starting point for my own answer to question (iii).

The terms “model” and “model-building” have been used to characterize the field of formal philosophy, to evaluate philosophy’s and philosophical logic’s progress and to define philosophical logic itself. A model is an idealization, in the sense of being a deliberate simplification of something relatively complex in which several important aspects are left aside, but also in the sense of being a view too perfect or excellent, not found in reality, of this thing. Paraconsistent logic is a branch of philosophical logic. It is however not clear how paraconsistent logic can be seen as model-building. What exactly is modeled? In this paper I adopt the perspective of looking at a particular instance of paraconsistent logic—paranormal modal logic—which might be seen as a model of a specific kind of agent: inductive agents. After ntroducing what I call the highlevel and low-level models of inductive agents, I analyze the extent to which the above-mentioned idealizing features of model-building appear in paranormal modal logic and how they affect its philosophical significance.

This paper introduces the special issue on Formal Approaches to the Ontological Argument of the Journal of Applied Logics (College Publications). The issue contains the following articles: Formal Approaches to the Ontological Argument, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre and Jean-Yves Béziau; A Brief Critical Introduction to the Ontological Argument and its Formalization: Anselm, Gaunilo, Descartes, Leibniz and Kant, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre; A Mechanically Assisted Examination of Begging the Question in Anselm’s Ontological Argument, by John Rushby; A Tractarian Resolution to the Ontological Argument, by Erik Thomsen; On Kant’s Hidden Ambivalence Toward Existential Generalization in his Critique of the Ontological Argument, by Giovanni Mion; The Totality of Predicates and the Possibility of the Most Real Being, by Srećko Kovač; An Even More Leibnizian Version of Gödel’s Ontological Argument, by Kordula Świętorzecka and Marcin Łyczak; A Case Study On Computational Hermeneutics: E. J. Lowe’s Modal Ontological Argument, by David Fuenmayor.

This volume deals with the relation between faith and reason, and brings the latest developments of modern logic into the scene. Faith and rationality are two perennial key concepts in the history of ideas. Philosophers and theologians have struggled to bring into harmony these otherwise conflicting concepts. Despite the diversity of approaches about what rationality effectively means, logic remains the cannon of objective and rational thought. The chapters in this volume analyze several issues pertaining to the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology from the perspective of their relation to logic and the benefit they can derive from the use of modern logic tools. The book is divided into five parts: (I) Introduction, (II) Analytic Philosophy of Religion, (III) Logical Philosophy of Religion, (IV) Computational Philosophy and Religion and (V) Logic, Language and Religion. This text appeals to students and researchers in the field.

My purpose in this chapter is to take seriously the idea that problem of evil is an incompatibility between the proposition that the world was created and is ruled by an omnipotent, omniscient and unlimitedly good being and one that says that there is evil and suffering in our world. Besides being in accordance with much of the literature on the problem of evil, this idea takes the problem at face value, that is to say, it sees it as a logical and incompatibility problem. More important than that, it allows for a comprehensive and elegant account of the key concepts involved in the debate: despite contrary appearances, the concept of problem of evil itself, the concept of argument from evil, the concepts of logical and evidential problems of evil and the concepts of theodicy and defense can be seen and defined from the standpoint of the same general idea about the problem of evil.

O propósito deste livro é preencher a lacuna existente no mercado editorial brasileiro no que diz respeito a obras de cunho acadêmico sobre hinduísmo e filosofia indiana. Essa lacuna se reflete, dentre outras, na inexistência de publicações em português que pretendam ir além do mero aspecto introdutório deste que é um dos maiores clássicos da literatura religiosa indiana e mundial: a Bhagavad-gita; também se reflete na inexistência de literatura especializada sobre as várias tradições indianas que têm a Bhagavad- gita como um de seus textos canônicos. Reunindo professores e pesquisadores do Brasil, Israel, Estados Unidos e Reino Unido, este volume apresenta uma visão acadêmica e acessível da Bhagavad-gita centrada em dois aspectos principais: introdução e contextualização da Gita no que se refere à sua história, estrutura e conceitos-chave, de um lado, e análise detalhada de algumas das noções e temas mais relevantes do texto, de outro. Também proporciona visão geral de uma das tradições da Índia - tanto vedanta como vaishava - que mais sofreram influência da teologia e filosofia da Bhagavad-gita: o vaishnavismo gaudiya de Caitanya (1486-1533). O livro encontra-se estruturado em três grupos, ou partes. A primeira, intitulada "Visão Geral da Bhagavad-gita", é composta de dois capítulos e tem como objetivo introduzir o leitor ao Gita como um todo. A segunda, intitulada "Conceitos e Tópicos-Chave da Bhagavad-gita", contém cinco capítulos, cada um centrado na análise de um conceito ou tópico específico da Gita. A terceira e última parte, intitulada "Hinduísmo e Vaishnavismo", é composta por três capítulos e visa apresentar o vaishnavismo, mais especificamente o vaishnavismo gaudiya, situando-o dentro do contexto mais geral do que hoje se denomina hinduísmo.

