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37Concepts: Where Subjectivism Goes WrongPhilosophy 84 (1): 5-29. 2009.The debate about concepts has always been shaped by a contrast between subjectivism, which treats them as phenomena in the mind or head of individuals, and objectivism, which insists that they exist independently of individual minds. The most prominent contemporary version of subjectivism is Fodor's RTM. The Fregean charge against subjectivism is that it cannot do justice to the fact that different individuals cansharethe same concepts. Proponents of RTM have accepted shareability as a ‘non-nego…Read more
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27Vorprung durch Logik: The German Analytic TraditionRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44 137-166. 1999.Although at present analytic philosophy is practiced mainly in the English-speaking world, it is to a considerable part the invention of German speakers. Its emergence owes much to Russell, Moore, and American Pragmatism, but even more to Frege, Wittgenstein, and the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. No one would think of analytic philosophy as a specifically Anglophone phenomenon, if the Nazis had not driven many of its pioneers out of central Europe.
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39Animals, Thoughts And ConceptsSynthese 123 (1): 35-64. 2000.There are three main positions on animalthought: lingualism denies that non-linguistic animalshave any thoughts; mentalism maintains that theirthoughts differ from ours only in degree, due totheir different perceptual inputs; an intermediateposition, occupied by common sense and Wittgenstein,maintains that animals can have thoughts of a simplekind. This paper argues in favor of an intermediateposition. It considers the most important arguments infavor of lingualism, namely those inspired byDavid…Read more
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30The object of philosophy: Tugendhat’s semantical transformation of ontologyCogito 8 (3): 234-241. 1994.
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18Externalism and First-Person AuthorityThe Monist 78 (4): 515-533. 1995.If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of.
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16Wittgenstein and historyIn Alois Pichler & Simo Säätelä (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works, Ontos. pp. 177-204. 2006.
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67Wittgenstein on truthIn W. Loffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief: Wissen Und Glauben, . pp. 13-31. 2004.
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11Wittgenstein and reasonIn Hans Johann Glock & J. Klagge (eds.), Glock, Hans Johann (2001). Wittgenstein and reason. In: Klagge, J. Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220, . pp. 195-220. 2001.
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62All kinds of nonsenseIn E. Ammereller & E. Fischer (eds.), Glock, Hans Johann (2004). All kinds of nonsense. In: Amareller, E; Fischer, E. Wittgenstein at work: Method in the Philosophical Investigations. London: Routledge, 221-245, . pp. 221-245. 2004.
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23Sir Anthony Kenny is one of the most distinguished and prolific philosophers of our time. In the wide range and historical breadth of his interests, he has influenced many parts of the philosophical landscape, especially in the philosophy of mind and the theory of human action and responsibility. In contrast to many of his contemporaries, who have played down philosophy's debt to its past, Kenny's work has always been rooted in the great tradition of Western philosophical inquiry. Mind, Method a…Read more
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130The normativity of meaning made simpleIn Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophy-Science -Scientific Philosophy, Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP 5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy, Mentis. pp. 219-41. 2005.
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23This paper considers the question of whether there is a human-animal or ‘anthropological difference’. It starts with a historical introduction to the project of philosophical anthropology. Section 2 explains the philosophical quest for an anthropological difference. Sections 3–4 are methodological and explain how philosophical anthropology should be pursued in my view, namely as impure conceptual analysis. The following two sections discuss two fundamental objections to the very idea of such a d…Read more
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13Ramsey and Wittgenstein: Mutual influencesIn M. J. Frapolli & F. P. Ramsey (eds.), Critical Reassessments, . pp. 41-68. 2004.