Alan Rubel

We argue that while presidential candidates have the right to medical privacy, the public nature and importance of the presidency generates a moral requirement that candidates waive those rights in certain circumstances. Specifically, candidates are required to disclose information about medical conditions that are likely to seriously undermine their ability to fulfill what we call the "core functions" of the office of the presidency. This requirement exists because (1) people have the right to be governed only with their consent, (2) people's consent is meaningful only when they have access to information necessary for making informed voting decisions, (3) such information is necessary for making informed voting decisions, and (4) there are no countervailing reasons sufficiently strong to override this right. We also investigate alternative mechanisms for legally encouraging or requiring disclosure. Protecting the public's right to this information is of particular importance because of the documented history of deception and secrecy regarding the health of presidents and presidential candidates.

Civil liberty and privacy advocates have criticized the USA PATRIOT Act (Act) on numerous grounds since it was passed in the wake of the World Trade Center attacks in 2001. Two of the primary targets of those criticisms are the Act’s sneak-and-peek search provision, which allows law enforcement agents to conduct searches without informing the search’s subjects, and the business records provision, which allows agents to secretly subpoena a variety of information – most notoriously, library borrowing records. Without attending to all of the ways that critics claim the Act burdens privacy, I examine whether those two controversial parts of the Act, the section 213 sneak-and-peak search and the section 215 business records gag-rule provisions, burden privacy as critics charge. I begin by describing the two provisions. Next, I explain why those provisions don’t burden privacy on standard philosophical accounts. Moreover, I argue that they need not conflict with the justifications for people’s claims to privacy, nor do they undermine the value of privacy on the standard accounts. However, rather than simply concluding that the sections don’t burden privacy, I argue that those provisions are problematic on the grounds that they undermine the value of whatever rights to privacy people have. Specifically, I argue that it is important to distinguish rights themselves from the value that those rights have to the rights-holders, and that an essential element of privacy rights having value is that privacy right-holders be able to tell the extent to which they actually have privacy. This element, which is justified by the right-holders’ autonomy interests, is harmed by the two provisions.

Questions of privacy have become particularly salient in recent years due, in part, to information-gathering initiatives precipitated by the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, increasing power of surveillance and computing technologies, and massive data collection about individuals for commercial purposes. While privacy is not new to the philosophical and legal literature, there is much to say about the nature and value of privacy. My focus here is on the nature of informational privacy. I argue that the predominant accounts of privacy are unsatisfactory and offer an alternative: for a person to have informational privacy is for there to be limits on the particularized judgments that others are able to reasonably make about that person

In the United States and elsewhere, there is substantial controversy regarding the use of race and ethnicity by police in determining whom to stop, question, and investigate in relation to crime and security issues. In the ethics literature, the debate about profiling largely focuses on the nature of profiling and when (if ever) profiling is morally justifiable. This essay addresses the related, but distinct, issue of whether states have a duty to collect information about the race and ethnicity of persons stopped by police. I argue that states in the U.S. do have such a duty on the grounds that such information collection would help secure the value of persons’ human rights against discrimination and unfair policing. Nonetheless, a large number of states do not require it. I begin by distinguishing rights from the value of rights, and arguing that under certain conditions persons have claims to the value of rights themselves, and that states have duties to secure that value. I then turn to the issue of profiling and offer the value of rights argument in favor of information collection about the race and ethnicity of persons stopped by police.

A suite of technological advances based on nanotechnology has received substantial attention for its potential to affect privacy. Reports of the National Nanotechnology Initiative have recognized that the societal implications of nanotechnology will include better surveillance and information-gathering technologies. A variety of academic and popular publications have explained the potential effects of nanotechnology on privacy.The ways in which nanotechnology might affect privacy are varied. It may make current information technology better, make old information-gathering techniques more reliable, or expand information-gathering into novel areas. My focus in this paper is on the privacy effects of one potential application of nanotechnology: sensors capable of detecting weapons agents or drugs—"nanosensors" or "sensors" for short. Nanotechnology may make possible small, accurate, and easy-to-use sensors to detect a variety of substances, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Explosive agents , as well as drugs. Analyzing the potential effects on privacy of sensors can provide important insights into the nature and extent of privacy rights

In her recent article, Does autonomy count in favor of labeling genetically modified food?, Kirsten Hansen argues that in Europe, voluntary negative labeling of non-GM foods respects consumer autonomy just as well as mandatory positive labeling of foods with GM content. She also argues that because negative labeling places labeling costs upon those consumers that want to know whether food is GM, negative labeling is better policy than positive labeling. In this paper, we argue that Hansens arguments are mistaken in several respects. Most importantly, she underestimates the demands of respecting autonomy and overestimates the cost of positive labeling. Moreover, she mistakenly implies that only a small minority of people desire information about GM content. We also explore the extent to which her arguments would apply to the US context, and argue that any discussion of the relationship between autonomy and labeling should include not just considerations of consumer autonomy but also considerations of what we call citizen autonomy.