Induction, conceived as the class of rational non-truth preserving inferences, has been a perennial problem in philosophy. Aside from the problem of justification of induction, a less debated issue is the problem of properly describing inductive inferences. The purpose of this book is to conceptually investigate this descriptive problem of induction from the standpoint of the nonmonotonic logical tradition raised inside the field of Artificial Intelligence in the last thirty years. As we try to show, an essential part of this enterprise involves the analysis of a pragmatically oriented notion of probability, called by us inductive plausibility. This in turn is made from the viewpoint of paraconsistency ? which according to some is the unavoidable companion of nonmonotonicity ? and modal logic. We therefore put forward a nonmonotonic, paraconsistent and modal approach to induction and plausibility. The book shall be useful to philosophers, logicians and computer scientists interested in the problem of induction in general and in the logical analysis of induction and plausibility in particular.

O propósito desse artigo é fornecer um tratamento formal para um tipo de ação até o momento negligenciada nas lógicas modais filosóficas da ação: ação em plano. Ao fazer isso nós seguimos a abordagem padrão nas lógicas modais da ação exemplificados pelos trabalhos de Belnap, Chellas and Pörn. Como nós acreditamos que existe uma relação forte entre plano, tempo e indeterminismo, nós usamos a teoria do tempo ramificado para investigar as características básicas da ação em plano. Além de introduzir uma semântica do tempo ramificado, nós também apresentamos um cálculo correto e completo com relação a essa semântica. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p421

Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to the project of meta-theodicy, understood here as the elucidation of the concept of theodicy through the analysis of its adequacy. In our case, the analysis shall be made inside a framework including a taxonomical view of the theodical adequacy conditions which allows for a rigorously acceptable description of them as well as for a natural appraisal of the role, importance and intra-logical relations holding between them. The result of the analysis shall be used to introduce definitions minimally precise of the notions of theodicy, satisfactory theodicy, plausible theodicy, ideal theodicy, and the like.

Sáo dois os propósitos deste artigo. Primeiro desejamos examinar porque o projeto de Carnap de construir uma lógica indutiva náo foi bem sucedido. De forma a realizar isso, nos apoiaremos na distinçáo entre o problema da justificaçáo da induçáo e o problema da descriçáo da induçáo. Tentaremos mostrar que a principal razáo pela qual o projeto de Carnap falhou foi sua relaçáo com o problema da justificaçáo da induçáo. Nosso segundo objetivo é propor algumas idéias de como seria um lógica da induçáo que propositadamente evite o problema da justificaçáo e possa consequentemente ser chamada de uma lógica puramente descritiva da induçáo. Utilizaremos para isso um conceito de probabilidade presente no Logical Foudations of Probability de Carnap chamada por ele de probabilidade pragmática

O objetivo geral deste artigo é o de fazer algumas considerações teoréticas sobre o aspecto inferencial da Lógica dos Diálogos Inteligentes dentro do quadro conceitual fornecido pelas lógicas do senso comum desenvolvidas dentro da Inteligência Artificial. Mais especificamente, tentarei mostrar aqui que, para bem cumprir o seu papel, a LDI deve possuir uma maneira de representar as inferências não-monotônicas. Como argumento principal, defenderei a tese de que a não-monotonicidade é uma característica intrínseca à compreensão e uso da linguagem. O principal fenômeno relacionado com a linguagem natural utilizado como evidência para essa tese será o fenômeno do uso não literal da linguagem.

  This paper is an effort to realize and explore the connections that exist between nonmonotonic logic and confirmation theory. We pick up one of the most wide-spread nonmonotonic formalisms – default logic – and analyze to what extent and under what adjustments it could work as a logic of induction in the philosophical sense. By making use of this analysis, we extend default logic so as to make it able to minimally perform the task of a logic of induction, having as a result a system which we believe has interesting properties from the standpoint of theory of confirmation. It is for instance able to represent chains of inductive rules as well as to reason paraconsistently on the conclusions obtained from them. We then use this logic to represent some traditional ideas concerning confirmation theory, in particular the ones proposed by Carl Hempel in his classical paper "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation" of 1945 and the ones incorporated in the so-called abductive and hy-pothetico-deductive models

This paper introduces the special issue on Logic and Philosophy of Religion of the journal Sophia: International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions (Springer). The issue contains the following articles: Logic and Philosophy of Religion, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre and Jean-Yvez Béziau; The End of Eternity, by Jamie Carlin Watson; The Vagueness of the Muse—The Logic of Peirce’s Humble Argument for the Reality of God, by Cassiano Terra Rodrigues; Misunderstanding the Talk(s) of the Divine: Theodicy in the Wittgensteinian Tradition, by Ondřej Beran; On the Concept of Theodicy, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre; The Logical Problem of the Trinity and the Strong Theory of Relative Identity, by Daniel Molto; Thomas Aquinas on Logic, Being, and Power, and Contemporary Problems for Divine Omnipotence, by Errin D. Clark.

