Hans-Johann Glock

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The debate about concepts has always been shaped by a contrast between subjectivism, which treats them as phenomena in the mind or head of individuals, and objectivism, which insists that they exist independently of individual minds. The most prominent contemporary version of subjectivism is Fodor's RTM. The Fregean charge against subjectivism is that it cannot do justice to the fact that different individuals can share the same concepts. Proponents of RTM have accepted shareability as a 'non-negotiable constraint'. At the same time they insist that by distinguishing between sign-types and -- tokens the Fregean objection cannot just be circumvented but revealed to be fallacious. My paper rehabilitates the Fregean argument against subjectivism. The RTM response rests either on an equivocation of 'concept'--between types which satisfy the non-negotiable constraint and tokens which are mental particulars in line with RTM doctrine--or on the untenable idea that one and the same entity can be both a shareable type and hence abstract and a concrete particular in the head. Furthermore, subjectivism cannot be rescued by adopting unorthodox metaphysical theories about the type/token and universal/particular contrasts. The final section argues that concepts are not representations or signs, but something represented by signs. Even if RTM is right to explain conceptual thinking by reference to the occurrence of mental representations, concepts themselves cannot be identical with such representations

This paper discusses Wittgenstein's ideas about the relation between thought, neurophysiology and language, and about the mental capacities of non-linguistic animals. It deals with his initial espousal and later rejection of a 'language of thought', his arguments against the idea that thought requires a medium of images or words, his reasons for resisting the encephalocentric conception of the mind which dominates contemporary philosophy of mind, his mature views about the connection between thought and language, and his remarks about animals. The aim is not just to get a clear picture of Wittgenstein's position, but also to contrast it with contemporary approaches such as those of Fodor and Searle. While rejecting some of Wittgenstein's claims about the role of the brain, I defend his basic idea, namely that the capacity for entertaining a thought is conceptually tied to the capacity for displaying that thought in behaviour, rather than to the possession of language as such or to the occurrence of specific neurophysiological phenomena

Ce dictionnaire apporte à l'œuvre de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) ce qui était à ses yeux la chose la plus importante en philosophie, une " vue synoptique ". L'œuvre de Wittgenstein, par son style et son inachèvement, demande beaucoup au lecteur. Ce livre est un véritable guide, dressant la carte de sa philosophie, ou plutôt de ses philosophies, puisque Wittgenstein présente le cas unique d'un grand philosophe auteur de deux philosophies, également influentes, et dont la seconde est largement une critique de la première. En soixante-dix-sept entrées, complétées par une " brève biographie intellectuelle " très accessible, le Dictionnaire Wittgenstein de Hans-Johann Glock explique les concepts de base de la pensée du philosophe, présente leur genèse et leur contexte, et livre les clés de son influence dans les débats philosophiques contemporains : la nature du langage et sa place dans la forme de vie humaine, la philosophie de la logique et des mathématiques, l'anthropologie des normes et, enfin, la transformation de la philosophie à l'âge de la science et de la fin de la métaphysique. Combinant notions élémentaires (" jeu de langage ", " grammaire " " forme logique ", etc.) et études détaillées dans tous les domaines abordés par Wittgenstein (par exemple " tautologie ", " non-sens ", " mémoire ", " anthropologie ", " éthique "), il sera utile au débutant comme au spécialiste. Les références nombreuses aux écrits de Wittgenstein et l'index détaillé permettent des parcours variés parmi les questions vives que sa pensée ne cesse de nourrir.

The paper is a reply to the accusation ("Philosophical Quarterly", 44, 1994) that my The Indispensability of Translation' ("Philosophical Quartrely", 43, 1993) misrepresents Davidson's account of radical interpretation. It defends my claim that Davidson assimilates everyday understanding to the interpretation of an alien language, and discusses the ways in which he identifies interpretation with translation. I admit that Davidson has recently acknowledged first person authority concerning speaker's meaning, but show that this is a change of his views. Davidson's position is inconsistent both diachronically and synchronically. One cannot subscribe to most of Quine's paradoxes and still do semantic business as usual

My paper reflects on the debate about reasons for action and action explanations between Wittgensteinian teleological approaches and causalist theories inspired by Davidson. After a brief discussion of similarities and differences in the philosophy of language, I sketch the prehistory and history of the controversy. I show that the conflict between Wittgenstein and Davidson revolves neither around revisionism nor around naturalism. Even in the philosophy of mind and action, Davidson is not as remote from Wittgenstein and his followers as is commonly assumed: there are numerous points of contact of both a biographical and a substantive kind. The real conflict concerns the difference between Davidson’s official subjectivist approach to reasons for action, according to which they are mental states of believing and desiring (or their onsets) on the one hand, and an objectivist approach, according to which reasons for action are what is believed or desired, non-mental facts or states of affairs

This unique study brings together for the first time two of the most important philosophers of this century. Never before have these two thinkers been compared - and commentators' opinions on their relationship differ greatly. Are the views of Wittgenstein and Quine on method and the nature of philosophy comparable or radically opposed? Does Wittgenstein's concept of language engender that of Quine, or threaten its philosophical foundations? An understanding of the similarities and differences between the thought of Wittgenstein and of Quine is essential if we are to have a full picture of contemporary philosophy. This collection of essays offers diverse and original ways in which to view their relationship

According to a venerable tradition in philosophy and linguistics, expressions have meaning through being subject to conventions or rules. This claim has become a central topic of contemporary philosophy of language and mind in the wake of Wittgenstein and Kripke, largely because the normativity of meaning is regarded as a serious challenge to naturalism. One reaction to this challenge is to deny that the normativity of meaning is genuine. While there are ‘semantic principles’ specifying conditions for the correct application of expressions, these are either not genuinely normative or they are not in fact constitutive of meaning. But this dilemma can be defused if one distinguishes different dimensions of semantic normativity and pays attention to different types of mistakes that can afflict linguistic behavior. In particular, one needs to keep apart norms of truth and norms of meaning, regulative, and constitutive rules, and to appreciate the normative dimensions of the notion of correctness. The final section discusses the role of communally shared rules or conventions for language, in particular the age-old problem of circularity: how could such conventions be essential to language, given that the latter appears prerequisite for establishing and communicating conventions in the first place.

This article explores the connections between analytic philosophy and applied ethics — both historical and substantive. Historically speaking, applied ethics is a child of analytic philosophy. It arose as the result of two factors in the 1960s: the re-emergence of normative ethics on the one hand, and urgent social and political challenges on the other. But is there a significant substantive link between applied ethics and analytic philosophy? I argue that applied ethics inherited important ‘analytic’ ideals such as clarity and argumentative rigour. At the same time these ideals are not the exclusive preserve of analytic philosophy and applied ethics. Moreover, they are under threat from various trends within applied ethics. In this context I rebut the allegation that the anti-revisionist reliance on pre-theoretical moral judgements (aka ‘intuitions’) is less rational than their revisionist dismissal. The article ends with a plea for an analytic approach within applied ethics