The so-called theory of karma is one of the distinguishing aspects of Hinduism and other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. At the same time that the theory can be seen as closely connected with the freedom of will and action that we humans supposedly have, it has many times been said to be determinist and fatalist. The purpose of this paper is to analyze in some deepness the relations that are between the theory of karma on one side and determinism, fatalism and free-will on the other side. In order to do that, I shall use what has been described as the best formal approach we have to indeterminism: branching time theory. More specifically, I shall introduce a branching time semantic framework in which, among other things, statements such as “state of affairs e is a karmic effect of agent a”, “a wills it to be the case that e” and “e is inevitable” could be properly represented.

In this two-parts paper we present paranormal modal logic: a modal logic which is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. Besides using a general framework in which a wide range of logics  including normal modal logics, paranormal modal logics and classical logic can be defined and proving some key theorems about paranormal modal logic (including that it is inferentially equivalent to classical normal modal logic), we also provide a philosophical justification for the view that paranormal modal logic is a formalization of the notions of skeptical and credulous plausibility

This paper aims to conduct a conceptual analysis of induction, starting with the issue of inductive ambiguities. We will argue that there are two equally valid approaches to addressing these ambiguities. By examining certain logical aspects of the two concepts of plausibility that emerge from these approaches, we can clarify much of the debate surrounding inductive ambiguities. Key to this analysis is the relationship between these notions of inductive plausibility and the concepts of paraconsistency and paracompleteness. Our exploration is grounded in a paraconsistent and paracomplete modal logic designed to address the fundamental elements of both approaches to induction. To illustrate the controversy and our proposed solution, we focus on a notable example of inductive inconsistencies: the lottery paradox.

My purpose in this paper is to clarify or explicate the concept of theodicy. More specifically, I shall provide an account of the concept that takes its logical aspects seriously into consideration as well as satisfies the basic intuitions philosophers of religions have had about it. This shall be done by systematically analysing the several theodical conditions found in the literature. As it shall be seen, these conditions are logically related to one another; collectively, they point not to one, but to several concepts of theodicy. Thus, as by-product of this explicatory endeavour, I shall provide a logically guided, I may say, analysis of such conditions as well as a systematization of the theodical concepts arising from them. I shall follow what might be termed a semiformal approach; despite not developing a full logical theory, I use the standard notation and some important results from the field of formal logic.

An investigation of what might be called the logical formalization of the process of theory change due to anomalies is presented. By anomaly, we mean an observed fact falling into the explanatory scope of a theory that does not agree with the theory prevision. A classical approach to restore the explicative power of a theory faced with an anomaly is to propose new, tentative auxiliary hypotheses which, along with part of the old set of auxiliary hypotheses, are able to solve the anomaly. After laying down some conclusions about the structure of such process, we propose a multi-modal and non-monotonic logical framework able to represent some key aspects of this important facet of the dynamics of scientific theories. Due to the necessity of accommodating incompatible tentative hypotheses, this framework incorporates a weak form of paraconsistency. As a case study, we analyze the anomalous behaviour of the planet Uranus that threatened the Newtonian celestial mechanics for more than half a century and gave rise to the discovery of Neptune

In this two-part paper we present paranormal modal logic: a modal logic which is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. Besides using a general framework in which a wide range of logics – including normal modal logics, paranormal modal logics and classical logic – can be defined and proving some key theorems about paranormal modal logic (including that it is inferentially equivalent to classical normal modal logic), we also provide a philosophical justification for the view that paranormal modal logic is a formalization of the notions of skeptical and credulous plausibility

This paper introduces the special issue on Logic and Religion of the journal Logica Universalis (Springer). The issue contains the following articles: Logic and Religion, by Jean-Yves Beziau and Ricardo Silvestre; Thinking Negation in Early Hinduism and Classical Indian Philosophy, by Purushottama Bilimoria; Karma Theory, Determinism, Fatalism and Freedom of Will, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre; From Logic in Islam to Islamic Logic, by Musa Akrami; Leibniz’s Ontological Proof of the Existence of God and the Problem of Impossible Objects, by Wolfgang Lenzen; A Logical Analysis of the Anselm’s Unum Argumentum (from Proslogion), by Jean-Pierre Desclés; Monotonic and Non-monotonic Embeddings of Anselm’s Proof, by Jacob Archambault; Computer-Assisted Analysis of the Anderson–Hájek Ontological Controversy, by C. Benzmüller, L. Weber and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First we want to extent a specific paranormal modal logic in such a way as obtain a paraconsistent and paracomplete multimodal logic able to formalize the notions of plausibility and certainty. With this logic at hand, and this is our second purpose, we shall use a modified version of Reiter‘s default logic to build a sort of inductive logic of plausibility and certainty able to represent some basic principles of epistemic inductive reasoning, such as a negative autoepistemic principle, an `error-prone feature of induction' principle and a confirmation by enumeration principle